Determination of the criterion “decisive influence” or controlling interest. There is no basis for a general conclusion that, where two persons have the same ability to influence decision-making, they both exercise joint control. Otherwise, Section 12(2) of the Corporation Tax Act should apply to any case where two or more persons exercise equal control over the management of a company, even if the only way in which decisions could ever be taken in the company is if they are taken in concert. It is not excluded that two persons have established a mechanism for exercising influence on an equal footing precisely in order to ensure that neither has a decisive influence. In order to apply Section 12(2) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax in accordance with its meaning, i.e. to identify cases where the decisive influence of a person has been the basis for entering into transactions which are not in line with market prices, it should be possible to identify a set of circumstances in circumstances of equal influence which makes it possible to consider that two or more persons are acting jointly. Such circumstances may be apparent, inter alia, from the activities of the undertaking over an extended period of time, from the location of the disputed transactions in the context of the other business activities, from the links between the persons concerned, in particular in the long term. Excerpt from the Judgement of the Supreme Court “[16] As can be seen, the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned case did not find any difference in principle between the direct or indirect interpretation of decisive influence contained in the Law on Concerns and other laws. There would be no reason to find such a difference in the present case, since, in view of the general meaning of the concept of decisive influence, it must be established that one person can take decisions (control) in relation to the company and, in the absence of specific agreements on other arrangements, such a situation must be established in the first place by a participation, from which, in ordinary cases, further derive the corresponding voting rights and the possibility to appoint and dismiss the management body. The Regional Court, too, in interpreting Article 1(12) of the Credit Institutions Law and concluding that decisive influence means the ability to control the decisions of the governing body of the company with regard to the conclusion of economic transactions and their value, has not in fact changed this general understanding, i.e. it has emphasised the ability to control decision-making. Moreover, any interpretation of the concept of ‘decisive influence’ cannot contradict its immediate general meaning, namely that the person concerned has the power to make a difference in the decision-making, in the determination of issues. In accordance with the general principles of commercial companies, this will normally be secured by an appropriate share in the share capital. At the same time, it should be noted that the Regional Court has used the concept (control) explained in Article 1(12) of the Credit Institutions Law to explain the concept of “decisive influence”, which is used in the provision as a means of clarification, but insofar as it does not detract from the meaning – the characteristic of being able to decisively influence decisions – the interpretation is not incorrect. One can agree with the representative of the State Revenue Service at the hearing that it is important to apply the concept of ‘decisive influence’ contained in Section 1(5) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax in its own right in accordance with its meaning. [17] The judgment of the District Court, after a legal analysis, further assesses the circumstances of the case. The Court finds that the status of the members of the applicant’s board of directors in the applicant, as well as their participation in the capital of the applicant’s parent company (50 per cent each) and their status as members of the parent company’s board of directors, created a set of circumstances which ensured decisive influence over the applicant and the ability to exercise (joint) control over the applicant. It follows from the above that the Regional Court, although it had previously examined the question of the elements of decisive influence of a single person, reached its conclusion by finding that two persons exercised control jointly. The assessment is thus based on an aspect which goes beyond the concept of decisive influence as contained in the Law on Concerns and the Law on Credit Institutions. The question of joint control requires consideration of whether decisive influence can be said to exist even if each person individually does not formally possess it under either definition and whether it is possible to consider the possibility of control by those persons together. The conclusion that, where two persons have the same ability to influence decision-making, they both exercise joint control is not self-evident. Otherwise, Section 12(2) of the Corporation Tax Act should apply to any case where two or more persons exercise equal control over the management of a company, even if the only way in which decisions could ever be taken in the company is by a decision agreed between them. It is not excluded that two persons have established a mechanism for exercising influence on an equal footing precisely in order to ensure that neither has a decisive influence. [18] At the same time, it cannot be excluded that, in a situation of equal influence, more than one person knowingly implements a common economic plan with a common objective, and it is precisely this conscious cooperation which makes it safe to assume that one person can count on the other in decision-making. That is to say, a plan or objective and the cooperation within it make it possible to regard them as a single entity. [19] In order to apply Section 12(2) of the Law on Corporation Tax in accordance with its meaning, namely to identify cases where the decisive influence of a person has been the ...