The French company SMAP carries out activities in the area of advertising management and organisation of trade fairs. Following an audit of the company for FY 2008 to 2011 and assessment was issued where deduction of costs for certain intra group “services” had been denied, resulting in additional value added tax, corporate income tax surcharges, apprenticeship tax and business value added tax. The company held that the tax administration had disregarded fiscal procedures, and that the reality of the services – and deductibility of the costs – cannot be disregarded on mere presumptions. Decision of the Court The Appeal of SARL SMAP was rejected by the Court. “Firstly, the administration notes that by virtue of a Lebanese legislative decree n° 46 of 24th June 1983, companies governed by Lebanese law … carrying out their essential activities outside the national territory are considered as offshore companies and as such benefit from a privileged tax regime. In particular, Article 4 of this legislative decree exempts these companies from the tax on the annual profits of joint stock companies. As mentioned in point 6, the activities of APCOM, as they are only covered by the 2004 contracts signed with SMAP SARL, concern administrative and financial services and commercial representation activities for companies not domiciled in Lebanon, and are therefore subject to the provisions of the Legislative Decree No. 46 of 24 June 1983. By merely maintaining that the company APCOM paid taxes in Lebanon, without producing any documents in support of its allegations, the applicant did not usefully contest the elements put forward by the administration. The latter must, therefore, be regarded as establishing that APCOM benefits from a privileged tax regime in Lebanon. It was therefore not required to establish the existence of a link of dependence between the two companies.” “…the claimant has not produced any documents to establish the reality of the services that APCOM performs on behalf of SMAP. Finally, the APCOM supplier account opened in the accounts of SMAP SARL functions as a partner’s current account. A transfer of 25,982 euros to SMAP was also entered there under the heading “loan repayment”, without any explanation being given by the applicant. Under these conditions, the administration must be considered as having produced elements likely to establish that the sums paid by SMAP SARL to APCOM constituted pure generosity granted in an interest other than that of the applicant company.” “…in order to establish the link of dependence between the applicant company and SMAP EXPO SL, the administration relies on the circumstance that the two companies shared the same director. Moreover, it is clear from the terms of the two proposed corrections that the administration also noted that the Spanish company, a sister company to SMAP EXPO S.L., had been the applicant company’s director.” “SARL SMAP, which does not have the material and human resources necessary to carry out its activity of organising trade fairs in Spain, relies on those of the applicant company. In these circumstances, the administration must be considered as establishing the link of dependence between the applicant and SMAP EXPO SL.” “As stated in paragraph 7, there is no evidence to establish the reality of the services which would have been provided by SMAP EXPO SL to SMAP SARL. Moreover, the applicant does not contest the transfer of profits to SMAP EXPO SL.” “It follows from what has just been said in the preceding points that the plea alleging that the administration has disregarded the provisions of Article 57 of the General Tax Code must be dismissed.” “It follows from all of the foregoing that SMAP SARL is not entitled to argue that the Montreuil Administrative Court wrongly rejected its claims in the contested judgment”. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Maderas Anchile exported wood chips to a Japanese corporation, Itochu, which indirectly owned 9.8499% of the shares in Maderas Anchile through another company, Forestal Anchile. At issue was whether these transactions between Maderas Anchile and Itochu were controlled. Based on the wording of the transfer pricing provisions in force at the time (Article 38 of the LIR), the tax authorities concluded that the transactions were controlled, and had issued a transfer pricing adjustment based on this assumption. >Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court applied a restrictive interpretation of the rule in article 38 of the LIR and decided in favour of Maderas Anchile. Excerpts “Ninth: That with regard to the validity of assessment No. 35, issued to Daio Paper Corporation, it is consequential to those affecting Maderas Anchile, and therefore, since the existence of transfer prices lower than those that would be set between independent companies has not been established, there are no tax differences in favour of the Treasury or sums that could be considered withdrawn by Daio Paper, in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the Income Tax Law. Tenth: That the judgment of appeal added that the hypotheses of “relationship” are not limited or restricted by the assumptions of relationship contained in Laws Nos. 18.045 and 18.046, because it is legally improper for the Internal Revenue Service to limit or restrict the express will of the legislator. In any case, Circular No. 3 of the Internal Revenue Service of 6 January 1998, which gives instructions on the amendments introduced to article 38 of the Income Tax Law by Law No. 19.506, does not indicate that this was the intention of the administration. But what is missing in this case is the basic assumption of “relationship”, which is the control exercised by one company over the other and which ultimately influences the determination of transfer prices. Eleventh: As can be seen, the point on which the liquidations are based arises from the text of article 38, third paragraph, of the Income Tax Law, modified by Law No. 19.506, of 30 July 1997, which at the time the audited operations took place, was as follows: “…. When the prices charged by the agency or branch to its parent company or to another agency or related company of the parent company are not in line with the values charged for similar operations between independent companies, the Regional Directorate may challenge them, taking as a reference basis for such prices a reasonable profitability for the characteristics of the operation, or the production costs plus a reasonable profit margin…”. Consequently, it was necessary to elucidate whether there was a “relationship” between the companies that carried out the audited and liquidated acts, for which reason it was reasoned about the elements provided by the precept to define whether there were operations carried out by related entities and, if so, whether the values charged by Maderas Anchile to Itochu Corporation were equivalent to those that in similar operations would be agreed between independent companies. Twelfth: That in the preceding grounds it has been described how the judges were convinced that these were not related companies, so that the challenge of the Internal Revenue Service was not founded, in fact and in law, because the assumptions for the application of article 38 of the Income Tax Law were not met. Thirteenth: That without prejudice to this, although unnecessary, the judgement also declared that the price was not influenced by the alleged relationship between the contracting companies, since the price stipulated in the audited operations corresponded to those that could be legitimately fixed by independent companies, a conclusion that arose from the inaccuracies of the Service, reflected in the liquidations, when assessing the transfer price. Fourteenth: That in the situation described above, it is not possible to see how the infringements of the rules that the appeal points out could occur, since neither the “relationship” nor the fixing of a transfer price lower than that of the same market developed by independent companies has been declared, which arose from the application of the rule of article 132, paragraph 14 of the Tax Code, a precept that has not been denounced as having been transgressed. Fifteenth: That in this way, the factual conclusions reached by the first instance judge, which the second instance judges adopted, appear to be in accordance with the merits of the proceedings and cannot be altered in cassation if it has not been demonstrated that the laws regulating evidence have been violated in order to establish the facts that were decisive to accept the claims in the case.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Determination of the criterion “decisive influence” or controlling interest. There is no basis for a general conclusion that, where two persons have the same ability to influence decision-making, they both exercise joint control. Otherwise, Section 12(2) of the Corporation Tax Act should apply to any case where two or more persons exercise equal control over the management of a company, even if the only way in which decisions could ever be taken in the company is if they are taken in concert. It is not excluded that two persons have established a mechanism for exercising influence on an equal footing precisely in order to ensure that neither has a decisive influence. In order to apply Section 12(2) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax in accordance with its meaning, i.e. to identify cases where the decisive influence of a person has been the basis for entering into transactions which are not in line with market prices, it should be possible to identify a set of circumstances in circumstances of equal influence which makes it possible to consider that two or more persons are acting jointly. Such circumstances may be apparent, inter alia, from the activities of the undertaking over an extended period of time, from the location of the disputed transactions in the context of the other business activities, from the links between the persons concerned, in particular in the long term. Excerpt from the Judgement of the Supreme Court “[16] As can be seen, the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned case did not find any difference in principle between the direct or indirect interpretation of decisive influence contained in the Law on Concerns and other laws. There would be no reason to find such a difference in the present case, since, in view of the general meaning of the concept of decisive influence, it must be established that one person can take decisions (control) in relation to the company and, in the absence of specific agreements on other arrangements, such a situation must be established in the first place by a participation, from which, in ordinary cases, further derive the corresponding voting rights and the possibility to appoint and dismiss the management body. The Regional Court, too, in interpreting Article 1(12) of the Credit Institutions Law and concluding that decisive influence means the ability to control the decisions of the governing body of the company with regard to the conclusion of economic transactions and their value, has not in fact changed this general understanding, i.e. it has emphasised the ability to control decision-making. Moreover, any interpretation of the concept of ‘decisive influence’ cannot contradict its immediate general meaning, namely that the person concerned has the power to make a difference in the decision-making, in the determination of issues. In accordance with the general principles of commercial companies, this will normally be secured by an appropriate share in the share capital. At the same time, it should be noted that the Regional Court has used the concept (control) explained in Article 1(12) of the Credit Institutions Law to explain the concept of “decisive influence”, which is used in the provision as a means of clarification, but insofar as it does not detract from the meaning – the characteristic of being able to decisively influence decisions – the interpretation is not incorrect. One can agree with the representative of the State Revenue Service at the hearing that it is important to apply the concept of ‘decisive influence’ contained in Section 1(5) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax in its own right in accordance with its meaning. [17] The judgment of the District Court, after a legal analysis, further assesses the circumstances of the case. The Court finds that the status of the members of the applicant’s board of directors in the applicant, as well as their participation in the capital of the applicant’s parent company (50 per cent each) and their status as members of the parent company’s board of directors, created a set of circumstances which ensured decisive influence over the applicant and the ability to exercise (joint) control over the applicant. It follows from the above that the Regional Court, although it had previously examined the question of the elements of decisive influence of a single person, reached its conclusion by finding that two persons exercised control jointly. The assessment is thus based on an aspect which goes beyond the concept of decisive influence as contained in the Law on Concerns and the Law on Credit Institutions. The question of joint control requires consideration of whether decisive influence can be said to exist even if each person individually does not formally possess it under either definition and whether it is possible to consider the possibility of control by those persons together. The conclusion that, where two persons have the same ability to influence decision-making, they both exercise joint control is not self-evident. Otherwise, Section 12(2) of the Corporation Tax Act should apply to any case where two or more persons exercise equal control over the management of a company, even if the only way in which decisions could ever be taken in the company is by a decision agreed between them. It is not excluded that two persons have established a mechanism for exercising influence on an equal footing precisely in order to ensure that neither has a decisive influence. [18] At the same time, it cannot be excluded that, in a situation of equal influence, more than one person knowingly implements a common economic plan with a common objective, and it is precisely this conscious cooperation which makes it safe to assume that one person can count on the other in decision-making. That is to say, a plan or objective and the cooperation within it make it possible to regard them as a single entity. [19] In order to apply Section 12(2) of the Law on Corporation Tax in accordance with its meaning, namely to identify cases where the decisive influence of a person has been the ...