Since 2012, the French company SASU Alchimedics has been owned by Sinomed Holding Ltd, the holding company of a group of the same name set up by a Chinese resident domiciled in the British Virgin Islands. SASU Alchimedics was engaged in the manufacture and marketing of products using electro-grafting technology for biomedical applications and the licensing and assignment of patents in the field of electro-grafting technologies. SASU Alchimedics was subject to an audit for the financial years 2014 and 2015, as a result of which the tax authorities increased its income for the financial years ended 31 December 2013, 2014 and 2015 by the price of services not invoiced to Sinomed Holding Ltd. In addition, the non-invoicing of these services was considered to be a transfer of profits abroad within the meaning of Article 57 of the French General Tax Code and the amounts were therefore also subject to withholding tax. The tax authorities considered that SASU Alchimedics had committed an abnormal act of management by not re-invoicing to its parent company the services provided in connection with the “development and defence of patents”. The price of the services reintegrated as an indirect transfer of profits was determined by applying to the amount of the expenses recorded a cost plus 5%, considered to be a normal margin. These amounts were used as the basis for calculating the withholding tax, which is the only issue in this case. SASU Alchimedics appealed against the assessment and, by judgment of 2 December 2002, the Administrative Court rejected its application for a refund of the withholding tax. An appeal was then lodged with the Administrative Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court The Administratibe Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the Administrative Court and decided in favor of SASU Alchimedics. Excerpts in English “… 6. In order to justify the existence of an advantage to the company, constituting an indirect transfer of profits, granted to Sinomed Holding Ltd, the tax authorities note that SASU Alchimedics is the owner of patents attached to a business acquired in 2007, and of an exclusive licence on patents and other intangible rights acquired, the same year, from the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and that it entered into an agreement, on 1 June 2007, with Sinomed Holding Ltd, which will become its parent company, and Beijing Sun Technologie Inc, a company incorporated under Chinese law, owned by Sinomed Holding Ltd, which will become its sister company, a patent licence and sub-licence agreement granting them a perpetual licence for the techniques developed by Sinomed Holding Ltd in return for a one-off payment of 9,530,000 euros. The French tax authorities argued that it was not normal for SASU Alchimedics, following the technology transfer agreement of 1 April 2007, to bear the cost of registering and maintaining the patents and licences alone, without any “financial guarantee in the event of successful marketing of the related products, particularly on the European and American markets”, whereas Sinomed Holding Ltd, which now controls the strategy of the companies it owns, stands to benefit from any future successes and is in a position to prevent it from transferring its assets to a third party. It deduced that by not re-invoicing its parent company, Sinomed Holding Ltd, for services provided in relation to “the development and defence of patents”, despite the fact that it had always been in a loss-making position, SASU Alchimedics had granted an undue advantage to its parent company, constituting an abnormal management practice and an indirect transfer of profits abroad. 7. However, the tax authorities do not dispute that, as SASU Alchimedics points out on appeal, the costs of maintaining and protecting the patents, which were expensed, were its responsibility under the terms of the contract entered into in 2007, which it does not claim was no longer in force. Nor does it dispute that the research expenses invoiced by Beyond and Université Paris-Diderot, and the overheads deducted as expenses, were incurred in the interests of SASU Alchimedics. The fact that this company has a chronic deficit does not, in itself, justify the increase in operating income, nor does the fact that an asset is insufficiently profitable constitute, in itself, an abnormal act of management. The tax authorities have failed to identify the “patent valuation and defence” service that they claim to have identified for the benefit of Sinomed Holding Ltd and the exact nature of the advantage that they intend to impose, and have failed to demonstrate under what obligation SASU Alchimedics should have re-invoiced this company for these expenses. The fact that SASU Alchimedics does not have control over its strategy is not, in itself, a decisive argument proving the reality of services provided for the benefit of Sinomed Holding Ltd. Moreover, the contract concluded with this company and with the company that was to become its sister company was signed in 2007 at a time when it is not alleged that SASU Alchimedics was dependent on Sinomed Holding Ltd, and the investigation shows that SASU Alchimedics did in fact benefit from the patent concessions and sub-concessions, which were remunerated in the form of a single payment in 2007. Lastly, although the French tax authorities invoke the prospect of marketing in Europe and the United States the products already developed by the Sinomed group, and in particular by the Chinese company Sino Medical, under the contract concluded in 2007, during the period in dispute there was nothing to require SASU Alchimedics to have signed a contract with its parent company to have the latter bear the costs of maintaining, registering and defending the patents and licences of which it remained the owner and which are not yet used on its continents, where they were not registered. 8. In these circumstances, the French tax authorities have not established the existence of an advantage granted by SASU Alchimedics to Sinomed Holding Ltd and, consequently, of a practice falling within the scope of Article 57 of the French General Tax Code ...

Italien fashion group, Dolce & Gabbana s.r.l. (hereinafter DG s.r.l.), the licensee of the Dolce&Gabbana trademark, entered into a sub-licensing agreement with its subsidiary Dolce&Gabbana Industria (hereinafter DG Industria or Industria) whereby the former granted to the latter the right to produce, distribute and sell products bearing the well-known trademark throughout the world and undertook to carry out promotion and marketing activities in return for royalties. DG s.r.l., in order to carry out promotion and marketing activities in the U.S.A., made use of the company Dolce&Gabbana Usa Inc. (hereinafter DG Usa) with contracts in force since 2002; in particular, on March 16, 2005, it entered into a service agreement whereby DG Usa undertook to provide the aforesaid services in return for an annual fee payable by DG s.r.l.; this consideration is determined on the basis of the costs analytically attributable to the provision of the agreed services in addition to a mark up, i.e. a mark-up, determined in a variable percentage based on the amount of the cost. In order to verify the fairness of the consideration, the parties have provided for the obligation of analytical reporting as well as an amicable settlement procedure through an auditing company. Lastly, DG s.r.l., DG Usa and DG Industria entered into another agreement, supply agreement, whereby DG Industria appointed DG Usa as its distributor for the USA in mono-brand shops, DG Usa committed to DG s.r.l. to adapt the shops to its high quality standards functional to increasing brand awareness, and DG s.r.l. committed to pay a service fee. The service contribution was recognised in relation to the costs exceeding a percentage of the turnover realised through the mono-brand sales outlets. In the course of an audit, the Italian Revenue Agency made the following findings in relation to the tax year 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005: first, it denied the deductibility from the taxable income for IRES and IRAP purposes of part of the fees paid by DG s.r.l. to DG USA under the service contract and precisely: a) of the costs of certain services (in particular, it recognised the costs for commercial sales, executive consultant, advertising Madison sales, advertising all others and not the others), because, provided that these were generic services, falling within the normal activity of the reseller of goods, remunerated by the resale margin, and that the reimbursable costs were defined generically, without provision of a ceiling, a reporting method and prior approval by DG s.r.l., it pointed out that it could only recognise the costs rendered in the interest >>also of the parent company<<; b) the portion corresponding to the chargeback of the mark-up, referring to Revenue Agency Circular No. 32/80 on intra-group services, where it provides that the mark-up in favour of the service provider is recognisable only where the services constitute the typical activity of the service provider and not for those services rendered by the parent company that have no market value or are attributable to the general management or administrative activity of the parent company; secondly, it denied the deductibility of the consideration paid by DG s.r.l. to DG Usa under the supply agreement, pointing out that the costs to be considered for the purposes of the contribution would be generically identified, there would be no obligation of adequate reporting or prior approval, which would in fact transfer to DG s.r.l. the risk of substantial inefficiencies of DG Usa, a risk that no independent third party would have assumed, and that the party had not adequately demonstrated that the costs corresponded to the normal value of the costs inasmuch as the documentation produced, relating to other fashion groups, concerned persons who were also owners of the mark, directly interested in its development and promotion. DG s.r.l. brought an appeal before the Provincial Tax Commission of Milan, which rejected it. An appeal was then brought before the Regional Tax Commission of Lombardy which was likewise rejected. In particular, the Regional Tax Commission, for what is relevant herein rejected the preliminary objections (failure to contest the recovery by means of a report; insufficiency and contradictory motivation); reconstructed the subject matter of the dispute, pointing out that the Agency had contested some costs of the service agreement, excluding their inherent nature; for the costs deemed inherent, it had recalculated the amount, excluding the mark-up; for the supply agreement, it had re-taxed the costs, excluding their deductibility due to lack of inherent nature in relation to the service agreement, it confirmed that the costs for the excluded services were not inherent, because: a) DG Usa also carried out activities pertaining to the retailer DG Industria, distributor of Dolce&Gabbana branded products in the U.S. and the costs were connected to this marketing activity; b) the correlation deducted by the company between the costs recharged to DG s.r.l. and the revenues that the latter obtains as a result of the royalties paid by DG Industria, because the costs connected to services intended to increase sales are those of the retailer and not of the licensee of the trademark, to which are inherent only the costs intended to increase the prestige of the trademark itself; c) the costs incurred in the interest of both DG s.r.l. and DG Usa is not relevant and the only cost items recognisable in favour of the former are those pertaining exclusively to its relevance; d) for the purpose of proving congruity, the expert’s report by Prof. Lorenzo Pozza and the certification by Mahoney Cohen & company were irrelevant, since they were mere opinions that were not binding on the administration; (e) the mark up was not deductible since the services rendered by DG USA were rendered in the interest of both DG s.r.l., licensee of the mark, and DG Industria, reseller, and it was not possible to take into consideration the actions of the latter in favour of Itierre s.p.a., reseller and therefore different from DG s.r.l.; (f) the recharging of costs to DG s.r.l. was formally obligatory in the antero but largely ...

While as a matter of principle tax administrations and taxpayers should try to establish the proper arm’s length pricing, it should not be overlooked that there may be practical reasons why a tax administration in its discretion exceptionally might be willing to forgo computing and taxing an arm’s length price from the performance of services in some cases, as distinct from allowing a taxpayer in appropriate circumstances to merely allocate the costs of providing those services. For instance, a cost-benefit analysis might indicate the additional tax revenue that would be collected does not justify the costs and administrative burdens of determining what an appropriate arm’s length price might be in some cases. In such cases, charging all relevant costs rather than an arm’s length price may provide a satisfactory result for MNEs and tax administrations. This concession is unlikely to be made by tax administrations where the provision of a service is a principal activity of the associated enterprise, where the profit element is relatively significant, or where direct charging is possible as a basis from which to determine the arm’s length price ...

When an associated enterprise is acting only as an agent or intermediary in the provision of services, it is important in applying the cost-plus method that the return or mark-up is appropriate for the performance of an agency function rather than for the performance of the services themselves. In such a case, it may not be appropriate to determine arm’s length pricing as a mark-up on the cost of the services but rather on the costs of the agency function itself, or alternatively, depending on the type of comparable data being used, the mark-up on the cost of services should be lower than would be appropriate for the performance of the services themselves. For example, an associated enterprise may incur the costs of renting advertising space on behalf of group members, costs that the group members would have incurred directly had they been independent. In such a case, it may well be appropriate to pass on these costs to the group recipients without a mark-up, and to apply a mark-up only to the costs incurred by the intermediary in performing its agency function ...

Where the cost plus method is determined to be the most appropriate method to the circumstances of the case, the analysis would require examining whether the costs incurred by the group service provider need some adjustment to make the comparison of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions reliable. For example, if the controlled transaction has a higher proportion of overhead costs to direct costs than the otherwise comparable transaction, it may be inappropriate to apply the mark-up achieved in that transaction without adjusting the cost base of the associated enterprise to make a valid comparison. In some cases, the costs that would be incurred by the recipient were it to perform the service for itself may be instructive of the type of arrangement an recipient would be prepared to accept for the service in dealing at arm’s length ...

For example, it may be the case that the market value of intra- group services is not greater than the costs incurred by the service provider. This could occur where, for example, the service is not an ordinary or recurrent activity of the service provider but is offered incidentally as a convenience to the MNE group. In determining whether the intra-group services represent the same value for money as could be obtained from an independent enterprise, a comparison of functions and expected benefits would be relevant to assessing comparability of the transactions. An MNE group may still determine to provide the service intra-group rather than using a third party for a variety of reasons, perhaps because of other intra- group benefits (for which arm’s length compensation may be appropriate). It would not be appropriate in such a case to increase the price for the service above what would be established by the CUP method just to make sure the associated enterprise makes a profit. Such a result would be contrary to the arm’s length principle. However, it is important to ensure that all benefits to the recipient are properly taken into account ...

Depending on the method being used to establish an arm’s length charge for intra-group services, the issue may arise whether it is necessary that the charge be such that it results in a profit for the service provider. In an arm’s length transaction, an independent enterprise normally would seek to charge for services in such a way as to generate profit, rather than providing the services merely at cost. The economic alternatives available to the recipient of the service also need to be taken into account in determining the arm’s length charge. However, there are circumstances (e.g. as outlined in the discussion on business strategies in Chapter I) in which an independent enterprise may not realise a profit from the performance of service activities alone, for example where a supplier’s costs (anticipated or actual) exceed market price but the supplier agrees to provide the service to increase its profitability, perhaps by complementing its range of activities. Therefore, it need not always be the case that an arm’s length price will result in a profit for an associated enterprise that is performing an intra– group service ...

It may be helpful to perform a functional analysis of the various members of the group to establish the relationship between the relevant services and the members’ activities and performance. In addition, it may be necessary to consider not only the immediate impact of a service, but also its long-term effect, bearing in mind that some costs will never actually produce the benefits that were reasonably expected when they were incurred. For example, expenditure on preparations for a marketing operation might prima facie be too heavy to be borne by a member in the light of its current resources; the determination whether the charge in such a case is arm’s length should consider expected benefits from the operation and the possibility that the amount and timing of the charge in some arm’s length arrangements might depend on the results of the operation. The taxpayer should be prepared to demonstrate the reasonableness of its charges to associated enterprises in such cases ...

The method to be used to determine arm’s length transfer pricing for intra-group services should be determined according to the guidelines in Chapters I, II, and III. Often, the application of these guidelines will lead to use of the CUP or cost plus method for pricing intra-group services. A CUP method is likely to be the most appropriate method where there is a comparable service provided between independent enterprises in the recipient’s market, or by the associated enterprise providing the services to an independent enterprise in comparable circumstances. For example, this might be the case where accounting, auditing, legal, or computer services are being provided subject to the controlled and uncontrolled transactions being comparable. A cost plus method would likely be the most appropriate method in the absence of a CUP where the nature of the activities involved, assets used, and risks assumed are comparable to those undertaken by independent enterprises. As indicated in Chapter II, Part II, in applying the cost plus method, there should be a consistency between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions in the categories of cost that are included. Transactional profit methods may be used where they are the most appropriate to the circumstances of the case (see paragraphs 2.1-2.11). In exceptional cases, for example where it may be difficult to apply the CUP method or the cost-plus method, it may be helpful to take account of more than one method (see paragraph 2.11) in reaching a satisfactory determination of arm’s length pricing ...

For example, from the perspective of an independent enterprise seeking a service, the service providers in that market may or may not be willing or able to supply the service at a price that the independent enterprise is prepared to pay. If the service providers can supply the wanted service within a range of prices that the independent enterprise would be prepared to pay, then a deal will be struck. From the point of view of the service provider, a price below which it would not supply the service and the cost to it are relevant considerations to address, but they are not necessarily determinative of the outcome in every case ...

In trying to determine the arm’s length price in relation to intra- group services, the matter should be considered both from the perspective of the service provider and from the perspective of the recipient of the service. In this respect, relevant considerations include the value of the service to the recipient and how much a comparable independent enterprise would be prepared to pay for that service in comparable circumstances, as well as the costs to the service provider ...

In identifying arrangements for charging any retainer for the provision of “on call” services (as discussed in paragraphs 7.16 and 7.17), it may be necessary to examine the terms for the actual use of the services since these may include provisions that no charge is made for actual use until the level of usage exceeds a predetermined level ...

When an indirect charge method is used, the relationship between the charge and the services provided may be obscured and it may become difficult to evaluate the benefit provided. Indeed, it may mean that the enterprise being charged for a service itself has not related the charge to the service. Consequently, there is an increased risk of double taxation because it may be more difficult to determine a deduction for costs incurred on behalf of group members if compensation cannot be readily identified, or for the recipient of the service to establish a deduction for any amount paid if it is unable to demonstrate that services have been provided ...

The compensation for services rendered to an associated enterprise may be included in the price for other transfers. For instance, the price for licensing a patent or know-how may include a payment for technical assistance services or centralised services performed for the licensee or for managerial advice on the marketing of the goods produced under the licence. In such cases, the tax administration and the taxpayers would have to check that there is no additional service fee charged and that there is no double deduction ...

The allocation might be based on turnover, or staff employed, or some other basis. Whether the allocation method is appropriate may depend on the nature and usage of the service. For example, the usage or provision of payroll services may be more related to the number of staff than to turnover, while the allocation of the stand-by costs of priority computer back-up could be allocated in proportion to relative expenditure on computer equipment by the group members ...

In some cases, an indirect charge method may be necessary due to the nature of the service being provided. One example is where the proportion of the value of the services rendered to the various relevant entities cannot be quantified except on an approximate or estimated basis. This problem may occur, for example, where sales promotion activities carried on centrally (e.g. at international fairs, in the international press, or through other centralised advertising campaigns) may affect the quantity of goods manufactured or sold by a number of affiliates. Another case is where a separate recording and analysis of the relevant service activities for each beneficiary would involve a burden of administrative work that would be disproportionately heavy in relation to the activities themselves. In such cases, the charge could be determined by reference to an allocation among all potential beneficiaries of the costs that cannot be allocated directly, i.e. costs that cannot be specifically assigned to the actual beneficiaries of the various services. To satisfy the arm’s length principle, the allocation method chosen must lead to a result that is consistent with what comparable independent enterprises would have been prepared to accept. See Section B.2.3 ...

In such cases, MNE groups may find they have few alternatives but to use cost allocation and apportionment methods which often necessitate some degree of estimation or approximation, as a basis for calculating an arm’s length charge following the principles in Section B.2.3 below. Such methods are generally referred to as indirect-charge methods and should be allowable provided sufficient regard has been given to the value of the services to recipients and the extent to which comparable services are provided between independent enterprises. These methods of calculating charges would generally not be acceptable where specific services that form a main business activity of the enterprise are provided not only to associated enterprises but also to independent parties. While every attempt should be made to charge fairly for the service provided, any charging has to be supported by an identifiable and reasonably foreseeable benefit. Any indirect-charge method should be sensitive to the commercial features of the individual case (e.g. the allocation key makes sense under the circumstances), contain safeguards against manipulation and follow sound accounting principles, and be capable of producing charges or allocations of costs that are commensurate with the actual or reasonably expected benefits to the recipient of the service ...

A direct-charge method for charging for intra-group services is so difficult to apply in practice in many cases for MNE groups that such groups have developed other methods for charging for services provided by parent companies or group service centres. In these cases, the practice of MNE groups for charging for intra-group services is often to make arrangements that are either a) readily identifiable but not based on a direct-charge method; or b) not readily identifiable and either incorporated into the charge for other transfers, allocated amongst group members on some basis, or in some cases not allocated amongst group members at all ...

An MNE group should often be able to adopt direct charging arrangements, particularly where services similar to those rendered to associated enterprises are also rendered to independent parties. If specific services are provided not only to associated enterprises but also to independent enterprises in a comparable manner and as a significant part of its business, it could be presumed that the MNE has the ability to demonstrate a separate basis for the charge (e.g. by recording the work done and costs expended in fulfilling its third party contracts). As a result, MNEs in such a case are encouraged to adopt the direct-charge method in relation to their transactions with associated enterprises. It is accepted, however, that this approach may not always be appropriate if, for example, the services to independent parties are merely occasional or marginal ...

To identify the amount, if any, that has actually been charged for services, a tax administration will need to identify what arrangements, if any, have actually been put in place between the associated enterprises to facilitate charges being made for the provision of services between them. In certain cases, the arrangements made for charging for intra-group services can be readily identified. These cases are where the MNE group uses a direct-charge method, i.e. where the associated enterprises are charged for specific services. In general, the direct-charge method is of great practical convenience to tax administrations because it allows the service performed and the basis for the payment to be clearly identified. Thus, the direct-charge method facilitates the determination of whether the charge is consistent with the arm’s length principle ...

Once it is determined that an intra-group service has been rendered, it is necessary, as for other types of intra-group transfers, to determine whether the amount of the charge, if any, is in accordance with the arm’s length principle. This means that the charge for intra-group services should be that which would have been made and accepted between independent enterprises in comparable circumstances. Consequently, such transactions should not be treated differently for tax purposes from comparable transactions between independent enterprises, simply because the transactions are between enterprises that happen to be associated ...

The fact that a payment was made to an associated enterprise for purported services can be useful in determining whether services were in fact provided, but the mere description of a payment as, for example, “management fees” should not be expected to be treated as prima facie evidence that such services have been rendered. At the same time, the absence of payments or contractual agreements does not automatically lead to the conclusion that no intra-group services have been rendered ...