UN Manual on Transfer Pricing (2017)

C.4. Dispute Avoidance and Resolution



C .4 .1 .       Introduction

C.4.1.1.                         Dispute avoidance and resolution procedures are essential to the effective and efficient functioning of all tax administrations. Such procedures, if properly designed and implemented, can enable fair and expeditious resolution of differences between tax administrations and taxpayers regarding interpretation and application of the relevant tax laws. They can help reduce the uncertainty, expense and delay associated with a general resort to litigation on tax matters or a failure to provide any recourse. They can also avoid integrity issues that might sometimes arise in case of an over-reliance on ad hoc (case by case) settlements. For the reasons mentioned above dispute avoidance and resolution procedures are of critical importance to taxpayers and access to effective procedures is therefore a key consideration for taxpayers.

C.4.1.2.                         The goal of dispute avoidance and resolution procedures is to facilitate the efficient and equitable determination and collection of tax revenues that are properly due. Ideally, this determination and collection should be done in ways that minimize controversy, cost, uncertainty and delay for both tax administrations and taxpayers. The most efficient method of addressing disputes is to prevent them from arising. Tax administrations seeking to use their resources most efficiently should therefore probably focus in the first instance on procedures for avoiding disputes while subsequently ensuring that appropriate dispute resolution procedures are available, should they become necessary.

C.4.1.3.                         In the cross-border context, dispute avoidance and resolution procedures are particularly important to avoid double taxation of the same income for a taxpayer or for associated enterprises. These procedures can also help avoid the imposition of tax not in accordance with the provisions of the applicable tax treaty, if any. When a tax treaty applies both tax administrations involved in a tax dispute ought to give effect to the provisions of that tax treaty and ought to provide rules and procedures for departing from the domestic law result where necessary to resolve disputes.

C .4 .2 .       Special Considerations for Developing Countries

C.4.2.1.                         The number of Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) disputes worldwide has been rising rapidly according to the MAP data for OECD countries and some partner economies available at the OECD website.101. However, tax administrations often face resource limitations regarding the handling of (cross-border) tax disputes and such limitations may be even greater for the tax administrations of many developing countries. Such limitations may affect staffing levels, training budgets, access to commercial databases needed for transfer pricing analyzes and other research materials, access to outside experts, travel funding and other factors. It should be recognized that such resource limitations may put tax administrations at a real (or perceived) disadvantage when dealing with better-resourced administrations. It is thus particularly important for developing countries that dispute avoidance and resolution procedures be designed to operate as efficiently as possible, to minimize the demand on tax administration resources. Efficient dispute avoidance and resolution procedures should benefit taxpayers as well. Access to properly functioning dispute avoidance and resolution procedures is particularly important for multinational enterprises as they are called on to comply with the tax laws and reporting requirements of many dozens of countries and may need to address any audits or disputes that may arise in any of the countries where they do business.

C.4.2.2.                         There are various administrative procedures that could be applied to minimize transfer pricing disputes and to help resolve them when they do arise between taxpayers and their administrations, and between different tax administrations. As indicated earlier, where two or more tax administrations take different positions in determining arm’s length conditions, double taxation may occur. This means that the same income is included in the taxable base by more than one tax administration. Double taxation is undesirable and should be eliminated wherever possible, because it constitutes a potential barrier to development of international trade and stated investment flows.

C.4.2.3.                         This chapter discusses several administrative approaches to resolving disputes caused by transfer pricing adjustments and for avoiding double taxation. The respective procedures all call upon domestic tax administration resources. If resource mobilization is a key concern or limiting factor for a country’s tax administration it should consider the approaches that can be realistically made available, are appropriate, and investments that may be required to expand the available dispute resolution procedures.

C .4 .3 . Dispute Avoidance Procedures: Domestic

C.4.3.1.     Legislation and Guidance

C.            As in other areas of the law, clear guidance in advance regarding any legal transfer pricing requirements that apply can serve to reduce tax disputes. This is equally important both for tax administrations, which need such guidance to apply the law properly and equitably, and for taxpayers, which must comply with the law. Clear guidance can help avoid unexpected results and therefore help minimize controversy.

C.            Guidance can serve these purposes only if it is clear and detailed enough to be properly understood by both tax administrations and taxpayers. Countries that have adopted transfer pricing legislation have struck various balances between the provision of general principles and detailed rules in that legislation and accompanying guidance. Where general principles are preferred it is often advisable, for the sake of clarity, to supplement them with examples illustrating their application.

C.            Developing countries seeking to adopt transfer pricing legislation or revise existing legislation generally base such legislation on the arm’s length principle, which is adopted in both the UN and OECD Model Conventions and in most national legislation throughout the world. As long as this remains the case, departures from the arm’s length principle will create an increased risk of double or unexpected taxation, with no realistic prospect of cross-border relief. This could make the costs of doing business in the country concerned prohibitive and have the effect of discouraging cross-border trade and investment, with negative effects on sustainable development. While it is for each country to determine its own tax system the desire to avoid double taxation has been an important factor in the very broad acceptance of the arm’s length principle internationally.

C.            Developing countries whose tax systems are at an early stage of development or who face severe resource constraints may choose, for practical reasons, to adopt an approach to transfer pricing that is simplified in comparison to that adopted by more developed countries and recommended by the OECD Guidelines. Where  a simplified approach is adopted care should be taken, for the reasons noted above, to avoid results that depart from the arm’s length principle. Where a country decides to adopt a simplified approach it may be advisable to re-evaluate that decision periodically. A simplified approach may not continue to meet the needs of the tax administration as it addresses more complex transactions, or the approach may no longer be needed for practical reasons.

C.            The setting of legislative priorities is obviously a matter for each country to decide for itself, in view of its particular circumstances and policies. Transfer pricing legislation may, for example, not be seen as a first priority by developing countries whose tax systems are still in a relatively early phase of legal development, especially if cross-border trade and investment are not yet significant in volume.

C.            However, where a country that has not adopted specific transfer pricing legislation decides that it is appropriate to challenge a company’s inter-company pricing it may find that it lacks a clear legal basis for such a challenge. While some countries may have general legal provisions or principles, such as general anti-avoidance rules or substance-over-form doctrines, they may find it difficult to successfully challenge inter-company pricing on this basis.

C.            Such an approach may also raise issues of fairness to the taxpayer, if the application of general principles to inter-company pricing is not sufficiently clear and predictable. In such a case, this lack of certainty may create significant controversy.

C.            Due to the above-mentioned considerations it is normally advisable for developing countries to adopt transfer pricing guidance as soon as they are in a position to do so and to examine transfer pricing practices to the extent possible.

C.4.3.2.         Tax Audit Practices and Domestic Tax Policies

C.            Tax audit practices and policies play a key role in any effort by a tax administration to avoid or minimize disputes with taxpayers. To the extent that a tax administration’s audit practices and policies are seen as fair and are implemented equitably it becomes less likely that taxpayers will see a need to pursue dispute resolution options. Conversely, where a tax administration has systemic integrity or confidentiality issues or applies the law in a manner that is not seen as fair and equitable, or is regarded as unpredictable, taxpayers are more likely to see a need to seek resolution of the dispute elsewhere. All tax administrations seeking to avoid or minimize disputes with taxpayers should therefore devote significant attention to the operation of their tax audit practices and policies. Issues relating to tax audits are discussed in more detail in Chapter C.3. of this Manual.

C.            Tax administrations may find it useful to consult the practical guides and information publications issued by tax administration organizations such as the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations (CIAT) and the OECD’s Forum on Tax Administration (FTA).

Advance Rulings

C.            Some countries have a practice of issuing advance rulings regarding the application of a country’s laws to a taxpayer’s particular facts (sometimes structured as unilateral Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) in some countries. These are discussed in more detail below in the section on cross-border dispute avoidance procedures).104 These advance determinations can often be very helpful in avoiding disputes between that taxpayer and the tax administration.

C.            When considering new issues tax administrations may initially prefer to provide guidance by a system of case-specific rulings so that they have an opportunity to consider the issues more fully before committing themselves to a general approach. On the other hand, where the issue is one of general application it may be more efficient for the tax administration to issue general guidance.

C.            A heavy reliance on ad hoc rulings may also give rise to integrity concerns and associated equity issues unless there is a robust ruling review process in place. Where guidance is routinely provided by way of rulings it may prove difficult to strike an appropriate balance between legitimate taxpayer confidentiality concerns and the level of transparency that may be desired to issue an effective ruling. While it is generally best practice to maximize transparency it would normally be inappropriate for the tax administration to publish case-specific rulings in their entirety as this would risk divulging sensitive taxpayer information to competitors. While many countries have a policy of publishing rulings after removing sensitive taxpayer information, even this approach may effectively disclose the identity of the taxpayer if these taxpayers operate in smaller markets, with negative consequences for the taxpayer’s competitive position. It may therefore make sense for tax administrations to use case-specific rulings primarily to provide guidance on issues that are unique, novel, or particularly difficult, or as an interim measure while adequate published guidance is being developed.

C.            An alternative means of promoting transparency and consistent treatment of taxpayers, reportedly used by Nigeria, for example, is to publish generally applicable guidance on issues of broad application after analyzing them in a cooperative relationship process with a particular taxpayer. Another possibility would be consultation processes with the business or industry sectors involved.

Cooperative Relationships

C.            In addition, tax administrations may wish to consider whether they should move towards a more cooperative relationship (sometimes referred to as an “enhanced relationship”) with some taxpayers and their advisors in order to get a better understanding of their business and transfer pricing practice. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are widely seen as having already successfully implemented cooperative relationship programmes and other countries (such as Nigeria) are currently testing this approach.

C.            A cooperative relationship can benefit tax administrations and taxpayers by offering greater certainty and transparency, an earlier and more efficient discussion on and resolution of any tax issues and lower administrative and compliance costs. It can also be used to resolve tax disputes or uncertainties for prior years more efficiently.

C.            From a tax administration perspective interest in a cooperative relationship follows from the understanding that:

Ø effective risk management requires current, relevant, and reliable information regarding the taxpayer’s facts and potential tax issues, for which the taxpayer is the best source;

Ø a cooperative relationship makes the collection of any taxes owed more efficient, saving audit and litigation resources; and

Ø tax payments will be received more quickly if disputes are avoided or resolved early in the process.

C.          From the taxpayer’s perspective a cooperative relationship may be worthwhile because it can:

Ø provide greater certainty and predictability regarding the taxation of the taxpayer’s investments, which is essential especially where significant investments are being considered;

Ø expedite the resolution of tax issues; and

Ø save costs by streamlining compliance and dispute resolution processes.

C.          A cooperative relationship initiative tends to be administration resource intensive, however, and must be carefully implemented to ensure the consistent application of legal provisions, to protect taxpayer rights and to avoid integrity issues. While the manner in which tax administrators, taxpayers and tax advisors deal with each other is modified, applicable tax provisions should continue to be applied impartially. It is also important to implement cooperative relationship initiatives efficiently so that adequate audit resources can be devoted to less compliant taxpayers.

C.          Development of a successful cooperative relationship requires that all parties engage on the basis of the following parameters:

Ø a genuine commitment to developing a relationship of mutual trust;

Ø a transparent and open approach;

Ø an understanding of commercial and industry aspects;

Ø an implementation process agreed at the start, including the designation of responsible persons at relevant levels of both the tax administration and the taxpayer; and

Ø clear agreement in advance on the period to be covered.

C.          Tax administrations may find it useful to adopt an industry-based focus where feasible, so that the experience gained can be leveraged and used to provide consistent and transparent treatment to similarly situated taxpayers (taking relevant differences into account).

Audit Settlements

C.          Many tax administrations, both developing and developed, rely heavily on case by case audit settlements to resolve disputes with taxpayers. To the extent audit settlements are based on clarifications and better understandings of relevant facts, this may be an effective use of limited resources. A disadvantage of audit settlements is that such an approach of dispute resolution is often not very transparent, is not necessarily coordinated to provide similar treatment to similarly situated taxpayers and is therefore not always perceived as fair by stakeholders. It may also raise more integrity concerns than some other dispute settlement procedures.

C.          Developing countries seeking to reassure current and potential investors should consider developing, improving or supporting the supplemental domestic dispute resolution procedures discussed below, in addition to cross-border procedures where possible.

C.4.3.3.     Formal Domestic Dispute Resolution Procedures

Administrative Appeals

C.            A well-designed administrative appeals procedure can help ensure that the tax administration resolves its disputes with taxpayers in an efficient and fair manner. This will provide an added level of assurance to investors. To operate well and to be perceived as fair, an appeals procedure must be independent of other parts of the tax administration, so that it can provide an independent review of the dispute. It may not be as effective, from an institutional perspective, to have the case heard by the persons responsible for issuing the assessments or by their peers.

C.            Countries seeking to avoid integrity issues may wish to consider using panels of decision-makers, as in India’s Dispute Resolution Panel programme, or implementing additional levels of reviews as in Nigeria’s rulings practice. Brazil’s Administrative Court of Tax Appeals (CARF) is an example of a successful administrative appeal procedure. Appeals are processed in three steps, the first step being within the tax administration while the second (the appeal) and the third (the special appeal, which is accepted under certain conditions) are decided by the CARF. The CARF is housed within the Ministry of Finance but is separate from the tax administration, even though that is part of the same ministry.


C.            Mediation and conciliation are sometimes mentioned as potential procedures to resolve disputes. Mediation has proven successful in resolving tax disputes within some EU Member States, e.g. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The most significant benefit of this approach towards dispute resolution is seen as the quick time frame within which disputes have been resolved. The mediation option may be made available as an administrative process within the tax administration, rather than as a separate independent mediation procedure outside of the administrative process. The process may be particularly promising in those situations where the tax auditor and taxpayer are no longer willing to communicate with each other and mutually resolve a dispute. In this environment, a mediator may be able to help overcome relationship challenges that prohibit the parties from reaching an agreement. While it may be worth testing these approaches it should be noted that they are not automatically effective in a cross-border context, as they would still require an additional administrative step to obtain avoidance of double taxation. Potential utilization of similar processes in the treaty dispute resolution process is noted in paragraph C.4.4.1. below.

Judicial System

C.            An independent judicial system that gives unbiased consideration to (tax) cases can do much to improve a country’s reputation among investors as a jurisdiction where tax disputes can be fairly resolved.

C.            However, owing to the call in the modern business world for real-time certainty regarding tax obligations the perceived bene fit of such a judicial system declines as the length of time to obtain a final decision grows. It is therefore important to ensure that the judicial system has adequate resources and that it is not unduly burdened by tax disputes due to real or perceived deficiencies at the audit and administrative appeals stages.

C .4 .4 .       Dispute Avoidance Procedures: Cross-Border

C.4.4.1.         Tax Treaty Provisions

Division of taxing jurisdiction

C.            Tax treaties significantly reduce the scope for cross-border disputes. Without a tax treaty, income from cross-border transactions or investment is subject to potential double taxation whenever the laws of the source and residence countries differ. Tax treaties seek to eliminate this double taxation by allocating between the contracting states the taxing jurisdiction over such income and by providing procedures for the relief of any residual double taxation. Treaties also typically require tax laws to be applied without discrimination based on nationality or capital ownership and without discrimination against the conduct of business through a permanent establishment.

C.            Treaties therefore offer significant reassurance and certainty to potential investors, as well as greater certainty for tax administrations, by reducing the risk of cross-border disputes. In considering whether to make the negotiation of tax treaties a priority and which treaty negotiations to prioritize, developing countries may wish to weigh these advantages against the resources and the balance of bilateral concessions required to achieve an agreed treaty.

The mutual agreement procedure

C.            Tax treaties also provide fora Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP); a cross-border dispute resolution procedure found at Article 25 of both the UN and OECD Model Tax Conventions. Operated by designated tax administration officials of each country who are referred to as “competent authorities”, the MAP enables tax administrations to reach bilateral agreement on issues of general interpretation or application and to thereby avoid double taxation on cross-border transactions and the resulting disputes. The MAP procedure is separate from, and additional to, domestic law remedies to resolve disputes. However, in many countries domestic law (and in particular a final court decision) can limit available solutions under MAP.

C.            These bilateral agreements may relate only to past years, or they may take the form of Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) that provide for agreement on a transfer pricing methodology for future years (and in many cases past years as well). The MAP also applies to resolve cross-border disputes that have arisen in particular cases.

C.           The UN Commentary on Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure) provides a great deal of guidance on dispute resolution through the MAP procedure, which is relevant for both transfer pricing and other disputes. The UN Committee of Experts has adopted a Guide to the Mutual Agreement Procedure under Tax Treaties, which provides additional guidance on best practices in the structuring and operation of MAP programmes based on practical experience, which developing countries may wish to evaluate and draw upon.

C.            Some tax administrations, including for example those of Canada, Germany, India, Japan, The Netherlands, the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) have published detailed internal MAP procedures. These may also provide useful comparative information for tax administrations that wish to learn more about the MAP. It is useful for tax administrations to indicate their intention to follow published guidelines or to publish their own MAP procedures. This promotes consistency in case handling and transparency regarding the expectations of the tax administration. It may be advisable to enact provisions in domestic law allowing for MAP and APA procedures and, if necessary (and possible), an amendment to the constitution, in order to provide juridical certainty to such procedures.

C.            The purpose of a MAP programme is to provide an effective means of reconciling differing positions of treaty partners, so that the treaty can operate as intended to avoid double taxation or other taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Experience has shown that this purpose can best be achieved if the MAP programme is structured so that tax administrators implementing the MAP programme are able to make decisions independently of those implementing the audit programme and are free from outside influence.

C.            Structural independence may be more difficult to achieve in smaller tax administrations, which may have a limited number of subject matter experts available to advise on such issues. Where, because of resource or other constraints, the same experts must be used for both audit and MAP programmes it will be important to provide a procedure for effective independent review of proposed MAP positions in order to ensure that they are not unduly influenced by the views of auditors.

C.        Freedom from political influence on the MAP process is equally important. Many tax administrations have found that this can be best achieved by placing the MAP function within the tax administration, rather than within the Ministry of Finance or other tax policy-making function. They believe it is helpful to establish procedures or practices preventing involvement by those outside the tax administration in decisions regarding particular MAP cases. Other countries believe that placing the MAP function within the Ministry of Finance is preferable, to reduce undue influence by the tax administration, or to facilitate coordination by policy-makers. The importance of developing and operating well-functioning MAP processes was recognized and highlighted in Action 14 of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project, resulting in the Action 14: 2015 Final Report “Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective”.111 The report contains a number of minimum standards and guidance on best practices some of which are discussed in the Commentary on Article 25 of the UN Model Convention in its 2017 update.

Operational considerations

C.          Given their purpose, it is important for MAP procedures to be operated in a consistent manner rather than handling each case in an ad hoc fashion. This will provide for similar treatment of similarly situated taxpayers and help the MAP programme to be viewed as equitable and effective. Both operational structure and training and other capacity building of the workforce can play important roles in promoting such consistency. For similar reasons it is important for a MAP programme to apply principled approaches to resolving cases. In the first instance, the approaches taken should be consistent with the provisions of the treaty and any relevant interpretive guidance. It is essential that foreign and domestic taxpayers and “inbound” and “outbound” transactions be treated in the same manner. This will help produce consistent, predictable results and further contribute to a view of the MAP programme as equitable and effective. Training and other capacity building will also be important.

C.          It is also essential to implement a policy of broad access to MAP, if it is to serve the purpose of resolving cross-border disputes and be regarded by potential investors as equitable and effective. This calls for the elimination of factors that could otherwise prevent or discourage the use of MAP, including unreasonable time limitations or unilateral attempts to exclude selected issues from MAP. Consideration should be given to suspending the collection of disputed tax assessments on cases pending in MAP, as these assessments can otherwise present serious cash flow difficulties for taxpayers that have already been taxed on the same amount in the other country. If necessary, this can be done in exchange for a bank guarantee to ensure the payment of any tax due upon the conclusion of the MAP procedure. Similarly, consideration should be given to preventing the imposition of interest or at least preventing the imposition of higher interest rates that may effectively operate as penalty measures, while cases are pending in the MAP programme.

C.          The MAP procedure generally commences with a request by a taxpayer addressed to the designated competent authority of a country for consideration of an issue for dispute resolution and/or relief of double taxation, because the taxpayer believes his tax treatment is not, or will not be, in accordance with the treaty. Alternatively, the process can be initiated because there are questions of interpretation or application of the Convention or to eliminate double taxation in cases not otherwise provided for in the Convention. The MAP process is intended to be used also to resolve economic double taxation, such as in the case of transfer pricing disputes. The case has to be presented to the competent authority of the country where the taxpayer is resident within three years from the (first) time the person is notified (for example by way of a notice of assessment) of the action that will result in taxation not in accordance with the convention. The three-year time limit is determined by the treaty article and may differ in certain cases. The definition of what constitutes (first) “notification” may be provided in domestic regulations. The form of the MAP request to be filed may be prescribed under domestic regulations as well. Alternatively, the commentary to the treaty or the model convention may be consulted in this regard or the OECD MEMAP could also be consulted.

C.          Once the MAP request has been received, it needs to be ascertained that the foreign competent authority is properly informed as well and that all relevant information to decide and agree on the matter is made available to both competent authorities. Considering the time limit within which competent authorities are expected to address and resolve a filed request, it is relevant to determine if further information is required from the taxpayer(s) involved or not, and if so, to request this information as soon as practicable. It would not be prudent to wait to ask for this information at the last minute and to extend or overrun the time limit provided by the applicable treaty. The competent authorities may wish to meet in person to compare notes on the matter and to explore available solutions or may wish to handle the matter through (electronic) correspondence or a combination of both of those approaches. It is generally understood that the competent authority of the country where the primary adjustment was made that is leading to the double taxation (or taxation not in accordance with the convention), has the burden of proof towards the other competent authority that the primary adjustment is justified. That competent authority traditionally will send a letter (a so-called position paper) to the other competent authority informing the latter of its position with respect to the issue for which the competent authority request was filed. Based on the position paper, the other competent authority can respond and explore to what extent it agrees with the position and is able to provide for avoidance of double taxation or not.

C.          If the competent authorities agree on a way to avoid double taxation and the taxpayer agrees to the suggested solution as well, a bilateral agreement is entered into between the two taxing authorities and an agreement is entered into between the respective competent authority and taxpayer of the country where the primary adjustment was made. Careful consideration is required on how the solution is to be implemented; in what taxable year and whether the statute of limitations is still open as regards that year in the other jurisdiction; or whether the treaty allows for an override of the domestic statute of limitation provisions. Consideration should also be given to whether the issue decided is a recurring issue (that applies to later years as well) or not. If the issue is a recurring issue and additional adjustments are to be expected for later years, the taxpayer and competent authorities may wish to explore to what extent they have the authority and means to resolve those years as well, or whether a new MAP request ought to be filed for later years.


C.          The UN Model Convention provides for an optional treaty text that allows the competent authorities to resolve the matter by way of arbitration, if no solution can be obtained within the time frame provided by the mutual agreement article. If that text is included in the treaty for the avoidance of double taxation, or agreement exists between treaty partners to resort to arbitration pursuant to that article, competent authorities that cannot find an acceptable solution for a dispute within the requisite time frame must invoke the arbitration procedures provided by the UN Model Convention or that may have been agreed to by the treaty partners otherwise.

C.          Mandatory arbitration provisions have been added ...