A.1.1. This chapter provides background material on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs); MNEs are a key aspect of globalization as they have integrated cross-border business operations. The chapter describes the factors that gave rise to MNEs and shows how an MNE is able to exploit integration opportunities in the cross-border production of goods and provision of services through a value chain (or value-added chain).
A.1.2. MNEs are groups of companies and generally operate worldwide through locally incorporated subsidiaries or permanent establishments; they may also use other structures such as joint ventures and partnerships. At the operational level, an MNE’s business operations may be organized in several different ways such as a functional structure, a divisional structure or a matrix structure. This chapter outlines the legal structures that may be used by MNEs, and considers the differences between them.
A.1.3. This chapter then uses a “value chain analysis” (see Paragraphs A.2.5 and A.3.5 below) as a measure for testing the performance of an MNE. It considers the management of the transfer pricing function in an MNE to minimize the risk of transfer pricing adjustments and to avoid double taxation. While MNEs test the performance of their business operations, for tax and company law purposes they are required to report the performance of associated entities in the countries in which they operate. An MNE’s transfer pricing policy should provide guidance on: transfer pricing documentation requirements; reporting for transfer pricing purposes; dealing with audits; and appropriate measures for dispute resolution with a tax authority.
A.2.1. In economic theory, firms are organizations that arrange the production of goods and the provision of services. The aim of a firm is to produce goods and provide services to maximize profits. In the absence of MNEs, production would be carried out through a series of arm’s length transactions between independent parties.7 These transactions would require contracts between the independent producers but a significant part of these resources would be used in the process of making contracts.
A.2.2. The expenses of making contracts are called “transaction costs” since expenses are incurred by individuals in finding other persons with whom to contract, as well as in negotiating and finalizing the contracts. As contracts cannot cover every possible issue that may arise between the contracting parties, there is a risk of disputes being created by unforeseen contingencies. When disputes occur between contracting parties they may incur considerable costs in resolving these disputes including negotiation costs, legal expenses, and litigation and mediation expenses. As transactions and associated costs would be significant in an economy without firms, it is rational for firms to be created to produce goods and services, provided that the firms’ costs of production are less than the costs of outsourcing the production.
A.2.3. Within a firm, contracts between the various factors of production are eliminated and replaced with administrative arrangements. Usually, the administrative costs of organizing production within a firm are less than the cost of the alternative, which is outsourcing market transactions. The theoretical limit to the expansion of a firm is the point at which its costs of organizing transactions are equal to the costs of carrying out the transactions through the market.
A.2.4. A firm will internalize the costs of production to the extent that it can achieve economies of scale in production and distribution and establish coordination economies. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in its 1993 World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations and Integrated Production noted that in many industries the expansion of internalized activities within multinational enterprises indicates that there are significant efficiency gains that may be achieved.
A.2.5. A firm’s functions in providing goods and services are collectively called its supply chain, through which the firm converts inputs into goods and services. Most firms begin by operating in their home market and rely on their competitive advantages to enter markets abroad. The term “supply chain” is defined as “the chain of processes involved in the production and distribution of a commodity.” In this chapter the term “supply chain” is used for the provision of both goods and services by MNEs. The term “value chain” is defined in this Manual as “the process or activities by which a company adds value to an article, including production, marketing, and the provision of after-sales service.”
A.2.6. MNEs create organizational structures and develop strategies to arrange the cross-border production of goods and services in locations around the world and to determine the level of intra-entity or intra-group integration. UNCTAD considered that there was a trend in many MNEs across a broad range of industries to use structures and strategies with high levels of integration in their operations. The integration included structures giving an associated enterprise control over a group-wide function or the sharing of group-wide functions between two or more enterprises.
A.2.7. Successful MNEs use their location and internalization advantages to maximize their share of global markets and growth opportunities. Thus, multinational enterprises are able to minimize their costs through their integration economies, which are not available to domestic firms.
A.2.8. The key feature of MNEs is that they are integrated (global) businesses. Globalization has made it possible for an MNE to achieve high levels of integration and the ability to have control centralized in one location. Modern information and communications systems also provide increased horizontal communications across geographic and functional business lines. This has resulted in many MNEs providing services such as advisory, research and development (R&D), legal, accounting, financial management, and data processing from one or several regional centres to group companies. Also, management teams of an MNE can be based in different locations, leading the MNE from several locations.
A.2.9. In order to optimize the value chain, MNEs may establish new business operations in a developing country. These investments often happen in stages, with the initial stage involving the establishment of infrastructure, improvement of the education of individuals and accordingly, provision of economic benefits to the country.
A.2.10. MNEs have common control, common goals and common resources, and the units of the enterprise — parent company, subsidiaries and branches — are located in more than one country. Thus, many MNEs are fully integrated businesses that plan and implement global strategies. UNCTAD has noted that integration of production by MNEs creates challenges for policy-makers in adapting the methods for allocating the income and costs of MNEs between jurisdictions for tax purposes.
A.2.11. In Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (2008) the authors argue that the history of MNEs was shaped by political, social and cultural events that influenced the ownership, organization and location of international production of their goods and services. The authors claim that MNE groups integrated their operations until the late 1980s and then more recently chose to outsource some activities in which they do not have competitive advantages.
A.2.12. For most of the twentieth century, MNE groups and international enterprises operating through branches or subsidiaries tended to expand the range of their value adding activities and by the late 1980s firms had integrated their production and marketing functions. Up to the 1960s and 1970s, MNEs had engaged in limited or no outsourcing of operations and they became large integrated conglomerates. But the authors argue that from the late 1980s MNEs began outsourcing many activities that were previously performed by the firms themselves. From the early 1990s, MNEs began restructuring to specialize in the areas in which they had competitive advantages, such as unique firm-specific assets, in particular high value intangible assets, and the capabilities that provided the firms with their market position and competitive edge.
A.2.13. MNEs examined their value chains to identify the functions in which they had no advantage over other firms. They then began deciding on which functions they would perform themselves and which functions would be outsourced to independent firms, a process called value chain optimization. For in-house services, MNEs might decide to provide some services through centralized service centres. While the initial functions that were outsourced were non-core activities such as payroll, billing and maintenance services, outsourcing has expanded to cover core activities. The core activities may involve producing goods or providing services. For example, many firms outsource call centre activities or certain administrative functions to independent firms in countries which have educated workforces and relatively low-cost labour. Consequently, modern MNE groups organize their cross-border operations through a network of contractual arrangements with independent enterprises and cooperative in-house relationships.
A.2.14. MNEs vary in size and include some small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). When SMEs commence operating in other jurisdictions through locally incorporated subsidiaries they will usually incur the additional requirement of complying with transfer pricing rules. Some SMEs may face challenges in complying with transfer pricing rules because of their lack of expertise with international tax issues in general and limited compliance resources that may hinder them from expanding their operations abroad. Consequently, domestic transfer pricing rules which apply to SMEs should reflect the capacity of SMEs to comply and the capacity of the tax authorities to administer them. Some countries may have special simplified rules for SMEs, such as simplified documentation requirements, and may use flexible approaches in handling transfer pricing issues involving SMEs. This creates the need to define an SME. Although there is no universal definition, an SME may be defined on the basis of criteria including: turnover; balance sheet value; number of employees; and transaction values.
A.3.1.1. The legal systems used by countries include the common law and civil law systems. The common law system originates in the UK and is used in countries such as Australia, Canada, India, Malaysia, New Zealand and the USA. The common law is based on judgments in court cases. A judgment of a superior court is binding on lower courts in future cases. The civil law system has its origins in Roman law and operates in Europe, South America and Japan. Under a civil law system, law is enacted and codified by parliament. Companies are recognized under both systems as artificial legal persons with perpetual life and limited liability. The domestic law treatment of a partnership varies in common law and civil law countries.
A.3.1.2. Most countries treat partnerships as fiscally transparent entities with flow-through treatment under which the partnership is ignored and tax is imposed on the partners according to their respective shares of partnership income. Other countries treat partnerships as taxable units subject to taxation as entities, including company treatment. Some countries such as the USA have limited liability companies which provide the benefit of limited liability and allow the entity to choose either flow-through treatment or treatment as a taxable unit. This is called the “check the box” system and the entities are referred to as “hybrids”. A feature of common law countries is the “trust” concept which is an obligation in relation to property which allows for concurrent legal and beneficial ownership of the trust property. A trustee will be the legal owner of property but holds the property on trust for the beneficiaries which may include both income and capital beneficiaries. While business operations may be carried on in some common law countries using a trust structure, MNEs would not normally use trusts to carry on business operations.
A.3.1.3. One of the key decisions facing any MNE when expanding its operations to another country is the type of legal structure it will use to operate in that jurisdiction. The alternatives for an MNE are to operate abroad through locally incorporated subsidiary companies (associated enterprises) or operate abroad using permanent establishments (branches). Foreign subsidiaries may be either fully-owned by the parent company or partly-owned.
A.3.1.4. An MNE is a group of companies or other entities and under the company law of the country in which each company is incorporated it is a legal entity. This choice of legal structure will be affected by a number of factors, apart from the tax implications, including:
A.3.1.5. Other factors which may affect the choice of the legal form of the enterprise include:
A.3.1.6. MNEs may also carry on business abroad through a partnership or joint venture. In most jurisdictions partnerships are not legal entities and are fiscally transparent. For a partnership to exist, an MNE would require other entities to be partners such as independent entities or subsidiaries. Joint ventures involve independent companies working together on a specific project and a joint venture party may include a government or a government authority. The business structures used by an MNE may change over time such as, for example, commencing operations in a jurisdiction using a joint venture structure and then buying out the joint venture partner and operating in that jurisdiction through an associated enterprise. An MNE may also operate abroad using an agent, which may be an independent agent, a dependent agent or a commissionaire.
A.3.2.1. In an MNE group, the parent company and subsidiary companies are separate legal entities and they may enter into intra-group transactions. On the other hand, an international enterprise with a head office in the country of residence and permanent establishments abroad is one legal entity and a permanent establishment cannot legally enter into transactions with other parts of the enterprise because transactions require at least two legal entities. In the context of the Business Profits article of some tax treaties, notional transactions within an international enterprise (either between a head office and its permanent establishment or between permanent establishments) may be recognized provided they comply with the arm’s length principle. In addition, for accounting and management purposes, the head office of an international enterprise and a branch may be treated as “transacting” with each other. Whether or not dealings between a head office and its branch are subject to transfer pricing rules would depend on the scope of a country’s domestic legislation and its tax treaties.
A.3.2.2. Operational structures used by MNEs vary and evolve over time. There are many types of structures or hybrids which an organization can choose to adopt, but an organization’s primary aim should be to adopt an operational structure that will most effectively support and help it to achieve its business objectives. MNE operational structures usually differ from the legal structures and as a result, employees generally operate beyond and across the boundaries of legal entities and countries. Examples of the types of modern operational structures an MNE may adopt include a functional structure, a divisional structure or a matrix structure as outlined below.
A.3.3.1. In a functional structure an MNE’s functions are performed by the employees within the functional divisions. These functions are usually specialized tasks, for instance the information technology engineering department would be staffed with software engineers. As a whole, a functional organization is best suited to a producer of standardized goods and services at large volume and low cost to exploit economies of scale. Coordination and specialization of tasks are centralized in a functional structure, which makes producing a limited amount of products or services efficient and predictable.
A.3.3.2. Under a divisional structure, each organizational function is grouped into a division with each division containing all the necessary resources and functions within it, such as human resources and accounts. Divisions can be categorized from different points of view. The distinction could for example be made on a geographical basis (e.g. a China division or a West Africa division) or on a product/service basis (e.g. different products for different customers: households or companies). For example, an automobile company may have a divisional structure with a division for hybrid cars and another division for other cars with each of these divisions having its own sales, engineering and marketing departments.
A.3.3.3. The matrix structure groups employees by multiple criteria with the most common criteria being function and product. Alternative criteria would be function and geographic location. A matrix organization frequently uses teams of employees to accomplish tasks. An example of a function-geographic matrix structure would be a company that produces two types of products (A and B) in several geographic locations. Using the matrix structure, this company would organize functions within the company as follows:
Product A/Americas; Product B/Americas; Product A/Asia-Pacific; Product B/Asia-Pacific;
Product A/Europe, Middle East, Africa (EMEA); Product B/EMEA.
In terms of this matrix structure a person in the Product A division in Brazil may report to the head of the Global Product A division and the head of the Americas division.
A.3.4.1. An MNE customarily maintains, parallel to its statutory accounts, a set of management accounts to mirror its operational structure in order to measure and report on the effectiveness of each operational unit for management purposes. Some of these divisions may be classified as cost centres for management account purposes (e.g. the human resources division) whilst others may be classified as profit centres (e.g. the product/services division). It is often challenging for an MNE to attempt to segregate the corporate and statutory financial statements to reflect the organization’s operational structure.
A.3.5.1. The aim of MNEs is to maximize profits from producing goods and services. The key feature of an optimal MNE business is to produce a profit from exploiting resources which produce property or services of greatest economic value. A useful starting point to understand how an MNE operates is a value chain analysis which will also form the basis for a transfer pricing functional analysis. An MNE’s value chain is used to convert its economic resources of lower value into economic resources of higher value which may involve the following steps:
A.3.5.2. The following example shows how three different MNEs could adopt different operational structures using the same generic value chain.
MNE Group A uses three different companies to perform very specific functions across the value chain as follows:
Company 1 in Country A is an R&D company carrying out research and also undertaking activities relating to the design of products for the entire group. A company of this nature would employ technical personnel such as engineers and scientists.
Company 2 in Country B is a fully-fledged manufacturing company (i.e. not a limited-risk contract manufacturer, for example) which also performs some functions on the design and practical application of its products.
Company 3 in Country C is responsible for the marketing, distribution and after-sales functions within the group.
MNE Group B uses two subsidiaries which perform some of the functions across the value chain and the group also outsources some of the activities to third parties:
Company 1 in Country A is an R&D company and carries out all the research and design activities in relation to the company’s products. This company is similar to Company 1 of Group A, apart from the fact that the design function is fully located in Company 1 and not partly carried out by Company 2.
Company 2 in Country B is the company responsible for marketing and customer service. This company is therefore the customer interface for the group.
The MNE has decided to outsource the production and distribution functions to third party companies.
MNE Group C uses three companies to perform the same functions in different geographical locations using intangibles developed by a third party, which would typically be used by the group under licence.
A.3.5.3. In addition to understanding the value chain of an MNE, it is also important to understand the context in which each of the companies within the MNE contributes to the value chain, as this will ultimately be relevant in analyzing the transfer pricing implications of the value chain.
A.3.5.4. For example, in MNE group A (see Figure A.1 below) the value chain is defined as Company 1 performing R&D, Company 2 manufacturing, and Company 3 distributing the MNE’s products. The value chain, however, may be different depending on the legal and contractual arrangements between the companies.
A.3.5.5. One possible context could be that Company 1 performs R&D at its own risk, and is the legal owner of any intangible property developed through that R&D; Company 2 acts as a limited-risk contract manufacturer through a contractual arrangement with Company 1, and Company 3 acts as a limited-risk distributor through a contractual arrangement with Company 1. In this case, Company 1 is the legal owner of the intangible property of the MNE, and bears substantial risk associated with the manufacturing and sales of the MNE’s products.
A.3.5.6. A different possible context of exactly the same value chain could be that Company 1 performs R&D on a contract basis for Company 2, which is the legal owner of any intangible property developed through that R&D; and Company 3 acts as a limited risk distributor through a contractual arrangement with Company 2. In this case, Company 2 is the legal owner of the intangible property of the MNE, and bears substantial risk associated with the manufacturing and sales of the MNE’s products.
A.3.5.7. A different possible structure of the same value chain could be that Company 1 performs R&D on a contract basis for Company 3, which is the legal owner of any intangible property developed through that R&D; and Company 2 acts as a limited risk contract manufacturer through a contractual arrangement with Company 3. In this case, Company 3 is the legal owner of the intangible property of the MNE, and bears substantial risk associated with the manufacturing and sales of the MNE’s products.
A.3.5.8. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, each of these different contexts would very likely result in different transfer pricing outcomes.15
A.4.1. MNEs face challenges in managing their transfer pricing function. While transfer pricing may be used in some MNEs for management control, MNEs nevertheless are required to comply with the transfer pricing rules for tax purposes in the countries in which they operate. The determination of the transfer price affects the allocation of taxable income among the associated enterprises of an MNE group.
A.4.2. Entities in an MNE group conduct global business that gives rise to opportunities to optimize the value chain of goods or services and therefore look for synergies. A challenge facing an MNE conducting a global business with associated enterprises is whether the transfer pricing method used for internal transactions is acceptable to the tax authorities in the countries in which the MNE operates. The transfer pricing challenge becomes even greater when the MNE has multiple global businesses with different business models and multiple cost centres. The size of the MNE adds to the complexity.
A.4.3. Financial reporting for MNEs is informed by two decision trees. On the one hand, corporate and tax law require an associated enterprise to determine its taxable income derived from a specific jurisdiction. On the other hand, an MNE will usually need to determine for management purposes the income and costs of its businesses lines, which, as the previous discussion shows, can operate across several jurisdictions. In other words, while tax authorities focus on an associated enterprise’s taxable income, an MNE’s managers focus on income from their business lines. MNEs, particularly those where the parent is listed on a stock exchange, are more likely to aim to meet their tax obligations in the countries in which they operate provided that they are not subject to double taxation. Consequently, MNEs should develop and publicize within the enterprise a global transfer pricing policy to help minimize the risk of transfer pricing adjustments which may result in double taxation.
A.4.4. The following is an illustrative example of the two different decision trees within an MNE:
A.4.5. The allocation of profits and costs to the various legal structures is based on the functions performed, risks assumed and assets employed. Since MNEs consist of numerous associated enterprises it is very difficult to allocate the profits and costs to all the separate legal entities due to the absence of market forces. It is a complex exercise to come up with a consistent global policy for allocating results to the legal structures.
A.4.6. The arm’s length principle allows national tax authorities to make an adjustment to the profits of one enterprise where the terms of transactions between associated enterprises differ from terms that would be agreed between unrelated enterprises in similar circumstances. A tax authority should only disregard a controlled transaction in exceptional circumstances. If the terms of a transaction between associated enterprises differ from those between unrelated parties and comparisons are difficult to make, an MNE bears the risk of transfer pricing adjustments. If the income of an associated enterprise within Country A is increased as a result of a transfer pricing adjustment, it would be reasonable to expect that there would be a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment resulting in a proportionate reduction in the income of the other associated enterprise in Country B, provided a consistent transfer pricing method is used by both countries.
A.4.7. But Country B may use different transfer pricing methods. Consequently, if transfer prices are adjusted by a tax authority in one country, double taxation will occur if the tax authority in the other country does not use the same transfer pricing method and allows a corresponding transfer pricing adjustment. It is the task of the transfer pricing function within an MNE to limit the risk of transfer pricing adjustments and the risk of double taxation. See the illustration of double taxation below in Figure A.3.
A.4.8. In principle, designing, implementing and documenting an appropriate transfer pricing policy should not be viewed solely as a compliance issue for MNEs. The main goal should be to develop a consistent global policy which cannot be altered to exploit tax laws. A well-developed and consistently applied transfer pricing policy should reduce an MNE’s risk of transfer pricing adjustments and the potential for double taxation, thereby increasing profitability by minimizing transfer pricing costs. Moreover, a global transfer pricing policy may be used as evidence in negotiations with tax authorities when transfer pricing disputes occur.
A.4.9. An MNE’s transfer pricing policy should ideally reduce the risk of transfer pricing adjustments and the risks of double taxation of cross-border transactions. A comprehensive transfer pricing policy should cover four key areas as shown in Figure A.4.
Ø Documentation; and
Ø Audit support/Dispute resolution.
Global Effect of Transfer Pricing Adjustments (before adjustment)
Global Business 2
Global Business 1
Global Business 3
A.4.10. Advising requires a thorough knowledge of an MNE’s business operations. It is a misconception that the tax department makes the key business decisions within an MNE. In practice, the business units of an MNE will identify business opportunities and a decision may be taken to exploit the opportunity if it fits into the MNE’s global business strategy. Advice can be provided to minimize the risk of transfer pricing adjustments and therefore optimize the business opportunity if the tax department is involved in an MNE’s decision-making.
A.4.11. In today’s environment there is an increasing level of detail required to meet each country’s transfer pricing documentation requirements. Most MNEs therefore prepare global and regional documentation (master files) of the various global businesses. Subsequently, global and regional reports are prepared for local purposes based on the identified risks for each country in which the MNE operates.
A.4.12. Tax authorities around the world are increasingly focused on transfer pricing and on expanding their transfer pricing capabilities. MNEs have to find a way to deal with the increasingly detailed, complex and often conflicting domestic transfer pricing legislation in the countries where they operate. Some countries follow guidance from international bodies, others only implement part of the guidance while some develop transfer pricing rules independently.
A.4.13. Tax authorities should not start from the assumption that MNEs are manipulating their results in order to obtain tax benefits. Many MNEs and certainly those with shares quoted on a stock exchange (listed MNEs) have published codes of conduct or a set of business principles or both. These codes or principles require that an MNE must comply with the tax rules of the countries in which they operate. Violations of these codes may result in severe consequences for a listed MNE.
A.4.14. As transfer pricing is often referred to as “an art, not a science”, the resulting uncertainty creates the potential for transfer pricing disputes with tax authorities, even if the MNE is seeking to comply with domestic transfer pricing rules. Despite the efforts MNEs invest in setting the appropriate transfer prices and preparing comprehensive documentation, there is always the risk that tax authorities disagree with the approach taken and there is thus the risk of a transfer pricing adjustment. This creates uncertainty for MNEs including the potential associated costs of preparing additional documentation, managing tax audits and conducting litigation. Notwithstanding this, there are cases where transfer prices are manipulated to shift prof its from one jurisdiction to another to gain tax benefits including low-taxation or no-taxation.
A.4.15. Transfer pricing rules are considered very useful by MNEs if they are able to achieve a globally consistent approach and eliminate the risk of transfer pricing disputes. If in one country an MNE’s transfer prices are adjusted, resulting in a higher taxable income, the associated enterprise in the other country should in principle receive a “corresponding adjustment”, reducing its taxable income. If there is no corresponding adjustment, the MNE will suffer double taxation. In this situation, the dispute is between two tax authorities with the MNE seeking to have consistent transfer prices accepted by both countries.
A.4.16. Countries should try to avoid such double taxation, though in some cases there may be legitimate reasons why a corresponding adjustment is not given, or is less than the original adjustment. In such a case, it is important that the two countries enter into discussions to resolve the double taxation issue under the mutual agreement procedure mechanism in a tax treaty.
A.4.17. The following diagram illustrates a transfer pricing adjustment to relieve double taxation:
Global Effects of Transfer Pricing Adjustments (after adjustment)
Global Business 2
|Global Business 1||Global Business 3|
B.1.1.1. This introductory chapter gives a brief outline of the subject of transfer pricing and addresses the practical issues and concerns surrounding it, especially the issues faced and approaches taken by developing countries. These are then dealt with in greater detail in later chapters.
B.1.1.2. Rapid advances in technology, transportation and communication have given rise to a large number of multinational enterprises (MNEs) which have the flexibility to place their enterprises and activities anywhere in the world, as outlined in Part A of this Manual.
B.1.1.3. A significant volume of global trade consists of international transfers of goods and services, capital (such as money) and intangibles (such as intellectual property) within an MNE group; such transfers are called “intra-group transactions”. There is evidence that intra-group trade has been growing steadily since the mid-20th century and arguably accounts for more than 30% of all international transactions.
B.1.1.4. In addition, transactions involving intangibles and multi-tiered services constitute a rapidly growing proportion of an MNE’s commercial transactions and have greatly increased the complexities involved in analyzing and understanding such transactions.
B.1.1.5. The structure of transactions within an MNE group is determined by a combination of the market and group driven forces which can differ from the open market conditions operating between independent entities. A large and growing number of international transactions are therefore not governed entirely by market forces, but driven by the common interests of the entities of a group.
B.1.1.6. In such a situation, it becomes important to establish the appropriate price, called the “transfer price”, for intra-group, cross-border transfers of goods, intangibles and services. “Transfer pricing” is the general term for the pricing of cross-border, intra-firm transactions between related parties. Transfer pricing therefore refers to the setting of prices18 for transactions between associated enterprises involving the transfer of property or services. These transactions are also referred to as “controlled” transactions, as distinct from “uncontrolled” transactions between companies that are not associated and can be assumed to operate independently (“on an arm’s length basis”) in setting terms for such transactions.
B.1.1.7. Transfer pricing thus does not necessarily involve tax avoidance, as the need to set such prices is a normal aspect of how MNEs must operate. Where the pricing does not accord with internationally applicable norms or with the arm’s length principle under domestic law, the tax administration may consider this to be “mis-pricing”, “incorrect pricing”, “unjustified pricing” or non-arm’s length pricing, and issues of tax avoidance and evasion may potentially arise. Two examples illustrate these points:
Example: Solid State Drive Manufacturer
Example: Luxury Watch Manufacturer
$100 distribution costs are exactly equal to the $1600 retail price. Country B’s tax administration considers that the transfer price should be set at $1400 so that Country B’s unit shows the group’s
$100 profit that would be liable for tax.
B.1.1.8. A possible reason for associated entities charging transfer prices for intra-group trade is to measure the performance of the individual entities in a multinational group. The individual entities within a multinational group may be separate profit centres and transfer prices are required to determine the profitability of the entities. However, not every entity would necessarily make a profit or loss under arm’s length conditions. Rationally, an entity having a view to its own interests as a distinct legal entity would only acquire products or services from an associated entity if the purchase price was equal to, or cheaper than, prices being charged by unrelated suppliers. This principle applies, conversely, in relation to an entity providing a product or service; it would rationally only sell products or services to an associated entity if the sale price was equal to, or higher than, prices paid by unrelated purchasers. On this basis prices should gravitate towards the “arm’s length price”, i.e. the transaction price to which two unrelated parties would agree.
B.1.1.9. While the above explanation of transfer pricing sounds logical and simple enough, arriving at an appropriate transfer price may be a complex task particularly because of the difficulties in identifying and valuing intangibles transferred and/or services provided. For example, intangibles could be of various different types such as industrial assets like patents, trade types, trade names, designs or models, literary and artistic property rights, know-how or trade secrets, which may or may not be reflected in the accounts. There are thus many complexities involved in dealing with transfer pricing in cross-border transactions between MNE entities.
B.1.1.10. Transfer pricing is a term that is also used in economics, so it is useful to see how economists define it. In business economics a transfer price is considered to be the amount that is charged by a part or segment of an organization for a product, asset or service that it supplies to another part or segment of the same organization. This definition is therefore consistent with the approach described above.
B.1.2.1. Transfer prices serve to determine the income of both parties involved in the cross-border transaction. The transfer price therefore influences the tax base of the countries involved in cross-border transactions.
B.1.2.2. In any cross-border tax scenario, the parties involved are the relevant entities of the MNE group along with the tax authorities of the countries involved in the transaction. When one country’s tax authority adjusts the profit of a member of the MNE group, this may have an effect on the tax base of another country. In other words, cross-border tax situations involve issues related to jurisdiction, allocation of income and valuation.
B.1.2.3. The key jurisdiction issues are: which government should tax the income of the group entities engaged in the transaction, and what happens if both governments claim the right to tax the same income? If the tax base arises in more than one country, should one of the governments give tax relief to prevent double taxation of the relevant entities’ income, and if so, which one?
B.1.2.4. An added dimension to the jurisdictional issue is that of the motivation for transfer pricing manipulation, as some MNEs engage in practices that seek to reduce their overall tax bills. This may involve profit shifting through non-arm’s length transfer pricing in order to reduce the aggregate tax burden of the MNE. However, while reduction of taxes may be a motive influencing the MNE in setting transfer prices for intra-group transactions, it is not the only factor that determines transfer pricing policies and practices.
B.1.2.5. The aim of non-arm’s length transfer pricing in such cases is usually to reduce an MNE’s worldwide taxes. This can be achieved by shifting profits from associated entities in higher tax countries to associated entities in relatively lower tax countries through either under-charging or over-charging the associated entity for intra-group trade. For example, if the parent company in an MNE group has a tax rate in the residence country of 30%, and has a subsidiary resident in another country with a tax rate of 20%, the parent may have an incentive to shift profits to its subsidiary to reduce its tax rate on these amounts from 30% to 20%. This may be achieved by the parent being over-charged for the acquisition of property and services from its subsidiary.
B.1.2.6. While the most obvious motivation may be to reduce the MNE’s worldwide taxation, other factors may influence transfer pricing decisions, such as imputation of tax benefits in the parent company’s country of residence.
B.1.2.7. A further motivation for an MNE to engage in such practices is to use a tax benefit, such as a tax loss, in a jurisdiction in which it operates. This may be either a current year loss or a loss that has been carried forward from a prior year by an associated company. In some cases, an international enterprise may wish to take advantage of an associated company’s tax losses before they expire, in situations where losses can only be carried forward for a certain number of years. Even if there are no restrictions on carrying forward tax losses by an associated company, the international enterprise has an incentive to use the losses as quickly as possible. In other words, profits may sometimes be shifted to certain countries in order to obtain specific tax benefits.
B.1.2.8. MNEs are global structures which may share common resources and overheads. From the perspective of the MNE these resources need to be allocated with maximum efficiency in an optimal manner.
B.1.2.9. From the government’s perspective, the allocation of costs and income from the MNE’s resources is an essential element in calculating the tax payable. There can thus be a dispute between countries in the allocation of costs and resources, owing to their objective of maximizing the tax base in their respective jurisdictions.
B.1.2.10. From the MNE’s perspective, any trade or taxation barriers in the countries in which it operates raise the MNE’s transaction costs while distorting the allocation of resources. Furthermore, many of the common resources which are a source of competitive advantage to an MNE cannot be separated from the income of the MNE’s group members for tax purposes. This is especially true in the case of intangibles and service-related intra-group transactions.
B.1.2.11. Mere allocation of income and expenses to one or more members of the MNE group is not sufficient; the income and expenses must also be valued. A key issue of transfer pricing is therefore the valuation of intra-group transfers.
B.1.2.12. As an MNE is an integrated structure with the ability to exploit international differentials and to utilize economies of integration not available to a stand-alone entity, transfer prices within the group are unlikely to be the same prices that unrelated parties would negotiate.
B.1.2.13. International tax issues, especially transfer pricing related issues, throw open a number of challenges, the complexity and magnitude of which are often especially daunting for smaller tax administrations.
B.1.2.14. One such complex yet pressing issue, especially given the exponential rise of the digital economy, is arriving at the appropriate arm’s-length price for transactions involving intangibles. Intangibles are often unique, mobile and difficult to value and this presents unique problems for taxpayers and tax authorities alike.
B.1.2.15. Another set of challenges involve transfer pricing issues related to business restructuring and intra-group services. Transfer pricing documentation requirements for MNE’s represent one more key focus area given the evolution of stringent documentation standards, including country-by-country reporting, not to mention the increasing information exchange between governments on international transactions.
B.1.2.16. All these basic and critical transfer pricing issues are addressed in detail in this Manual in separate chapters.
B.1.2.17. Overall, it should be amply clear that transfer pricing rules are essential for countries in order to protect their tax base, to eliminate double taxation and to enhance cross-border trade. For developing countries, transfer pricing rules are essential to provide a climate of certainty and an environment for increased cross-border trade while at the same time ensuring that the country is not losing out on critical tax revenue. Transfer pricing is thus of paramount importance and hence detailed transfer pricing rules are essential.
B.1.3.1. This section aims to trace the history and the reasons for transfer pricing taxation regimes. It is important to note that transfer pricing essentially involves the application of economic principles to a fluid marketplace. Thus new approaches and techniques that help arrive at the appropriate transfer price from the perspective of one or more factors in the system continue to be developed.
B.1.3.2. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD Guidelines) as amended and updated, were first published in 1995. This followed previous OECD reports on transfer pricing in 1979 and 1984. The OECD Guidelines represent a consensus among OECD Members, mostly developed countries, and have largely been followed in domestic transfer pricing regulations of these countries. Another transfer pricing framework of note which has evolved over time is represented by the USA Transfer Pricing Regulations (26 USC 482).
B.1.3.3. Special attention must be focused on the meaning and scope of the term “associated enterprises”, which is a topic of importance but one not defined or discussed adequately so far. This issue is discussed in more detail below.
B.1.3.4. From a financial perspective, transfer pricing is probably the most important cross-border tax issue globally. This is partly because the term “MNE” not only covers large corporate groups but also smaller groups with one or more subsidiaries or permanent establishments (PEs) in countries other than those where the parent company or head office is located.
B.1.3.5. Parent companies of large MNE groups usually have intermediary or sub-holdings in several countries around the world. From a management perspective, the decision-making in MNE groups may range from highly centralized structures to highly decentralized structures with profit responsibility allocated to individual group members. Such group structures typically include:
Ø Research and development (R&D) and services that may be concentrated in centres operating for the whole group or specific parts of the group;
Ø Intangibles, developed by entities of the MNE group; these may be concentrated around certain group members;
Ø Finance and “captive insurance companies”19 which may operate as insurers or internal finance companies; and
Ø Production units, where the production or assembly of final products may take place in many countries around the world.
B.1.3.6. The on-going and continuous relocation of the production of components and finished products to particular countries; the rise of many new economies in the developing countries with their infrastructure, skilled labour, low production costs, conducive economic climate etc.; the round-the-clock trading in financial instruments and commodities; and the rise of e-commerce and Internet-based business models are a few of the many reasons why transfer pricing has become such a high profile issue over the last couple of decades.
B.1.3.7. Other considerations have also had an impact on the importance of transfer pricing. Some developed countries have tightened their transfer pricing legislation to address the issue of foreign enterprises active in their countries paying lower tax than comparable domestic groups. Consequently, some developing countries have introduced equally exhaustive transfer pricing regulations in their countries to keep their tax bases intact. Other developing countries are recognizing that they need to effectively address the challenges of transfer pricing in some way.
B.1.3.8. Countries with less sophisticated tax systems and administrations have run the risk of absorbing the effect of stronger enforcement of transfer pricing in developed countries and in effect paying at least some of the MNEs’ tax costs in those countries. In order to avoid this, many countries have introduced new transfer pricing rules.
B.1.3.9. The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs continues to monitor developments in transfer pricing, in particular developments in the use of profit-based methods, and in comparability matters. The recent thrust of the OECD has been studying, along with G20 countries, the current international taxation rules to identify weakness which may result in opportunities for Base Erosion and Profit Sharing (BEPS). In September 2013, the OECD launched the Action Plan on BEPS initiative which identified 15 actions aimed at providing new or reinforced international standards and measures to help countries tackle BEPS. The OECD BEPS initiative released 7 preliminary reports in 2014 and followed it with the release of a final package of 15 reports, one for each Action Plan, at the G20 Finance Ministers meeting in October 2015. The Action Plans provide Model provisions to prevent treaty abuse; call for standardized Country-by-Country Reporting in terms of documentation requirements; elucidate a peer review process for addressing harmful tax practices; endorse a minimum standard to secure progress on dispute resolution and make many other such recommendations.
B.1.3.10. While the OECD BEPS initiative, theoretically, is aimed at revamping international tax standards to keep pace with the changing global business environment, the practical implementation of such BEPS measures is dependent on the individual countries making necessary changes to their domestic laws as well as modifying treaty provisions with other countries and doing all of this in a coordinated manner — which is yet to happen.
B.1.3.11. It is to be noted that the OECD TP Guidelines have emerged from Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention; they have also been applied in the context of the UN Model Double Tax Convention. However, developing countries have found it very difficult to implement such guidelines in practice. There are presently five different prescribed transfer pricing methods (see Chapter B.3.) that may be used under the OECD Guidelines in various situations to arrive at an arm’s length price. However, while these methods may be able to provide a computation of the arm’s length price (i.e., an appropriate transfer price) within the MNE, in practice disagreements between tax authorities in applying these methods may result in taxable profits between two MNEs being either more than 100% or less than 100% of actual combined profits. This situation could arise as a result of adjustments carried out by one tax authority without corresponding adjustments by the tax authority in the other country, where such adjustments are not endorsed in the relevant double taxation treaty.
B.1.3.12. The European Commission has also developed proposals on income allocation to members of MNEs active in the European Union (EU). Some of the approaches considered have included the possibility of a “common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB)” and “home state taxation”. Under both options transfer pricing would be replaced by formulary apportionment, whereby taxing rights would be allocated between countries based upon the apportionment of the European business activity of an MNE conducted in those countries. Apportionment would be under an agreed formula, based upon some criteria of business activity such as some combination of sales, payroll, and assets. In recent years, the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum21 has developed proposals to improve transfer pricing dispute resolution (Mutual Agreement Procedure, arbitration and Advance Pricing Arrangements), and a proposal to harmonize transfer pricing documentation requirements. The proposals on EU transfer pricing documentation requirements and on the implementation of the EU Arbitration Convention have been adopted as “Codes of Conduct” by the EU Council. The EU Council also issued, on 17 May 2011, some guidelines on low-value-adding intra-group services; they are endorsed on the basis that their implementation should contribute to reducing tax disputes. In January 2016, the European Commission also published a Communication on a “Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union” which aims to set out how the OECD/G20 BEPS measures can be implemented within the EU.
B.1.3.13. The United Nations for its part published an important report on “International Income Taxation and Developing Countries” in 1988. The report discusses significant opportunities for transfer pricing manipulation by MNEs to the detriment of developing country tax bases. It recommends a range of mechanisms specially tailored to deal with the particular intra-group transactions by developing countries. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also issued a major report on Transfer Pricing in 1999.The United Nations is again taking a leadership role, through this Transfer Pricing Manual, in trying to arrive at updated global transfer pricing guidance which can be used by countries all over the world in developing and implementing their transfer pricing regulations.
B.1.4.1. The UN Model Tax Convention Article 9(1) states the following
(a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or
(b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of these conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly”. In other words, the transactions between two related parties must be based on the arm’s length principle (ALP). The term “arm’s length principle” itself is not a term specifically used in Article 9, but is well accepted by countries as encapsulating the approach taken in Article 9, with some differing interpretations as to what this means in practice. The principle set out above in the UN Model has also been reiterated in the OECD Model Tax Convention and the OECD Guidelines as supplemented and amended.
B.1.4.2. The arm’s length principle is thus the accepted guiding principle in establishing an acceptable transfer price under Article 9 of the UN Model. The arm’s length principle by itself is not new; it has its origins in contract law to arrange an equitable agreement that will stand up to legal scrutiny, even though the parties involved may have shared interests.
B.1.4.3. Under the arm’s length principle, transactions within a group are compared to transactions between unrelated entities under comparable circumstances to determine acceptable transfer prices. Thus, the marketplace comprising independent entities is the measure or benchmark for verifying the transfer prices for intra-entity or intra-group transactions and their acceptability for taxation purposes.
B.1.4.4. The rationale for the arm’s length principle itself is that because the market governs most of the transactions in an economy it is appropriate to treat intra-group transactions as equivalent to those between independent entities. Under the arm’s length principle, intra-group transactions are tested and may be adjusted if the transfer prices are found to deviate from comparable arm’s length transactions. The arm’s length principle is argued to be acceptable to everyone concerned as it uses the marketplace as the norm.
B.1.4.5. An argument in favour of using the arm’s length principle is that it is geographically neutral, as it treats profits from investments in different places in a similar manner. However, this claim of neutrality is conditional on consistent rules and administration of the arm’s length principle throughout the jurisdictions in which an international enterprise operates. In the absence of consistent rules and administration, international enterprises may have an incentive to avoid taxation through transfer pricing manipulation.
B.1.4.6. While it is relatively easy to describe the arm’s length principle, establishing guidelines on the practical application of the principle is a complex task. Practical application of the principle requires identification and application of reliable comparable transactions.
B.1.4.7. A practical example follows of a situation where the arm’s length principle needs to be applied:
Example: Automobile Seat Manufacturer
Assume a Corporation P (parent) manufactures automobile seats in Country A, then sells the finished seats to its Subsidiary S in Country B which in turn sells those finished seats in Country B to unrelated parties (e.g., the public at large). In such a case S’s taxable profits are determined by the sale price of the seats to the unrelated parties minus the price at which the seats were obtained from its parent corporation (cost of goods sold in the accounts of S, in this case the transfer price) and its expenses other than the cost of goods sold.
If Country A where the seats are manufactured has a tax rate much lower than the tax rate in Country B where the seats are sold to the public at large, i.e. to unrelated parties, then perhaps Corporation P would have an incentive to book as much profit as possible in Country A and to this end show a very high sales value (or transfer price) of the seats to its Subsidiary S in Country B. If the tax rate was higher in Country A than in Country B, then the corporation would have an incentive to show a very low sales value (or transfer price) of the seats to its Subsidiary S in Country B and concentrate almost the entire profit in the hands of Country B.
This is a clear example that when associated enterprises deal with each other their commercial or financial relations may not be directly affected by market forces but may be influenced more by other considerations. The arm’s length principle therefore seeks to determine whether the transactions between related taxpayers (in this case Corporation P and its Subsidiary S) are appropriately priced to reflect their true tax liability by comparing them to similar transactions between unrelated taxpayers at arm’s length.
B.1.4.8. Intangibles present a unique challenge to applying the arm’s-length principle to arrive at the appropriate transfer price as in practice they may be tough to identify, value and find comparables for. A whole host of transfer pricing issues has opened up due to the rapid increase in the use of intangibles by MNE’s.
B.1.4.9. All parties involved, and especially the tax authorities conducting transfer pricing examinations, should be aware that there can be many factors affecting the arm’s length price. These factors range from government policies and regulations to cash-flows of the entities in the MNE group.
B.1.4.10. There should not be an implicit assumption on the part of the tax authorities that there is profit manipulation by the MNE simply because there is an adjustment to approximate to the arm’s length transaction; any such adjustment may arise irrespective of the contractual terms between the entities. Another incorrect assumption, often made in practice, is that the commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises and in the marketplace will without fail be different and always at odds with each other.
B.1.4.11. In many cases the MNEs themselves may have an incentive to set an arm’s length price for their intra-group transactions so as to judge the true performance of their underlying entities.
B.1.4.12. Overall, the underlying idea behind the arm’s length principle is the attempt to place transactions, both uncontrolled and controlled, on equal terms with respect to the tax advantages (or disadvantages) that they create. The arm’s length principle has been widely accepted and has found its way into most transfer pricing legislation across the world.
B.1.4.13. An alternative to the arm’s length principle might be a Global Formulary Apportionment Method, which would allocate the global profits of an MNE group amongst the associated enterprises on the basis of a multi-factor weighted formula (using factors such as property, payroll and sales for example, or such other factors as may be defined when adopting the formula). A formulary apportionment approach is currently used by some states of the USA, cantons of Switzerland and provinces of Canada. Also, the Brazilian transfer pricing rules set out a maximum ceiling on the expenses that may be deducted for tax purposes in respect of imports and lay down a minimum level for the gross income in relation to exports, effectively using a set formula to allocate income to Brazil. The EU is also considering a formulary approach, at the option of taxpayers, to harmonize its corporate taxes under the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) initiative.
B.1.4.14. The process to arrive at the appropriate arm’s length price typically involves the following processes or steps:
Ø Comparability analysis;
Ø Evaluation of transactions;
Ø Evaluation of separate and combined transactions;
Ø Use of an arm’s length range or a central point in the range;
Ø Use of multiple year data;
Ø Location savings and location rents;
Ø Intentional set-offs; and
Ø Use of customs valuation.
B.1.4.15. The above processes are discussed in detail in Chapter B.2 of this Manual on Comparability Analysis.
B.1.4.16. The transfer pricing methods are set forth in more detail at B.1.5. below, and are dealt with comprehensively at Chapter B.3. It is, however, important to note at the outset that there is no single transfer pricing method which is generally applicable in every possible situation.
B.1.4.17. Computing an arm’s length price using transfer pricing analysis is a complex task. The task requires effort and goodwill from both the taxpayer and the tax authorities in terms of documentation, groundwork, analysis and research; comparables play a critical role. This Manual seeks to assist developing countries in that task as much as possible, but it has to be recognized that the task will rarely be a simple one.
B.1.5.1. The key question is how to apply the arm’s length principle in practice to determine the arm’s length price of a transaction. Several acceptable transfer pricing methods exist, providing a conceptual framework for the determination of the arm’s length price. No single method is considered suitable in every situation and the taxpayer must select the method that provides the best estimate of an arm’s length price for the transaction in question.
B.1.5.2. All these transfer pricing methods rely directly or indirectly on the comparable profit, price or margin information of similar transactions. This information may be an “internal comparable” based on similar uncontrolled transactions between the entity and a third party or an “external comparable” involving independent enterprises in the same market or industry.
B.1.5.3. The six major transfer pricing methods (discussed in detail at Chapter B.3. of this Manual) are as follows:
B.1.5.4. Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) The CUP Method compares the price charged for a property or service transferred in a controlled transaction to the price charged for a comparable property or service transferred in a comparable uncontrolled transaction in comparable circumstances.
B.1.5.5. Resale Price Method (RPM) The Resale Price Method is used to determine the price to be paid by a reseller for a product purchased from an associated enterprise and resold to an independent enterprise. The purchase price is set so that the margin earned by the reseller is sufficient to allow it to cover its selling and operating expenses and make an appropriate profit.
B.1.5.6. Cost Plus (C+ or CP) The Cost Plus Method is used to determine the appropriate price to be charged by a supplier of property or services to a related purchaser. The price is determined by adding to costs incurred by the supplier an appropriate gross margin so that the supplier will make an appropriate profit in the light of market conditions and functions performed.
B.1.5.7. Two classes of transactional profit methods are recognized by the US Section 482 IRS regulations and the OECD Guidelines. These may be categorized as profit-comparison methods (Transactional Net Margin Method or TNMM/Comparable Profits Method or CPM) and profit-split methods.
B.1.5.8. Profit comparison methods (TNMM/CPM). These methods seek to determine the level of profits that would have resulted from controlled transactions by reference to the return realized by the comparable independent enterprise. The TNMM determines the net profit margin relative to an appropriate base realized from the controlled transactions by reference to the net profit margin relative to the same appropriate base realized from uncontrolled transactions.
B.1.5.9. Profit-split methods. Profit-split methods take the combined profits earned by two related parties from one or a series of transactions and then divide those profits using an economically valid defined basis that aims at replicating the division of profits that would have been anticipated in an agreement made at arm’s length. Arm’s length pricing is therefore derived for both parties by working back from profit to price.
B.1.5.10. Sixth method (Commodity Rule). The Commodity Rule, also known as the ‘sixth method’ is especially applicable to commodity transactions. It is in use, with many variations thereof, by several developing countries for arriving at the arm’s-length price of import and export transactions of commodities such as grains, oil and oilseeds, oil and gas, mining and fishing.
B.1.5.11. The workings of the Commodity Rule may resemble the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method. The fact pattern addressed by this method is, for example, where one of the associated enterprises engaged in exporting commodities invoices an associated enterprise in relation to the sale of the commodities though it ships the commodities to a party (and jurisdiction) different from the associated enterprise that it (the seller) invoiced. Furthermore, the actual shipment date is usually at a later point in time than date of the original sale between the associated enterprises and the intercompany invoice date. Typically, the associated enterprise being invoiced is a trading entity that carries title to the shipped goods for a limited period of time and the subsequent shipment is to a destination determined by a third party that has bought the commodities from the associated trader (not to the residence of the associated trading entity). There are a number of permutations of this Commodity Rule observed in practice related to different aspects that make up the rule. Chapter B.3. deals with this sixth method, namely the Commodity Rule, in detail.
B.1.5.12. The first three methods above (i.e. CUP, RPM and CM) are often called “traditional transaction” methods and the last two are called “transactional profit methods” or “profit-based” methods. As noted above, there is growing acceptance of the practical importance of the profit-based methods. All these methods are widely accepted by national tax authorities. It must be noted that the US regulations provide for the use of additional methods applicable to global dealing operations like the Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction (CUT) Method. This method is similar to the CUP in that it determines an arm’s length royalty rate for an intangible by comparison to uncontrolled transfers of comparable intangible property in comparable circumstances.
B.1.5.13. Other unspecified methods may be used to evaluate whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is at arm’s length. Any such method should be applied in accordance with the reliability considerations used to apply the specified methods described above. An unspecified method should take into account the general principle that uncontrolled taxpayers evaluate the terms of a transaction by considering the realistic alternatives to that transaction, and only enter into a particular transaction if none of the alternatives is preferable to it. In establishing whether a controlled transaction achieves an arm’s length result, an unspecified method should provide information on the prices or profits that the controlled taxpayer could have realized by choosing a realistic alternative to the controlled transaction. These methods are discussed in detail at Chapter B.3.
B.1.6.1. Generally, a transfer pricing exercise involves various steps such as:
Ø Gathering background information;
Ø Industry analysis;
Ø Comparability analysis (which includes functional analysis);
Ø Selection of the method for determining arm’s length pricing; and
Ø Determination of the arm’s length price.
B.1.6.2. At every stage of the transfer pricing process, varying degrees of documentation are necessary, such as information on contemporaneous transactions. One pressing concern regarding transfer pricing documentation is the risk of overburdening the taxpayer with disproportionately high costs in obtaining relevant documentation or in an exhaustive search for comparables that may not exist. Ideally, the taxpayer should not be expected to provide more documentation than is objectively required for a reasonable determination by the tax authorities of whether or not the taxpayer has complied with the arm’s length principle. Cumbersome documentation demands may affect how a country is viewed as an investment destination and may have particularly discouraging effects on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
B.1.6.3. Broadly, the information or documents that the taxpayer needs to provide can be classified as:
B.1.6.4. The domestic legislation of some countries may also require “contemporaneous documentation”. Such countries may consider defining the term “contemporaneous” in their domestic legislation. The term “contemporaneous” means “existing or occurring in the same period of time”. Different countries have different views about how the word “contemporaneous” is to be interpreted with respect to transfer pricing documentation. Some believe that it refers to using comparables that are contemporaneous with the transaction, regardless of when the documentation is produced or when the comparables are obtained. Other countries interpret contemporaneous to mean using only those comparables available at the time the transaction occurs.
B.1.6.5. An important development in the documentation requirements for transfer pricing purposes is the recent effort to establish a uniform documentation standard. In connection with this, in 2015, the OECD/G20 BEPS Project issued guidance which set out a standardized three-tier approach to transfer pricing documentation. It suggests that the documentation should include (i) a Master File containing general information about the MNE group relevant to all MNE group members; (ii) a Local File referring specifically to material transactions of the MNE group members resident in the local jurisdiction and setting out the taxpayer’s transfer pricing methodology and
(iii) a Country-by-Country Report (“CbC Report”) containing information relating to global allocation among the MNE’s taxing jurisdictions and taxes paid along with economic activity indicators in the MNE group. The Final BEPS Report included agreed guidance on implementing the new documentation and reporting rules. See further Chapter C.2.
B.1.6.6. These OECD/G20 BEPS guidelines relating to documentation cannot be automatically assumed to be adopted in full by developing countries. The guidelines have to be analyzed as to how in practice they may be applicable in a developing country context and the constraints that may exist in the MNE and the tax administrations in developing countries have to be kept in mind. Developing countries may, however, assume that in future MNEs generally will prepare the Master File, and that the largest MNEs will additionally prepare the CbC Report. The key question for developing countries would likely be whether the Local File envisioned in these BEPS guidelines should be adopted without modification in the country.
B.1.6.7. Intangibles (literally meaning assets that cannot be touched) encompass something which is neither a physical nor a financial asset, which is capable of being owned or controlled for commercial purposes, whose use or transfer would be compensated had it occurred between independent enterprises in comparable circumstances. This definition is the same as that in the OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan 8 Report, which looks at transfer pricing issues involving intangibles.
B.1.6.8. A common distinction is made between legally registered and non-registered intangibles. Another category of intangibles is that of ‘soft’ intangibles, which refer to items such as network effects, internal procedures and best practices that may not be legally registered and may not be separately traded between third parties though they might form a key part of the success or failure of companies in competitive markets.
B.1.6.9. For the purpose of transfer pricing issues, intangibles are typically divided into “trade intangibles” and “marketing intangibles”. Trade intangibles such as know-how relate to the production of goods and the provision of services and are typically developed through research and development. Marketing intangibles refer to intangibles such as trade names, trademarks and client lists that aid in the commercial exploitation of a product or service.
B.1.6.10. For transfer pricing, whether a particular intangible is ‘unique and valuable’ is an important, separate concept and is measured by whether such intangible is not present in otherwise comparable uncontrolled transactions and whether it leads to significant expected premium value in business operations
B.1.6.11. There are many types of intangibles — including “market features” i.e. specific non-local characteristics of a certain market which may affect arm’s-length, “goodwill” or “ongoing concern value”, “group synergies”, existence of a qualified and skilled “workforce” which may all meet the criteria of being considered an intangible depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.
B.1.6.12. The analysis of transactions involving intangibles is thus quite complicated and typically, at the fact-finding phase itself, one must consider the development (or else acquisition from third-parties) of the intangibles, the enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles — together collectively known as “DAEMPE” contributions.
B.1.6.13. The legal ownership and contractual terms also form the basis for analysis of intangibles, and their transfer, between associated enterprises. Legal ownership of intangibles does not by itself confer a right to ultimately retain returns derived at MNE level. What is relevant for transfer pricing is to determine with accuracy the valuable contributions by the associated enterprises in terms of functions performed, risks assumed and assets utilized in the context of value creation.
B.1.6.14. Further, the question of who should bear the difference between ex ante returns and actual ex post returns depends on the extent to which the relevant risk is assumed by the parties and requires proper delineation of the transaction involving intangibles.
B.1.6.15. It suffices to say that the arm’s length principle often becomes very difficult to apply to intangibles. The multitude of issues involved in the transfer pricing of transactions involving intangibles has been dealt with in detail in Chapter B.5, of this Manual.
B.1.6.16. The Profit Split Method is typically used in cases where both parties to the transaction make unique and valuable contributions. However, care should be taken to identify the intangibles in question. Experience has shown that the transfer pricing methods most likely to prove useful in matters involving transfers of intangibles or rights in intangibles are the CUP Method and the Transactional Profit Split Method. Valuation techniques can be useful tools in some circumstances.
B.1.6.17. There is no universally accepted definition for business restructuring but in the transfer pricing scenario, it is considered to be cross-border redeployment of functions, assets and risks to which a profit/loss potential may be attached. Business restructuring has a very wide ambit; typically, it may concern the conversion of local full-fledged manufacturers into contract manufacturers; the adoption of a limited-risk distribution structure by a distributor; or the transfer of intangibles to principal companies abroad.
B.1.6.18. The general rule is that businesses may organize their activities in the manner they see fit. The key issue becomes whether such restructuring is undertaken in a manner consistent with the arm’s-length principle.
B.1.6.19. For developing countries, it is important to ensure that the arm’s-length principle is applied neutrally i.e. not distinguishing whether one of the entities in the restructuring is in a developing country. There might be implementation issues with respect to the lack of comparables in a developing country but that should not affect the fact that the transfer pricing effects of a business restructuring should be the same regardless of where the reorganization actually takes place.
B.1.6.20. Chapter B.7 deals with the various aspects of the transfer pricing of business restructurings in more detail.
B.1.6.21. An intra-group service, as the name suggests, is a service provided by one enterprise to another in the same MNE group. For a service to be considered an intra-group service it must be similar to a service which an independent enterprise in comparable circumstances would be willing to pay for in-house or else perform by itself. If not, the activity should not be considered as an intra-group service under the arm’s length principle. The rationale is that if specific group members do not need the activity and would not be willing to pay for it if they were independent, the activity cannot justify a payment. Further, any incidental benefit gained solely by being a member of an MNE group, without any specific services provided or performed, should be ignored.
B.1.6.22. In the case of centralized services, each associated enterprise within the MNE group receiving a benefit from a centralized service has to be charged at the arm’s length price for the services. These centralized services may be part of an associated enterprise’s main business activity or it may be low-margin services, for example administrative services. Different charging methods may be used appropriately for such low and high-margin services.
B.1.6.23. An arm’s length price for intra-group services may be determined directly or indirectly — in the case of a direct charge, the CUP Method could be used if comparable services are provided in the open market. In the absence of comparable services, the Cost Plus Method could be appropriate.
B.1.6.24. If a direct charge method is difficult to apply, the MNE may apply the charge indirectly by cost sharing, by incorporating a service charge or by not charging at all. Such methods would usually be accepted by the tax authorities only if the charges are supported by foreseeable benefits for the recipients of the services, the methods are based on sound accounting and commercial principles and they are capable of producing charges or allocations that are commensurate with the reasonably expected benefits to the recipient. In addition, tax authorities might allow a fixed charge on intra-group services under safe harbour rules or a presumptive taxation regime, for instance where it is not practical to calculate an arm’s length price for the performance of services and tax accordingly.
B.1.6.25. A separate chapter, Chapter B.4 deals with the issues related to intra-group services.
B.1.6.26. Cost-contribution agreements (CCAs) may be formulated among group entities to jointly develop, produce or obtain rights, assets or services. Each participant bears a share of the costs and in return is expected to receive pro rata (i.e. proportionate) benefits from the developed property without further payment. Such arrangements tend to involve research and development or services such as centralized management, advertising campaigns etc.
B.1.6.27. In a CCA there is not always a benefit that ultimately arises; only an expected benefit during the course of the CCA which may or may not ultimately materialize. The interest of each participant should be agreed upon at the outset. The contributions are required to be consistent with the amount an independent enterprise would have contributed under comparable circumstances, given these expected benefits. The CCA is not a transfer pricing method; it is a contract. However, it may have transfer pricing consequences and therefore needs to comply with the arm’s length principle.
B.1.6.28. A CCA will fail the arm’s-length test if the contributions of the participants are inconsistent with their share of expected benefits. If a participant’s share of the benefits is inadequate in comparison to its contribution, a tax authority may make an adjustment to rectify the imbalance. In certain cases, the CCA terms might differ from the economic reality of a CCA and the entire CCA, or some terms thereof, may be disregarded by a tax authority.
B.1.6.29. A separate chapter, Chapter B.6, deals with the issues related to cost-contribution arrangements.
B.1.6.30. There is often concern expressed by enterprises over aspects of data collection by tax authorities and its confidentiality.
Tax authorities need to have access to very sensitive and highly confidential information about taxpayers, such as data relating to margins, profitability, business contacts and contracts. Confidence in the tax system means that this information needs to be treated very carefully, especially as it may reveal sensitive business information about that taxpayer’s profitability, business strategies and so forth.
B.1.6.31. Using a secret comparable generally means the use of information or data about a taxpayer by the tax authorities to form the basis of risk assessment or a transfer pricing audit of another taxpayer. That second taxpayer is often not given access to that information as it may reveal confidential information about a competitor’s operations.
B.1.6.32. Caution should be exercised in permitting the use of secret comparables in the transfer pricing audit unless the tax authorities are able to (within limits of confidentiality) disclose the data to the taxpayer so as to assist the taxpayer to defend itself against an adjustment. Taxpayers may otherwise contend that the use of such secret information is against the basic principles of equity, as they are required to benchmark controlled transactions with comparables not available to them — without the opportunity to question comparability or argue that adjustments are needed.
B.1.7.1. Article 9 (“Associated Enterprises”) of tax treaties typically only regulates the basic conditions for adjustment of transfer pricing and corresponding adjustments in case of double taxation. The Article advises the application of the arm’s length principle but does not go into the particulars of transfer pricing rules. It is generally understood that Article 9 is not “self-executing” as to domestic application — it does not create a transfer pricing regime in a country where such a regime does not already exist.
B.1.7.2. It should be recognized that transfer pricing regimes are creatures of domestic law and each country is required to formulate detailed domestic legislation to implement transfer pricing rules. Many countries have passed such domestic transfer pricing legislation which typically tends to limit the application of transfer pricing rules to cross-border related party transactions only.
B.1.7.3. It is important to note that the definition of an “associated enterprise” is based on domestic circumstances and hence varies, to some extent, amongst different countries. For example, a majority of countries employ a hybrid qualification for such taxpayers, namely a mixture of qualification by minimum shareholding (generally equal to or more than 50%) and effective control by any other factors (dependency in financial, personnel and trading conditions). De minimis criteria for the value of related party transactions may also exist. In other words, some transactions may be considered small enough that the costs of compliance and collection do not justify applying the transfer pricing rules, but this should not allow what are in reality larger transactions to be split into apparently smaller transactions to avoid the operation of the law.
B.1.7.4. It must be noted that transfer pricing being essentially domestic regulation has a long history, and international consistency of transfer pricing rules is beneficial not only regarding the basic structure of taxable persons and events but also in the manner of application of the arm’s length principle. However, it is ultimately for each country to adopt an approach that works in its domestic legal and administrative framework, and is consistent with its treaty obligations.
B.1.7.5. There are countries which have “safe harbour” rules providing that if a taxpayer meets certain criteria it is exempt from the application of a particular rule, or at least exempt from scrutiny as to whether the rule has been met. The intention is to increase taxpayer certainty and reduce taxpayer compliance costs, but also to reduce the administration’s costs of collection, as well as allowing the administration to concentrate scarce audit and other resources on those cases where more is likely to be at stake in terms of non-compliance and revenue.
B.1.7.6. Safe harbour rules are provisions whereby if a taxpayer’s reported profits are within a certain range or percentage or under a certain amount, the taxpayer is not required to follow a complex and burdensome rule, such as applying the transfer price methodologies.
They may only be used by the taxpayers at their option. There are some risks to safe harbours, such as arbitrariness in setting parameters and range; equity and uniformity issues; incompatibility with the arm’s length principle; opportunities for tax planning and tax evasion and potential risk of double taxation. In any case, consistent with the purpose of this Manual, introducing a safe harbour rule should involve analysis of whether, in a broad sense, the administrative and simplification benefits of a safe harbour outweigh the potential costs of applying something other than the arm’s length principle.
B.1.7.7. Some countries operate Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules. CFC rules are designed to prevent tax being deferred or avoided by taxpayers using foreign corporations in which they hold a controlling shareholding in low-tax jurisdictions and “parking” income there. CFC rules treat this income as though it has been repatriated and it is therefore taxable prior to actual repatriation. Where there are CFC rules in addition to transfer pricing rules, an important question arises as to which rules have priority in adjusting the taxpayer’s returns. Due to the fact that the transfer pricing rules assume all transactions are originally conducted under the arm’s length principle, it is widely considered that transfer pricing rules should have priority in application over CFC rules. After the application of transfer pricing rules, countries can apply the CFC rules on the retained profits of foreign subsidiaries.
B.1.7.8. Domestic tax laws in many countries consider a company to be “thinly capitalized” when there is a much greater proportionate contribution of debt than of equity in its capital. This is because it may be sometimes more advantageous from a tax viewpoint to finance a company by way of debt (i.e., leveraging) rather than by way of equity contributions as typically the payment of interest on the debts may be deducted for tax purposes whereas distributions are non-deductible dividends. To prevent tax avoidance by such excessive leveraging, many countries have introduced rules to prevent thin capitalization, typically by prescribing a maximum debt to equity ratio. Country tax administrations often introduce rules that place a limit on the amount of interest that can be deducted in calculating the measure of a company’s profit for tax purposes. Such rules are designed to counter cross-border shifting of profit through excessive debt, and thus aim to protect a country’s tax base. From a policy perspective, failure to tackle excessive interest payments to associated enterprises gives MNEs an advantage over purely domestic businesses which are unable to gain such tax advantages.
B.1.7.9. Another important issue for implementing domestic laws is the documentation requirement associated with transfer pricing. Tax authorities need a variety of business documents which support the application of the arm’s length principle by specified taxpayers. However, there is some divergence of legislation in terms of the nature of documents required, penalties imposed, and the degree of the examiners’ authority to collect information when taxpayers fail to produce such documents. There is also the issue of whether documentation needs to be “contemporaneous”, as noted above.
B.1.7.10. In deciding on the requirements for such documentation there needs to be, as already noted, recognition of the compliance costs imposed on taxpayers required to produce the documentation. Another issue is whether the benefits, if any, of the documentation requirements from the administration’s view in dealing with a potentially small number of non-compliant taxpayers are justified by a burden placed on taxpayers generally. A useful principle to bear in mind would be that the widely accepted international approach which takes into account compliance costs for taxpayers should be followed, unless a departure from this approach can be clearly and openly justified because of local conditions which cannot be changed immediately (e.g. constitutional requirements or other overriding legal requirements). In other cases, there is great benefit for all in taking a widely accepted approach. See further Chapter C.2 of this Manual which details the most widely accepted approaches.
B.1.7.11. Multinational businesses have often relied on Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) (or “Advance Pricing Arrangements”, as some countries prefer) with tax authorities, especially in the framework of the Mutual Agreement Procedure. These APAs are so named because pricing methodologies are agreed in advance in relation to certain types of transactions, often called the “covered transactions”. APAs provide greater certainty for the taxpayer on the taxation of certain cross-border transactions and are considered by the taxpayers as the safest way to avoid double taxation, especially where they are bilateral or multilateral. Many countries have introduced APA procedures in their domestic laws though these may have different legal forms. For example, in certain countries an APA may be a legally binding engagement between taxpayers and tax authorities, while in other countries it may be a more informal arrangement between the tax authorities and the taxpayer. The possible advantages and disadvantages of APAs for developing country administrations and taxpayers, including some implementation issues, are addressed in Chapter C.4.
B.1.7.12. Another important point for transfer pricing domestic legislation is the “statute of limitations” issue — the time allowed in domestic law for the tax administration to complete transfer pricing audits, make necessary assessments, etc. Since a transfer pricing audit can place heavy burdens on the taxpayers and tax authorities, the normal “statute of limitations” period for taking action is often extended compared with general domestic taxation rules. However, too long a period during which adjustment is possible leaves taxpayers in some cases with potentially very large financial risks. Differences in country practices in relation to time limitation should not lead to double taxation. Countries should keep this issue of balance between the interests of the revenue and of taxpayers in mind when setting an extended period during which adjustments can be made.
B.1.7.13. Both developed and developing countries need to have domestic transfer pricing rules to counter transfer pricing manipulation and also need the “associated enterprises” article of tax treaties (usually Article 9) which is relevant to avoidance and elimination of double taxation due to transfer pricing adjustments. One view is that the associated enterprises article of a tax treaty provides a separate and independent domestic basis for making transfer pricing adjustments.
The contrary view is that tax treaties do not increase a country’s tax jurisdiction and consequently the associated enterprises article of a country’s tax treaties cannot provide a separate source of tax jurisdiction. The detail in such domestic laws will vary from country to country and will often vary depending on how advanced the country is in its transfer pricing journey.
B.1.7.14. One view is that a country’s tax jurisdiction, usually some mixture of residence and source-based taxation, is based on its domestic legislation; when two countries enter into a tax treaty with each other they agree to mutually modify the exercise of their respective taxing rights to prevent double taxation. A tax treaty is, in this view, a mechanism to allocate the taxing rights to prevent double taxation arising from the overlap of residence and source jurisdiction. Tax treaties operate by altering the operation of domestic tax law; by either excluding the operation of the domestic tax law of a treaty country or by requiring a treaty country to provide a credit against its domestic tax for tax paid in the other treaty country. The generally held view is that a tax obligation under a tax treaty exists if the requirements of the treaty country’s domestic law and the tax treaty are both satisfied. The taxing powers of each treaty country are based on their respective domestic taxation law and may be limited but not expanded by the treaty. Also, treaties do not provide the necessary detail on how a transfer pricing regime will work in practice, such as the documentation required. As a consequence of these factors, it is generally considered that a country with tax treaties should enact domestic transfer pricing measures rather than asserting that its treaties provide it with a power to make transfer pricing adjustments.
B.1.7.15. For transfer pricing measures to be effective, a jurisdiction must enforce them and ensure that taxpayers comply with the rules. If jurisdictions either do not enact transfer pricing measures or do not enforce those measures there is an incentive for taxpayers to ensure that intra-group transfer prices favour jurisdictions that enforce their rules. This may be described as taking the line of least resistance, but it does provide an incentive for developing jurisdictions to enact and enforce some form of transfer pricing rules to protect their revenue base.
B.1.7.16. That MNEs might use transfer prices to shift profits from lower tax countries to higher tax countries is a paradox, but happens in practice (e.g. to benefit from certain tax incentives in the high tax country or because there are losses in the high tax country that can be offset with profits from a lower tax country). MNEs may also have an incentive to shift profits to jurisdictions in which tax laws, such as transfer pricing rules, are not enforced. Transfer pricing is a “zero sum game” — a situation in which the “gain” of taxable profits by one jurisdiction must be matched by a “loss” by the other jurisdiction. Consequently, some international enterprises might set their transfer prices to favour a jurisdiction expected to enforce its transfer pricing rules, in order to minimize the risk of transfer pricing adjustments and penalties in that jurisdiction. Moreover, transfer pricing disputes are generally time consuming and expensive.
B.1.8.1. The OECD Model Convention was first published in 1963 as a draft version. A final version was first published in 1977. This OECD work followed up some work already done by the League of Nations; and then after World War II by the United Nations. The United Nations produced a UN Model Convention for Treaties between Developed and Developing Nations in 1980, with updates in 2001 and 2011.29 The UN Model Convention was most recently updated in 2017.30 The UN Model is in many respects similar to the OECD Model but the differences (such as preserving greater taxation rights to countries hosting investments) are very significant, especially for developing countries.
B.1.8.2. There has historically been a widespread view that the OECD Model was most appropriate for negotiations between developed countries and less suitable for capital importing or developing countries. In general, it can be said that the UN Model preserves more taxation rights to the source state (i.e. host state of investment) or capital-importing country than the OECD Model. The UN Model has been embraced by many developing states as the basis of their treaty policy. Some developed countries also adopt some UN Model provisions, and at times it has influenced changes to give aspects of the OECD Model a greater source country orientation.
B.1.8.3. Article 9 of the OECD Model is a statement of the arm’s length principle and allows for profit adjustments if the actual price or the conditions of transactions between associated enterprises differ from the price or conditions that would be charged by independent enterprises under normal market commercial terms, i.e. an arm’s length basis. It also requires that an appropriate “corresponding adjustment” be made by the other Contracting State in such cases to avoid economic double taxation, taxation of essentially the same profit in the hands of two different legal entities if justified in principle and in amount. In other words, if one country increases the profit attributed to one side of the transaction, the other country should reduce the profit attributed to the other side of the transaction. The competent authorities of the Contracting States are if necessary to consult with each other in determining the adjustment.
B.1.8.4. Other OECD Model Tax Convention articles which apply the arm’s length principle include the article concerning dealings between the head office and a permanent establishment (Article 7(2)). Article 7(4) previously explicitly permitted the use of the apportionment of total profit by countries customarily using it, provided the result was consistent with the arm’s length principle, but this has been removed from the latest (2010) version of the OECD Model in a major re-write of Article 7.
B.1.8.5. The UN Model contains similar provisions to the OECD Model in Article 9 (at Paragraph 1 especially) and therefore serves as a guide for applying the arm’s length principle for developing countries.
However, the UN Model also includes an additional paragraph (Article 9(3)) which stipulates that a Contracting State is not required to make the corresponding adjustment referred to in Article 9(2) where judicial, administrative or other legal proceedings have resulted in a final ruling that, by the actions giving rise to an adjustment of profits under Article 9(1), one of the enterprises concerned is liable to a penalty with respect to fraud, or to gross or willful default.
B.1.8.6. There is some ambiguity in the concept of “associated enterprises” in the context of the Model Conventions; e.g. the term is used in the heading of Article 9, but not in the text. The Model Conventions use the concept to cover relationships between enterprises which are sufficiently close to require the application of transfer pricing rules. Concepts such as “management”, “capital” and “control” are often defined under the domestic law in many countries and may be extended for transfer pricing. E.g., if parties to the transaction make arrangements differing from those made by unrelated parties this could be considered to lead to a situation of “control”. Also, sometimes a wider definition including both de jure (i.e. according to legal form) and de facto (i.e. according to practical reality) control, which are difficult to define, may be adopted based on the anti-avoidance provisions in domestic law.
B.1.8.7. The Model Conventions also spell out in Article 25 a key transfer pricing dispute resolution mechanism — the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). The MAP facilitates the settlement of disputes on corresponding adjustments among competent authorities. It should be noted that the MAP procedure does not guarantee relief as it is voluntary; there is, however, a duty to negotiate in good faith to try to achieve a result consistent with the treaty allocation of taxing rights. Chapter C.4 discusses the MAP in more detail.
B.1.8.8. Finally, there are a small number of bilateral treaties which allow for arbitration to resolve transfer pricing disputes. Further, the EU Arbitration Convention establishes a procedure to resolve disputes where double taxation occurs between enterprises of different Member States in the EU as a result of an upward adjustment of profits of an enterprise of one Member State.
B.1.8.9. Overall, the Model Conventions are a critical source of acceptance for the arm’s length principle. Given that many countries around the world follow fairly closely one of the Model Conventions, the arm’s length principle has been widely accepted, even though its imperfections are also widely recognized.
Relevance of UN and OECD Model and the OECD Guidelines to developing countries
B.1.8.10. Transfer pricing rules have been developed mainly by the members of the OECD (i.e. developed countries) because of their historical and economic backgrounds. Many developing countries currently face some of the same conditions as the OECD countries did in the period from the 1970s to the 1990s. It is therefore useful to focus on certain key areas where many developing countries are encountering difficulties with administering the arm’s length principle.
B.1.8.11. Developing countries often have substantial problems with the availability of comparable transactions. This issue is considered more fully in Chapter B.2; it suffices to note that due to a typically small domestic market in many developing countries, third party transactions comparable to the MNE’s intra-group transactions are rarely discovered in the home market.
B.1.8.12. Documentation requirements should as far as possible be common between the two Models (UN and OECD), because diversity in documentation rules results in excessive compliance costs for MNEs and smaller enterprises. Targeted documentation requirements can be an alternative to full scale documentation where transactions are simple and the tax at issue is not large. This may be especially important in responding to the needs and capabilities of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
B.1.9.1. The UN and OECD Model Conventions, the OECD Guidelines and domestic legislation of various countries have provided examples for introduction of transfer pricing legislation worldwide, as a response to the increasing globalization of business and the concern that this may be abused to the detriment of countries without such legislation. Many other countries depend on anti-avoidance rules to deal with the most abusive forms of transfer pricing; see further Part B.8 on the General Legal Environment concerning legislative design principles for a transfer pricing regime.
B.1.10.1. Several issues arise when applying the arm’s length principle to the domestic realities of developing countries. The high level of integration of international enterprises, the proliferation of intra-group trading in intangibles and services and the use of sophisticated financing arrangements have increasingly made the arm’s length principle difficult to apply in practice.
B.1.10.2. Increasing globalization, sophisticated communication systems and information technology allow an MNE to control the operations of its various subsidiaries from one or two locations worldwide. Trade between associated enterprises often involves intangibles. The nature of the world on which international tax principles are based has changed significantly. All these issues raise challenges in applying the arm’s length concept to the globalized and integrated operations of international enterprises. Overall, it is clear that in the 21st century the arm’s length principle presents real challenges in allocating the income of highly integrated international enterprises.
B.1.10.3. It is widely accepted that transfer pricing is not an exact science and that the application of transfer pricing methods requires the application of information, skill and judgement by both taxpayers and tax authorities. In view of the skill, information and resource “gaps” in many developing countries, this can be very difficult for those developing countries; the task often requires the best officials, who may leave the tax department after acquiring their special skills. The intention of this Manual is to play a part in reducing those gaps.
B.1.10.4. For all countries, but particularly for many developing countries, equipping an administration to deal fairly and effectively with transfer pricing issues seems to be a “taxing exercise”, both literally and figuratively.
B.1.10.5. Some of the specific challenges that many developing countries particularly face in dealing effectively with transfer pricing issues (and which will be dealt with in more detail later in this Manual) are listed below.
B.1.10.6. One of the foundations of the arm’s length principle is examining the pricing of comparable transactions. Proper comparability is often difficult to achieve in practice, a factor which in the view of many weakens the continued validity of the principle itself. The fact is that the traditional transfer pricing methods (CUP, RPM and CP) directly rely on comparables. These comparables have to be close in order to be of use for the transfer pricing analysis. It is often extremely difficult in practice, especially in some developing countries, to obtain adequate information to apply the arm’s length principle for the following reasons:
Ø There tend to be fewer organized operators in any given sector in developing countries; so finding proper comparable data can be very difficult;
Ø The comparable information in developing countries may be incomplete and in a form which is difficult to analyze, as the resources and processes are not available. In the worst case, information about an independent enterprise may simply not exist. Databases relied on in transfer pricing analysis tend to focus on developed country data that may not be relevant to developing country markets (at least without resource and information-intensive adjustments), and in any event are usually very costly to access; and
Ø Transition countries whose economies have just opened up or are in the process of opening up may have “first mover” companies who have come into existence in many of the sectors and areas hitherto unexploited or unexplored; in such cases there would be an inevitable lack of comparables.
B.1.10.7. Given these issues, critics of the current transfer pricing methods equate finding a satisfactory comparable to finding a needle in a haystack. Overall, it is quite clear that finding appropriate comparables in developing countries for analysis is quite possibly the biggest practical problem currently faced by enterprises and tax authorities alike, but the aim of this Manual is to assist that process in a practical way. The Toolkit jointly produced by the IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank provides additional guidance on this issue. Chapter B.2 of this Manual provides analysis and practical examples on Comparability Analysis.
B.1.10.8. Transfer pricing methods are complex and time-consuming, often requiring time and attention from some of the most skilled and valuable human resources in both MNEs and tax administrations. Transfer pricing reports often run into hundreds of pages with many legal and accounting experts employed to create them. This kind of complexity and knowledge requirement puts tremendous strain on both the tax authorities and the taxpayers, especially in developing countries where resources tend to be scarce and the appropriate training in such a specialized area is not readily available. Their transfer pricing regulations have, however, helped some developing countries in creating requisite skill sets and building capacity, while also protecting their tax base.
B.1.10.9. Rules based on the arm’s length principle are becoming increasingly difficult and complex to administer. Transfer pricing compliance may involve expensive databases and the associated expertise to handle the data. Transfer pricing audits need to be performed on a case by case basis and are often complex and costly tasks for all parties concerned.
B.1.10.10. In developing countries resources, monetary and otherwise, may be limited for the taxpayer (especially small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)) that have to prepare detailed and complex transfer pricing reports and comply with the transfer pricing regulations, and these resources may have to be “bought-in”. Similarly, the tax authorities of many developing countries do not have sufficient resources to examine the facts and circumstances of each and every case so as to determine the acceptable transfer price, especially in cases where there is a lack of comparables. Transfer pricing audits also tend to be a long, time consuming process which may be contentious and may ultimately result in “estimates” fraught with conflicting interpretations.
B.1.10.11. In case of disputes between the revenue authorities of two countries, the currently available prescribed option is the Mutual Agreement Procedure as noted above. This too can possibly lead to a protracted and involved dialogue, often between unequal economic powers, and may cause strains on the resources of the companies in question and the revenue authorities of the developing countries.
B.1.10.12. The Internet has completely changed the way the world works by changing how information is exchanged and business is transacted. Physical limitations, which have long defined traditional taxation concepts, no longer apply and the application of international tax concepts to the Internet and related e-commerce transactions is sometimes problematic and unclear.
B.1.10.13. From the viewpoint of many countries, it is essential for them to be able to appropriately exercise taxing rights on these intangible-related transactions, such as e-commerce and web-based business models. Whether they can do so effectively using the current international taxation models is a matter of considerable debate. Many have suggested the amendment of key existing concepts, such as permanent establishment, as well as the introduction of new concepts, such as an equalization levy, to include the virtual world and its workings in the ambit of international taxation. In many developing countries, the digital economy currently plays a role as a key growth driver in their economic engine and it is therefore imperative for tax authorities to tackle transfer pricing issues related to it.
B.1.10.14. Some countries (usually developing countries) take the view that the economic benefit arising from moving operations to a low-cost jurisdiction, i.e., “location savings”, should accrue to that country where such operations are actually carried out.
B.1.10.15. Accordingly, the determination of location savings, and their allocation between the group companies (and thus, between the tax authorities of the two countries) has become a key transfer pricing issue in the context of developing countries. Unfortunately, most international guidelines do not provide much guidance on this issue of location savings, though they sometimes do recognize geographic conditions and ownership of intangibles. The US Section 482 regulations provide some sort of limited guidance in the form of recognizing that adjustments for significant differences in cost attributable to a geographic location must be based on the impact such differences would have on the controlled transaction price given the relative competitive positions of buyers and sellers in each market. The OECD Guidelines also consider the issue of location savings, emphasizing that the allocation of the savings depends on what would have been agreed by independent parties in similar circumstances. This issue is dealt with in greater detail later in this Manual. An overview of location savings is provided in Chapter B.2 and some specific country practices on the use of location savings are provided in Part D.
B.1.11.1. Transfer pricing is generally considered to be the major international taxation issue faced by MNEs today and thus demands significant attention on the part of tax administrations of developing countries. Even though responses to it will in some respects vary, transfer pricing is a complex and constantly evolving area and no government or MNE can afford to ignore it.
B.1.11.2. Transfer pricing is a difficult challenge for both governments and taxpayers; it tends to involve significant resources, often including some of the most skilled human resources, and costs of compliance. It is often especially difficult to find comparables, even those where some adjustment is needed to apply the transfer pricing methods.
B.1.11.3. The rise of the digital economy has brought to the fore the transfer pricing aspects of ownership, management, use and transfer of intangibles which can be highly complex due to the fact that intangibles are typically hard to value while being easy to transfer between parties. The plethora of issues involved in the transfer pricing of intangibles may put an additional burden on the constraints faced by taxpayers and tax authorities in developing countries.
B.1.11.4. For governments, transfer pricing administration is resource intensive and developing countries often do not have easy access to resources to effectively administer their transfer pricing regulations. In addition, from the government’s perspective, transfer pricing manipulation reduces revenue available for country development, and with increasing globalization the potential loss of revenue may run into billions of dollars.
B.1.11.5. Overall, it is a difficult task to simplify the international taxation system, especially transfer pricing, while keeping it equitable and effective for all parties involved. However, a practical approach, such as that proposed by this Manual, will help ensure the focus is on solutions to these problems. It will help equip developing countries to address transfer pricing issues in a way that is robust and fair to all the stakeholders, while remaining true to the goals of being internationally coherent, seeking to reduce compliance costs and reduce unrelieved double taxation.
B.1.11.6. This chapter aims to introduce the fundamentals of the concepts involved in transfer pricing such as the arm’s length principle and issues related to it. Subsequent chapters will deal with specific transfer pricing concepts in greater detail.
B .2 .1 . Rationale for Comparability Analysis
B.2.1.1. The term “comparability analysis” is used to designate two distinct but related analytical steps:
1) An understanding of
2) A comparison between the conditions of the controlled transaction (as established in step 1 immediately above) and those in uncontrolled transactions (i.e. transactions between independent enterprises) taking place in comparable circumstances. The latter are often referred to as “comparable uncontrolled transactions” or “comparables”.
B.2.1.2. This concept of comparability analysis is used in the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method, as well as in applying the selected method to arrive at an arm’s length price or financial indicator (or range of prices or financial indicators). It thus plays a central role in the overall application of the arm’s length principle.
B.2.1.3. A practical difficulty in applying the arm’s length principle is that associated enterprises may engage in transactions that independent enterprises would not undertake. Where independent enterprises do not undertake transactions of the type entered into by associated enterprises, the arm’s length principle is difficult to apply because there is little or no direct evidence of what conditions would have been established by independent enterprises. The mere fact that a transaction may not be found between independent parties does not of itself mean that it is, or is not, arm’s length.
B.2.1.4. It should be kept in mind that the lack of a comparable for a taxpayer’s controlled transaction does not imply that the arm’s length principle is inapplicable to that transaction. Nor does it imply anything about whether that transaction is or is not, in fact, at arm’s length. In a number of instances, it will be possible to use “imperfect” comparables, e.g. comparables from another country with comparable economic conditions or comparables from another industry sector. Such a comparable would possibly need to be adjusted to eliminate or reduce the differences between that transaction and the controlled transaction as discussed in Paragraph B.2.1.5 below. In other instances, where no comparables are found for a controlled transaction between associated enterprises, it may become necessary to use approaches not depending directly on comparables to find an arm’s length price35 (see further Chapter B.3.). It may also be necessary to examine the economic substance of the controlled transaction to determine whether its conditions are such that it might be expected to have been agreed between independent parties in similar circumstances — in the absence of evidence of what independent parties have actually done in similar circumstances.
B.2.1.5. A controlled and an uncontrolled transaction are regarded as comparable if the economically relevant characteristics of the two transactions and the circumstances surrounding them are sufficiently similar to provide a reliable measure of an arm’s length result. It is recognized that in reality two transactions are seldom completely alike and in this imperfect world, perfect comparables are often not available. It is therefore necessary to use a practical approach to establish the degree of comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions. To be comparable does not mean that the two transactions are necessarily identical, but instead means that either none of the differences between them could materially affect the arm’s length price or profit or, where such material differences exist, that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate their effect. Thus, in determining a reasonable degree of comparability, adjustments may need to be made to account for certain material differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions. These adjustments (which are referred to as “comparability adjustments”) are to be made only if the effect of the material differences on price or profits can be ascertained with sufficient accuracy to improve the reliability of the results.
B.2.1.6. The aforesaid degree of comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions is typically determined on the basis of a number of attributes of the transactions or parties that could materially affect prices or profits and the adjustment that can be made to account for differences. An examination of these attributes is therefore necessary to both steps of the comparability analysis. These attributes, which are usually referred to as the five comparability factors, include:
Ø Characteristics of the property or service transferred;
Ø Functions performed by the parties taking into account assets employed and risks assumed, in short referred to as the “functional analysis”;
Ø Contractual terms;
Ø Economic circumstances; and
Ø Business strategies pursued.
B.2.1.7. Obviously, as the degree of comparability increases, the number and extent of potential differences that could render the analysis inaccurate necessarily decreases. Also, in general, while adjustments can and must be made when evaluating these factors so as to increase comparability, the number, magnitude and the reliability of such adjustments may affect the reliability of the overall comparability analysis.
B.2.1.8. The type and attributes of available comparables in a given situation also needs to be considered in determining the most appropriate transfer pricing method. For further information, see Chapter B.1, Paragraph B.1.5 and Chapter B.3. In general, closely comparable products or services are required if the Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method is used for arm’s length pricing; the Resale Price Method, Cost Plus Method and Transactional Net Margin Method, may also be appropriate where only functional comparables are available, i.e. where the functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed by the parties to the controlled transaction are sufficiently comparable to the functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed by the parties to the uncontrolled transaction so that the comparison makes economic sense. An example would be two comparable distributors of consumer goods of the same industry segment, where the goods distributed may not be exactly the same, but the functional analyzes of the two distributors would be comparable. See further Chapter B.3.
B.2.1.9. Practical guidance is needed for cases without sufficient comparables. There seem to be two distinct problems relating to comparables for developing countries’ tax authorities. The first is lack of access to existing sources, such as existing non-local company databases; the second is the lack of reliable local country comparables. For each of these, there are problems associated with both administration (e.g., how the lack of data impedes the reliable and efficient determination of appropriate arm’s length results) and problems associated with double tax/dispute avoidance (e.g., how the lack of appropriate data impedes a developing country’s ability to reach agreement with other tax authorities, or prevent the developing country from being taken advantage of).
B.2.1.10. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines point out that non-domestic comparables should not be automatically rejected. The Guidelines further recommend that where independent transactions are scarce in certain markets and industries a pragmatic solution needs to be found on a case by case basis. This means that when the data are insufficient, stakeholders can still use imperfect comparables, after necessary adjustments are made, to assess the arm’s length price. The validity of such procedures depends heavily on the accuracy of the comparability analysis as a whole.
B.2.1.11. This chapter discusses a possible procedure to identify, screen, select and adjust comparables in a manner that enables the taxpayer or tax administration to make an informed choice of the most appropriate transfer pricing method and apply that method correctly to arrive at the appropriate arm’s length price or profit (or range of prices or profits).
A typical approach that can be followed while performing a comparability analysis is outlined below. The steps below are by no means exhaustive but rather suggest an outline based upon which a comparability analysis could be carried out. It may be noted that the process is not linear: for example, a number of the steps may need to be carried out repeatedly until a satisfactory result is achieved. The subsequent sections of this chapter deal with each of these steps in more detail:
Ø Understanding the economically significant characteristics of the industry, taxpayer’s business and controlled transactions
Gathering of basic information about the taxpayer
Identifying and accurately delineating the controlled transaction in question
Evaluation of separate and/or combined transactions;
Ø Examination of comparability factors of the controlled transaction
Characteristics of the property or service transferred
Functional analysis of the controlled transaction under examination
Contractual terms of the transaction
Economic circumstances of the transaction
Business strategies of the parties;
Ø Selecting the tested party/ parties (if applicable);
Ø Identifying potentially comparable transactions — internal and external;
Ø Comparability adjustments where appropriate;
Ø Selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method;
Ø Determination of an arm’s length price or profit (or range of prices or profits);
Ø Documentation of comparability analysis and monitoring.
Gathering of basic information about the taxpayer
B.18.104.22.168. An essential first step to enabling effective transfer pricing analysis is the collection of information about the taxpayer to understand its business operations and activities. This fact-finding process should include identification of associated enterprises involved in the controlled transaction, and gathering information about relevant cross-border controlled transactions in the context of the commercial and financial relations between the enterprises (including the functions performed, assets used (including intangibles, see Chapter B.5.) and risks assumed, by each party, the nature of products/services transferred, the terms and conditions of the transaction, the economic circumstances, etc.).
B.22.214.171.124. An analysis should be performed of the taxpayer’s circumstances including but not limited to an analysis of the industry, competition, economy, regulatory factors and other elements that may significantly affect the taxpayer and its environment. This analysis is by nature specific to each taxpayer and industry.
B.126.96.36.199. Information about the taxpayer from its annual report, product brochures, news articles, research reports prepared by independent agencies, management letters and internal reports could act as a good starting point for understanding the taxpayer’s circumstances. A study of these documents will provide an idea of the industry to which the enterprise belongs, the nature of its business activities (i.e. manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, etc.), its market segment, market share, market penetration strategies, type of products/services dealt in, etc.
Identify the accurately delineated transaction
B.188.8.131.52. The arm’s length price must be established in relation to transactions actually undertaken. Thus, the critical first step in any comparability analysis is to accurately define those transactions by analyzing their economically relevant characteristics, as reflected not only in the contracts between the parties, but also their conduct and any other facts. In this regard, the contractual terms will generally be the starting point for the analysis (as clarified or supplemented by the parties’ conduct); and to the extent that the conduct or other facts are inconsistent with the written contract, the former should be taken as the best evidence of the transaction(s) actually undertaken.
B.184.108.40.206. Tax authorities should not substitute other transactions in the place of those that have actually happened and should not disregard those transactions actually undertaken other than in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances may exist, for example, where the arrangements viewed in their totality are not commercially rational thereby preventing the determination of an arm’s length price for each party to the transaction (taking into account their own perspectives and the options realistically available to each of them). This test is a substantive one and looks at the nature of the arrangements entered into: a lack of comparable, independent transactions does not, of itself, indicate that the controlled transaction lacks commercial rationality.
B.220.127.116.11. The test for commercial rationality must be considered from each entity’s own perspective, as an arrangement that is commercially rational at group level is not necessarily arm’s length from the perspective of each party.
B.18.104.22.168. In addition, an arrangement that is expected to leave the MNE group as a whole worse off on a pre-tax basis than it would be if it had not entered into the arrangement will raise the question whether it is primarily tax driven and it may warrant further examination as to whether it is commercially irrational thereby preventing the determination of an arm’s length price for each party to the transaction.
B.22.214.171.124. Where a transaction that was actually undertaken is not commercially rational, any alternative transactions that are substituted for transfer pricing purposes should correspond as closely as possible to the actual facts of the case whilst achieving a commercially rational expected result: i.e. one which would have enabled party the parties to come to a price acceptable to both at the time the arrangement was entered into.
B.126.96.36.199. In general, non-recognition or substitution of transactions should not be undertaken lightly as this would create significant uncertainty for taxpayers and tax administrations; this may also lead to double taxation due to the divergent views taken by countries on how any substitute transactions are structured. The ability of tax authorities to disregard or substitute transactions will depend on their powers under applicable domestic law, and should be considered in developing domestic transfer pricing legislation and administrative rules. See further Chapters B.8. and C.5.
Evaluation of separate and combined transactions
B.188.8.131.52. An important aspect of transfer pricing analysis is whether this analysis has to be carried out with respect to a taxpayer’s individual international controlled transactions or to a group of international controlled transactions having a close economic nexus.
B.184.108.40.206. The transfer pricing analysis should ideally be made on a transaction-by-transaction basis. However, there are cases where separate transactions are so closely linked that such an approach would not lead to a reliable result. Where transactions are so closely interrelated or continuous that application of the arm’s length principle on a transaction-by-transaction basis would become unreliable or cumbersome, transactions are often aggregated for the purposes of the analysis.
B.220.127.116.11. An example can be the case of transactions involving the licensing of know-how to associated manufacturers together with the supply to the licensed associated manufacturers of components needed to exploit such know-how. In such a case, the transfer pricing analysis may be more reliable if it takes into account both the license and the supply of components together, compared to a consideration of each separate activity without recognizing that they are closely interrelated transactions. Similarly, long-term service supply contracts and pricing of closely linked products are difficult to analyze separately.
B.18.104.22.168. Another important aspect of combined transactions is the increasing presence of composite contracts and “package deals” in an MNE group. A composite contract and/or package deal may contain a number of elements including leases, sales and licenses all packaged into one deal. Generally, it will be appropriate to consider the deal in its totality to understand how the various elements relate to each other, but the components of the composite contract and/or package deal may or may not, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, need to be evaluated separately to arrive at the appropriate transfer price. In certain cases, it may be more reliable to allocate the price to the elements of the composite contract or package deal.
B.22.214.171.124. “Aggregation” issues also arise when looking at potential comparables. Since third party information is not often available at the transaction level, entity level information is frequently used in practice when looking at external comparables (e.g. in the absence of reliable internal comparables; “external comparable” and “internal comparable” are defined in Paragraph B.126.96.36.199. below). It must be noted that any application of the arm’s length principle, whether on a transaction-by-transaction basis or on an aggregation basis, needs to be evaluated case by case, applying the most appropriate transfer pricing method to the facts in that particular case.
B.188.8.131.52. The first part of a comparability analysis for transfer pricing purposes involves understanding and defining the controlled transaction to be tested. In addition to the contextual information on the industry and the overall business of the taxpayer, this analysis is typically structured around the five comparability factors: the characteristics of the property or service; contractual terms; functional analysis; economic circumstances and business strategies.
Characteristics of the property or service transferred
B.184.108.40.206. Property, whether tangible or intangible, as well as services, may have differing characteristics which may lead to a difference in their values in the open market. Therefore, these differences must be accounted for and considered in any comparability analysis of controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Characteristics that may be important to consider are:
Ø In the case of tangible property: physical features, quality, reliability, availability and the volume of supply;
Ø In the case of services: nature and extent of such services; and
Ø In the case of intangible property: form of the transaction (e.g. licensing or sale) and the type and form of property, duration and degree of protection and anticipated benefits from use of the property.
For example, comparability analysis should take into account the differences between trademarks and trade names that aid in commercial exploitation (marketing intangibles) as opposed to patents and know-how (trade intangibles).
Contractual terms of transaction
B.220.127.116.11. The conduct of the contracting parties is generally a result of the terms of the contract between them. The contractual relationship thus warrants careful analysis when computing the transfer price. Other than a written contract, the terms of the transactions may be found in correspondence and communications between the parties involved. In cases where the terms of the arrangement between the two parties are not explicitly defined, the contractual terms have to be deduced from their economic relationship and conduct.
B.18.104.22.168. An important point to note is that associated enterprises may not hold each other fully to the terms of the contract since they have common overarching interests; this contrasts with independent enterprises, which are expected to hold each other to the terms of the contract. Thus, it is important to figure out whether the contractual terms between the associated enterprises are a “sham” (something that appears genuine, but when looked at more closely lacks reality, and is not valid under many legal systems) and/or have not been followed in reality.
B.22.214.171.124. Also, explicit contractual terms of a transaction involving members of an MNE may provide evidence as to the form in which the responsibilities, risks and benefits have been assigned among those members. For example, the contractual terms might include the form of consideration charged or paid, sales and purchase volumes, the warranties provided, the rights to revisions and modifications, delivery terms, credit and payment terms etc. In addition to an examination of these contractual terms, it will be important to check that the actual conduct of the parties conforms to them.
B.126.96.36.199. Where there are material differences in economically significant contractual terms between the taxpayer’s controlled transactions and the potential comparables, such differences should be evaluated, in order to judge whether comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions is nevertheless satisfied and whether comparability adjustments need to be made to eliminate the effects of such differences.
B.188.8.131.52. How contractual terms may affect transfer pricing may be seen in the following example:
Example: Relevance of Contractual Terms
Consider Company A in one country, an agricultural exporter, which regularly buys transportation services from Company B (its foreign subsidiary) to ship its product, cocoa beans, from Company A’s Country to overseas markets. Company B occasionally provides transportation services to Company C, an unrelated domestic corporation in the same country as Company B. However, the provision of such services to Company C accounts for only 10% of the gross revenues of Company B and the remaining 90% of Company B’s revenues are attributable to the provision of transportation services for cocoa beans to Company A. In determining the degree of comparability between Company B’s uncontrolled transaction with Company C and its controlled transaction with Company A, the difference in volumes involved in the two transactions, volume discount if any, and the regularity with which these services are provided must be taken into account where such factors would have a material effect on the price charged.
B.184.108.40.206. Functional analysis typically involves identification of functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed (also called FAR analysis) with respect to the international controlled transactions of an enterprise. Functional analysis seeks to identify and compare the economically significant activities and the responsibilities undertaken by the independent and the associated enterprises. An economically significant activity is one which materially affects the price charged in a transaction and/or the profits earned from that transaction.
B.220.127.116.11. Functional analysis is the cornerstone of any transfer pricing exercise; its purpose is to gain an understanding of the operations of an enterprise with its associated enterprises and of the respective roles of the parties to the controlled transaction under examination. These will affect the determination of an arm’s length remuneration for the transaction since compensation in transactions between two independent enterprises will usually reflect the functions that each enterprise performs, taking into account assets employed and risks assumed. Generally, the more valuable those functions and assets, and the greater the risks, the greater the expected remuneration. Functional analysis is also essential to the identification of potential comparables, as the search for such comparables will generally focus on uncontrolled transactions that present a similar allocation of functions, assets and risks between the parties.
B.18.104.22.168. Functional analysis is a process of finding and organizing facts about the transaction in terms of the functions, risks and assets in order to identify how these are divided between the parties involved in the transaction. The functions, risks and assets are analyzed to determine the nature of functions performed, degree of risks undertaken and the nature of the assets employed by each party. This analysis helps to select the tested party/parties where needed (as explained below), the most appropriate transfer pricing method, the comparables, and ultimately to determine whether the profits (or losses) earned by the entities are appropriate to the functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed.
B.22.214.171.124. The functional analysis is important because the expected return of the entities involved in a transaction depends on the importance of the functions performed, the nature and degree of risks assumed and the nature and value of assets employed. Generally, the more valuable the functions performed, assets employed and the greater the risks assumed by a party to a transaction the greater its expected return (or potential loss). It is therefore extremely important to map the functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed by all the associated enterprises in relation to the controlled transaction under examination.
B.126.96.36.199. A clearer understanding of functional analysis may be gained from an example which can be examined in detail below. Further, hypothetical examples for illustration purposes concerning the different types of international transactions listed below are given with a view to explaining the chapter in a more practical manner. The situations are:
1) Manufacturing of products by XYZ & Co, where the technology is owned by an associated enterprise ABC & Co; and
2) Distribution by A Co of products imported from an associated enterprise B Co for sale in A Co’s country.
Further hypothetical examples for illustration purposes concerning other types of international transactions are provided at Appendix 1 at the end of this Manual with a view to explaining functional analysis in a more practical manner. The situations covered in such examples are that of a manufacturing entity and of a distributor.
Example: “A Co” — Energy Solutions
A Co is a company incorporated and registered under the laws of Country
B Co is a company incorporated and registered under the laws of Country B and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of A Co. B Co intends to manufacture a wide range of electronic energy meters and portable calibrators, which would cater to all segments of the power generation, transmission, distribution and consumption sectors and offers similar features required for electricity revenue management. However, such equipment will have to be customized to cater to the needs of domestic users. Such adaptations would be developed by B Co in its own R&D facilities.
B Co entered into a license agreement with A Co to source its core technology, TECHNO A™ — developed and patented by A Co. TECHNO A™, being software driven, allows cost effective product feature enhancements and provides flexibility to utilities to effectively manage electricity revenue and demand, thereby limiting or eliminating revenue losses. TECHNO A™ technology was developed in Country A by A Co. TECHNO A™ technology measures electricity flow using digital and microprocessor based techniques and processes the measurements into useful information. Use
of TECHNO A™ technology has major advantages in the design and manufacture of meters.
With the above context, the controlled transactions between B Co and A Co are the purchase of certain components and the license of technology from A Co. As noted above, A Co is specialized in dealing with processors and other components of electronic meters and their sub-assemblies. These are critical components of an electronic meter. B Co manufactures energy meters in Country B and uses processors and related components purchased from A Co. B Co then sells energy meters to A Co, in line with its requirements.
B Co has its own R&D centre which tries to improve the technologies so as to achieve further efficiencies. This would mean that dependence on outside sources for technologies would be reduced in the future and cost-savings could be achieved. Also B Co has penetrated the market in the territory of Country B by incurring huge marketing expenditure to establish its own marketing intangibles. These are separate from the intangibles of A Co in Country A for which a technology license agreement is in place between A Co and B Co.
The following paragraphs describe how functional analysis can be carried out and documented in the example just given involving A Co. For these purposes it is necessary to have a qualitative description of the intra-group transactions and circumstances; this can be represented by the following type of table:
Qualitative Assessment of Intra-Group Transactions
|Symbol||Comparative risk level standards||Comparative functional level standards||Comparative asset level standard|
|–||No risk||No Functions||No assets|
|®||Lowest risk||Least Functions||Few assets|
|®®||Medium risk||Lesser Functions||Medium assets|
|®®®||Highest risk||Highest Functions||Most assets|
These symbols are a tool to summarize key aspects of a functional analysis, and to qualitatively compare the different enterprises in a MNE group across a number of categories related to functions, assets, and risks based solely on the facts of a particular case. This tool, commonly referred to as a “tick chart” is used extensively in this chapter and in Appendix 1. Tick charts, while very useful, are inherently subjective. Accordingly, the same set of facts in the hands of two different analysts may not result in identical tick charts. Caution should be used in giving tick charts quantitative significance. For example, three ticks do not reflect three times more value than a single tick. Moreover, all categories in the chart do not have equivalent weight. Accordingly, tick charts should primarily be used as a tool in evaluating qualitative aspects of the analysis, and should not be used mechanically to split profits according to the relative number of ticks.
B.188.8.131.52. Functions performed are the activities that are carried out by each of the parties to the transaction. In conducting a functional analysis, economically significant functions are to be considered; as such functions add more value to the transactions and are therefore expected to fetch higher anticipated returns for the entity performing such functions. Thus, the focus should not be on identifying the maximum number of functions but rather on the identification of critical functions performed by the associated enterprises.
B.184.108.40.206. Some of the relevant functions that are generally observed and examined in a transaction are:
Ø Research and development;
Ø Product design and engineering;
Ø Manufacturing, production, process engineering and design work;
Ø Purchasing, materials management and other procurement activities;
Ø Manufacturing, production or assembly work;
Ø Transportation, warehousing and inventory;
Ø Marketing, advertising, publicity and distribution;
Ø Market intelligence on technological developments; and
Ø Intra-group services, for example managerial, legal, accounting and finance, credit and collection, training and personnel management services.
B.220.127.116.11. It should be emphasized that this list is purely indicative; the extent to which each of these functions (or other functions not listed above) is economically significant and contributes to the creation of value depends on the industry and on the taxpayer-specific circumstances. A typical check list is provided in Appendix 1.
B.18.104.22.168. Functional analysis can be approached by evaluating all the economically significant activities performed in relation to the controlled transaction under examination (such as the list indicated above) and in potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions. In general, a taxpayer should prepare this list for both parties to the relevant controlled transaction (e.g. for the producing and selling/distributing activities in this example) to ultimately support the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method.
B.22.214.171.124. Continuing the example from Paragraph B.126.96.36.199. the following are the functions performed by the respective parties.
Functions performed by A Co
With respect to the sale of technology and components of electronic energy meters:
In this example, it is assumed that in the context of the sale of electronic energy meters by B Co on the basis of the technological support of A Co, A Co performs the following economically significant functions:
Ø Market development: A Co shares its expertise with B Co and assists in developing presentations to be made by B Co to the utilities (i.e. the bodies responsible for supply of power to the public) for the development of markets.
Ø Product development: A Co undertakes the product development activities based on the concept developed and offered by it to the users. Product development involves product engineering, designs, development or customization of microprocessors, observance of international standards and national standards for the product etc.
Ø Quality control: A Co undertakes quality control processes in order to ensure that the products manufactured by B Co conform to contractual specifications and international and
Ø national quality standards before the products are delivered to utilities and other customers. This is a critical activity because failure to ensure quality control may invite reputational risk and product liability risk.
With respect to the import/purchase of raw materials/components by B Co:
It is assumed that, in the purchase of processors and other components by B Co from A Co, the economically significant functions performed by A Co can be summarized as follows:
Ø Market development;
Ø Market intelligence on technological developments;
Ø Research and development activities;
Ø Production planning;
Ø Inventory management;
Ø Testing and quality controls;
Ø Selling and distribution activities;
Ø Post-sales activities including replacements; and
Ø Technical assistance, wherever required.
Functions performed by B Co
It is assumed that the functions of B Co in the context of the purchase of components and subsequent sale to domestic utilities are as follows:
Ø Market development: B Co undertakes market development activities. The market development activities primarily include development of the sales concept (i.e. identifying how the company can offer a customized solution to a utility having regard to the specific issues being faced by the utility concerned). B Co makes sales presentations to utilities in both the public and private sectors and conducts further liaison with them. Based on acceptance of the concept, pilot orders for the meters are procured by B Co. It also participates in the tendering process to procure full commercial orders for the energy meters once the pilot runs successfully. B Co also carries out activities in relation to advertisement, appointment of distributors, commission agents, sales promotion, market research and marketing strategies. Also B Co has developed the market for the new product in the territory of Country B by incurring sizeable marketing expenditure to establish its own marketing intangibles that are separate from the intangibles of A Co in Country A;
Ø Research and development: B Co has its own R&D centre which tries to boost its performance by improving the technologies so as to achieve further efficiencies, reducing dependence on outside technologies in future and achieving cost savings.;
Ø Production scheduling: The production by B Co is based on orders obtained from domestic utilities. The procurement process for the various raw materials/inputs is based on prudently prepared sales forecasts. The procurement function and the ordering processes are looked after by the “materials department”. Factors like lead time, availability, negotiations, etc. are taken into consideration while deciding the party from which a particular raw material/input is to be purchased;
Ø Tooling: The tooling activities in relation to the products to be produced are undertaken by B Co. Different products may require different tooling. Different contract specifications may require different tooling;
Ø Assembly: This involves the assembling of components. Assembly operations are mechanical as well as manual. The activity involves mounting surface-mount technology components, manual inspection of placement of the components, computerized soldering of mounted components, manual inspection of the soldering process, mounting of plasma transformed arc components manually, etc.;
Ø Intelligence loading: Intelligence loading refers to the process of loading software and other intelligence features on the manufactured meter. B Co undertakes this activity based on the technology and microprocessor specification of the contract;
Ø Testing: Testing and quality controls are critical processes in the manufacture and marketing of electronic meters. B Co performs testing and A Co undertakes quality control measures. Testing activity involves temperature variation testing, testing of manufactured meters against standard meters etc.;
Ø Packaging and delivery: B Co packs the products into specially designed containers of various sizes depending on the consignment. The containers are in the form of cartons and pallet packaging. After packaging, products are delivered to domestic utilities;
Ø Post sales activities: Depending on the contracts with the customers, B Co undertakes installation and commissioning activities wherever required under the contracts. It is also responsible for the collection of payments from customers. Contractual and non-contractual product warranties are provided to customers. Any replacement or further activities required pursuant to product performance warranties are also undertaken by B Co;
Ø Inventory management: B Co is responsible for managing the procurement of raw materials/components and maintaining the requisite stock levels for the products including finished goods. As raw materials are generally product specific and the finished products are manufactured against the confirmed orders from domestic utilities, no substantial inventory management is involved.
General management functions
In the above example the functions addressed below are common functions that are carried out by any business irrespective of its size and type. These functions are drivers of every business and are indispensable in the economic environment.
Ø Corporate strategy determination: Generally, all policies within the MNE group are determined by the management of the respective entities which continuously monitor the economic environment surrounding the entity, assess their strategic position within the industry and set targets to achieve their corporate objectives;
Ø Finance, accounting, treasury and legal functions: The management of the respective entity is responsible for managing the finance, treasury, legal and accounting functions. Each entity is also responsible for all local statutory compliance;
Ø Human resource management function: The HR function of each entity is co-ordinated by its management, which is responsible for recruitment, development and training of the personnel including the pay structure.
Qualitative Relative Assessment of Functions Performed
(by A Co and B Co in relation to B Co’s Market)
|Category||Level of Intensity|
|A Co||B Co|
|Post sales activities||–||®®®|
|General management functions||–||–|
|Corporate strategy determination||®||®®®|
|Finance, accounting, treasury and legal||–||®®®|
|Human resource management||–||®®®|
B.188.8.131.52. Assets (tangible as well as intangible) that are used by, or transferred between, the associated enterprises in the course of an international controlled transaction need to identify the significant assets (tangible as well as intangible) used by, or transferred between, the associated enterprises in the course of an international controlled transaction.
B.184.108.40.206. The analysis should involve the identification of the type of capital assets employed (e.g. plant and equipment, intangible assets, financial assets, etc.) and their significance to the controlled transaction. For economically significant assets it may be necessary to perform a more detailed analysis of the assets employed, such as their age, location, property right protections available, market value, etc.
B.220.127.116.11. In the case of capital-intensive industries, the employment of a capital asset such as property, plant and equipment, etc. is costly and has to be financed either internally or externally. However, there can also be cases where the entities are involved in activities for which the assets employed may not require such a large capital investment. Depending on the applicable accounting standards, interest expenses are sometimes treated as operating expenses (“above the line”) or as financial expenses (“below the line”). Where interest expenses are treated as operating expenses in the accounts of the taxpayer and/or of the comparable, they will be addressed in the comparability analysis. Adjustment might be required to ensure consistency of accounting standards between the controlled transaction and the comparable. Differences in the use of assets can sometimes be eliminated or reduced to a significant extent by making comparability adjustments on account of working capital or capacity utilization.
B.18.104.22.168. Where the transactions involve the use or transfer of economically significant intangibles, the special considerations set out in Chapter B.5 should be borne in mind.
B.22.214.171.124. Continuing the above example, the following are the assets employed by the respective parties:
Tangible assets owned by B Co
It is assumed for the purpose of the example that B Co owns the following tangible assets:
Ø Land and buildings;
Ø Plant and machinery;
Ø R&D equipment;
Ø Office equipment;
Ø Furniture and fixtures;
Ø Computers; and
Ø Testing equipment.
Intangible asset ownership
It is assumed for the purpose of the example that:
Ø B Co has established a research and development department which tries to increase the level of its performance by improving technologies so as to achieve further efficiencies. This would also reduce dependence on outside sources of technology in the future and achieve cost savings. The department also conducts R&D programmes to support B Co’s business and to provide technical assistance to its customers. These efforts help to increase production efficiency and product quality;
Ø B Co has established its own marketing intangibles in Country B by incurring significant expenditure on marketing and has penetrated the market for the new product in the territory of Country B. As noted above, these marketing intangibles are separate from the intangibles of A Co in Country A for which a technology agreement is in place with A Co;
Ø B Co has entered into a technology license agreement with A Co for procuring technology for the manufacture of specified products. Thus B Co uses the process, know-how, operating/ quality standards etc. developed/owned by A Co. B Co leverages value from these intangibles for continued growth in revenues and profits;
Ø A Co is the market leader in the development and supply of electronic meters, as well as related software, energy monitoring, billing solutions and payment systems. Over the years the company has amassed a wealth of proprietary technical knowledge. This includes product specifications, designs, the latest manufacturing processes and empirical data on the usage of products by customers in the industry;
Ø A Co enjoys a reputation for quality products. In the international utility markets, product supplies from international players from developed countries are preferred by the customers and utilities as compared to direct product supplies from suppliers located in developing countries. B Co leverages on A Co’s established brand name and reputation for high technology products. A Co’s commitment to quality also provides B Co with an edge while selling products in the domestic markets.
Summary of Assets Employed
|Category||Level of Intensity|
|A Co||B Co|
B.126.96.36.199. Risk analysis is important in the functional analysis and it should be considered together with the functions and assets. The detailed guidance provided in this section on the analysis of risks as part of a functional analysis covering functions, assets, and risks, should not be interpreted as indicating that risks are more important than functions or assets. The relevance of functions, assets and risks in a specific transaction will need to be determined through a detailed functional analysis.
B.188.8.131.52. Risks are an inherent part of commercial activities. Businesses exist and undertake commercial activities in order to pursue opportunities to make profits. Simply put, risk is the effect of uncertainty on the objectives of the business. As has been noted above, greater risks are associated with higher expected returns— profit-seeking enterprises would only take on risks associated with commercial opportunities if they anticipate a positive return. But such opportunities are inherently uncertain: costs may be higher than anticipated; revenues may be lower; circumstances may change and therefore actual results may be better or worse than those which were expected.
B.184.108.40.206. Since the assumption of economically significant risks will be relevant to the pricing of a transaction, a transfer pricing analysis must first identify such risks, and then determine which entity assumes them. This analysis will start from the contractual terms that exist between the parties, but should also have regard to the conduct of the parties, including the functions they perform and any other relevant facts. Only then can the controlled transaction be properly understood and defined, and from there, appropriately priced. For transfer pricing purposes, the analysis of risk can be broken down into 6 steps, illustrated in the diagram below.
STEP 1: Identification of economically significant risks
B.220.127.116.11. There are many sources and types of risk, the significance of which will vary depending on the nature of the business transaction. The significance of a risk will depend on a combination of its likelihood and its potential impact on the profits (or losses) of the business. For example, the risk associated with the design of new packaging to improve visibility of a product may be relatively small compared to the risk associated with the development of a completely new product
line. Changes to a ‘flagship’ product are likely to carry more risk than changes or variations to a less important product or to one product among many sold by the business, and developments based on novel technologies or wholly new applications are likely to be higher risk than those which build on existing, proven products or technologies.
functions, up/down side consequences, financial capcity
B.18.104.22.168. An examination of the key functions and commercial context of a transaction will help to identify significant risks. In many cases, an examination of the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by other associated enterprises in the MNE group contributing to the group’s creation of value may help in this process since risks also represent opportunities and businesses will generally allocate resources to manage significant risks.
B.22.214.171.124. An illustrative list of risks that may be assumed by the parties to the transaction is provided below; however, the relevance and significance of each individual risk factor listed below will depend on the nature of the transaction.
Illustrative List of Risks Assumed
|Nature of risks||Particulars|
|1. Financial risk||a. Method of funding|
|b. Fluctuation in interest rates|
|c. Funding of losses|
|d. Foreign exchange risk|
|2. Product risk||a. Design and development of product|
|b. Upgrading / obsolescence of product|
|c. After sales service|
|d. Risks associated with R&D|
|e. Product liability risk|
|f. Intellectual property risk|
|g. Scheduling risk|
|h. Inventory risk|
|Market risk||a. Development of a market including advertisement and product promotion, etc.|
|b. Fluctuation in demand and prices|
|c. Business cycle risk|
|d. Volume risk|
|Table B .2 .4 . (cont’d)|
|Nature of risks||Particulars|
|e. Service incentive scheme risk|
|f. Asset redundancy risk|
|Collection risk||a. Credit risk|
|b. Bad debt risk|
|Entrepreneurial risk||a. Risk of loss associated with capital investment|
|b. Single customer risk|
|c. Risk of losing human capital intangible|
|General business risk||a. Risk related to ownership of property|
|b. Risk associated with the exploitation of a business|
|c. Inflation risk|
|Country/regional risk||a. Political risk|
|b. Security risk|
|c. Regulatory risk|
|d. Risk related to government policies|
B.126.96.36.199. It should be emphasized that this list is purely illustrative, and that the extent to which each of these risks (or other risks not listed above) is economically significant and contributes to the creation of value depends on the industry and on the taxpayer-specific circumstances. Hence, real life knowledge of how a particular MNE is functioning vis-à-vis its associated enterprise is very crucial in determination of the risk. For instance, not all industries involve the same level of product liability risk.
STEP 2: Contractual assumption of risk
B.188.8.131.52. Once economically significant risks have been identified, the analysis turns to consideration of which party assumes such risks. In this regard, the starting point for the analysis is usually the contractual terms between the parties (STEP 2). Parties transacting at arm’s length would be expected to agree on the allocation of significant risks between them before the outcome of the risk-taking is known.
However, contracts between associated enterprises may not specify the allocation of all the economically significant risks. Most of the commonly assigned risks in the contract are risks which can be mitigated against, for example inventory risk, bad debts, foreign exchange risk etc. Market circumstances, price competition, the supply of raw materials, rises in wages etc. are risks which typically are more difficult to mitigate, and which may not be identified in the contract. Volatility in the global market in the last decade has demonstrated that risks which are difficult to mitigate are often economically more significant than the kinds of contractual risks as mentioned above.
B.184.108.40.206. Moreover, in some cases, written contracts may be inconsistent or may not be followed in practice. For example, in a situation where a contract states that a manufacturer of electronic goods bears warranty risk, but in fact the reseller habitually pays for the cost of customer repairs made under warranty, it is the reseller that is bearing the risk in practice. The determination of the risk assumption between the parties must therefore have regard to the actual conduct of the parties, rather than merely to the legal form of the agreement.
B.220.127.116.11. Even where a comprehensive and consistent contract is in place, an analysis of the conduct of the parties and other facts is critical. In particular, it is important to consider which party or parties control the economically significant risks, and whether a party assigned a risk in fact has the financial capacity to assume it. Both control (see paras B.18.104.22.168. to B.22.214.171.124. immediately below) and financial capacity (see paras B.126.96.36.199. to B.188.8.131.52. below) are necessary for the assumption of risk; but neither of them is by itself sufficient.
STEP 3: Functional analysis in relation to risk
B.184.108.40.206. The next step in the risk analysis process gathers facts on the actual conduct of the parties through a functional analysis. As has been noted above, information relating to the exercise of control over risk and the financial capacity to assume risk are particularly important. This information will then be analyzed in the remaining steps.
Control over risk
B.220.127.116.11. While it may be impossible to eliminate or even influence some risks, economically significant risks are central to the success or failure of commercial operations, and thus commercial enterprises generally devote substantial resources to managing significant commercial opportunities and their inherent risks.
B.18.104.22.168. In a transfer pricing analysis, “control” over a risk has a specific meaning. It is:
1) the capability to make decisions to take on, lay off or decline a risk-bearing opportunity, together with the actual performance of that decision-making function;
2) the capability to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated with the opportunity, together with the actual performance of that decision-making function; and
3) either the performance of risk mitigation functions (i.e. taking measures that affect risk outcomes) or, if risk mitigation is outsourced to another party (whether associated or independent), the capability to determine the objectives of the outsourced activities, to decide to hire the provider of those activities, to assess whether the objectives are being adequately met, and where necessary, to decide to adapt or terminate the contract with the provider; together with the actual performance of such assessment and decision-making.
Example: Clothing Manufacturer
Company X runs a clothing manufacturing facility. It enters into a contract with Company Y to manufacture children’s pyjamas on Y’s behalf. The design and pattern for the pyjamas are provided by Company Y. Company Y also specifies the sizes and number of pyjamas to be produced, as well as timing of production. Company X is required to manufacture the pyjamas to Y’s specifications, including meeting Y’s quality standards and using materials approved by Company Y. Company Y undertakes quality control audits to ensure that the pyjamas produced by X meet those specifications, and provided that is the case, it guarantees to buy all the pyjamas produced by X as specified under the contract. The contract also states that provided X meets the quality control standards set out by Y, the latter will indemnify it against any warranty or compensation claims which may arise from the sale of the pyjamas.
In this example, the economically significant risks are identified as the inventory risk and warranty / product recall risk. In respect of both of these, Company Y has the capability and actually performs the decision making functions regarding what to produce and when, and it sets and actively monitors the quality control standards and other specifications. Y can therefore be said to control these risks.
B.22.214.171.124. Control over risk involves the process of real decision-making. Decision-makers must be able to understand the risk and the impact the decision could have on the business. They must have access to relevant information. If information or analyzes are provided by others, the decision-maker must be able to assess whether the right information has been provided, and whether the analyzes being relied upon are adequate. Without the foregoing, the mere formalization of a decision, for example in the form of the signing of documents or the minutes of a meeting reflecting a decision effectively already made elsewhere, are insufficient.
B.126.96.36.199. The setting of the broad policy framework in which to assess risks is also not enough. For example, the setting by senior management of broad company objectives or a general company ‘image’ would not mean that such senior management control risks relating to specific marketing strategies. Similarly, a requirement to analyze and report on certain risks in a certain way, or in accordance with a particular framework or template does not constitute control over risk for the purposes of a transfer pricing analysis.
Example: Control over Risk by Parent Company
Company A situated in Country Z belongs to an MNE group with operations worldwide through various subsidiaries. Company A is responsible for the overall research programmes of the group. The group has two R&D centres operated by Companies B and C, both subsidiaries of Company A and situated in Countries X and Y respectively. Risks relating to R&D are identified as economically significant (STEP 1).
Company A employs a workforce that includes the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, senior management and technical personnel that provide strategic supervision of the group’s R&D activities. Company A claims that it controls and takes all strategic decisions with regard to the core functions of Companies B and C. The contractual arrangements between the companies support this (STEP 2).
STEP 3 Functional analysis: Company A designs and monitors the MNEs overall research programmes, making the decisions regarding which areas of research to pursue, as well as setting the objectives of the research. Company A establishes a reporting and analysis framework against which Companies B and C must provide information on the progress of the research activities. It also provides funds needed for R&D activities and controls the annual budget for R&D activities of Companies B and C. The CEO, CFO and other senior management personnel of Companies B and C reside in Countries X and Y and are technically and functionally competent to take decisions and carry out the R&D activities of Company B and C, under the overall direction of Company A. The technical manpower needed for R&D activity and the assets of companies B and C are located in Countries X and Y.
Company A claims that it controls the risk of the R&D activities of its subsidiaries. On inquiry, it is found that the personnel managing the group’s R&D activities in Company A in Country Z are experienced and qualified to make decisions on and to monitor the R&D activities of Companies B and C, and that they in fact do so, based on regular reports provided by B and C on the progress of the research, which it evaluates. In addition, Company A has furnished evidence that it has covered the costs of Companies B and C’s R&D activities in all the instances where such activities did not lead to successful outcomes. It was also noted that Companies B and C actually perform R&D functions and take the decisions required for performing the day-to-day functions of R&D.
STEPS 4-6 Analysis and conclusions: In this example, while the actual functions of R&D activities are undertaken in Countries X and Y, Company A contractually assumes the risk related to the ultimate success or otherwise of the R&D activity and has demonstrated that it has the capability to control, and actually controls these risks through its strategic decisions and monitoring activities and through bearing the losses from unsuccessful R&D programmes. Provided Company A has the financial capacity to assume these risks, it will be concluded that Company A assumes the risks associated with the success or failure of the research activity undertaken by Companies B and C. Companies B and C, which perform operational R&D activities and take the decisions necessary to perform these day-to-day functions of R&D and also bear the related operational risk, should be entitled to an appropriate return for these functions and risks.
Company A, which provides the strategic direction and management of the group’s R&D activities, funds the group’s R&D activities and exercises control over the risk of unsuccessful R&D activity, should be entitled to an appropriate return for its functions and risks. Company A should be entitled to the returns from the intangibles (if any) associated with the R&D, less the appropriate returns to Companies B and C.
Example: Control over Risk by Subsidiaries
Company A situated in Country Z, a low-tax/no-tax jurisdiction, belongs to an MNE group having operations worldwide through various subsidiaries. Company B and C, which are both subsidiaries of Company A, operate R&D centres situated in Country X and Y respectively, having normal tax rates. Risks relating to R&D were identified as economically significant (STEP 1). Company A, which employs a workforce of ten persons including a CEO, CFO and other senior management, claims that it controls and takes all strategic decisions with regard to the core functions of companies B and C. The contractual arrangements between the companies support this (STEP 2).
STEP 3 Functional analysis: Company A provides the funds needed for R&D activities and controls the annual budget for such activities of Companies B and C. It also provides technical assistance for registration of patents in Countries X, Y and Z. The CEO, CFO and other senior management personnel of Company B and C reside in Countries X and Y and are technically and functionally competent to take decisions and carry out R&D activities of Company B and C. The technical manpower needed for R&D activity and the R&D related assets of Companies B and C are located in Countries X and Y.
Company A claims that it controls the risk of the R&D activities of its subsidiaries. Upon audit it was found that the CEO and CFO and senior management of Company A in Country Z do not have the technical skills and experience to take strategic decisions regarding the direction of the R&D activities, or to monitor those activities. Company A has not furnished any evidence that it takes strategic decisions relating to the R&D programmes of Companies B and C. On the other hand, it was found that the senior management of Companies B and C are taking the important strategic decisions related to the design and direction of the R&D programme and budget, including determining the objectives of the research and evaluating which areas of research to pursue. However, Company A has furnished evidence that the funds were actually transferred to its subsidiaries for R&D activities.
STEPS 4-6 Analysis and conclusions: In this example all the core functions of R&D activities are located in Countries X and Y and the non-core functions of registering patents are located in Country Z. Even though the senior management of company A are located in Country Z they are not capable of taking strategic decisions or controlling and monitoring R&D activities and do not, in fact, do so. The determination, utilization and control of the budget for carrying out R&D activities and decisions regarding day-to-day performance of R&D activities were carried out by Companies B and C. In view of these facts it cannot be upheld that Company A controls the risk of R&D activities. Company A should be entitled to an appropriate return for the provision of funding and Companies B and C should be entitled to an appropriate return for their functions including the strategic decisions and control over the risk of R&D activities.
Note that in this example, the conclusion would have been the same even if Company A had been a resident of a high tax jurisdiction.
Financial capacity to assume a risk
B.188.8.131.52. Where a risk has materialized it will be a question of fact as to which party bore the consequences. However, since any analysis of risks must take into account temporality (i.e. past risks where outcomes are known are no longer risks at all), it will be relevant to consider whether a party has the financial capacity to assume a risk. Financial capacity to assume risk can be defined as access to funding to take on or to lay off the risk, to pay for the risk mitigation functions and to bear the consequences of the risk if it materializes. Access to funding takes into account the available assets of the party, as well as the options realistically available to it to access additional liquidity, if needed, to cover the costs anticipated to arise should the risk materialize. The consideration of whether an entity has the necessary financial capacity should be done on the basis that it is operating as an unrelated party in the same circumstances as the entity. For instance, if an entity has the right to exploit income-generating assets, it is likely to be able to access liquidity against its income stream.
B.184.108.40.206. It should be noted that the financial capacity to assume the risk is not necessarily the financial capacity to bear the full consequences of the risk materializing (e.g. the full loss): the risk-bearer may have the capacity to protect itself from the consequences of the risk materializing (e.g. by hedging the risk or insuring against the impact of the risk). However, because financial capacity to assume a risk is not by itself sufficient to assume a risk, a high level of capitalization does not necessarily mean that the highly capitalized party assumes the risk.
B.220.127.116.11. It is relevant to mention here that in a multinational enterprise associated entities may work together to exert control over the risks of the entire MNE group. Precise distribution of risk among the associated enterprises may be extremely difficult to achieve. The transfer pricing analysis as to which entity assumes certain risks should therefore be done considering all the facts and circumstances of each case.
STEPS 4-6: Analyzing the information gathered to draw conclusions on assumption of risk
B.18.104.22.168. Steps 4 to 6 of the risk analysis framework analyze the information gathered in the earlier steps to determine the assumption of risk for the purposes of the transfer pricing analysis.
B.22.214.171.124. In cases where the contractual assumption of risk is fully supported by the parties’ conduct, including an alignment with the exercise of control and financial capacity to assume the risk, the analysis will be straightforward. That is, where a party, which is assigned a risk under a consistent contract (i.e. one that is followed in practice) (STEP 4(i)) also controls that risk and has the relevant financial capacity (STEP 4(ii)), it will be regarded as assuming the risk for the purposes of understanding and defining the transaction and pricing it under a TP analysis (STEP 6). The fact that another party also performs control functions or has financial capacity will not affect the determination of the assumption of risk under the transfer pricing analysis. In some cases, risks may be contractually shared by more than one party.
B.126.96.36.199. In other cases, where the contractual assumption of risk is not aligned with the exercise of control or the financial capacity to assume the risk, the analysis will require an additional step (Step 5). That is, where a party is contractually assigned a risk (or is made to actually bear the costs of the risk when it materializes) (STEP 4(i)) but does not control it, or does not have the relevant financial capacity (STEP 4(ii)), it cannot be regarded as truly assuming the risk. Instead, the party which does exercise control over the risk and has the relevant financial capacity should be allocated the risk (STEP 5). If multiple associated enterprises are identified that both exercise control and have the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the risk should be allocated to the associated enterprise or group of enterprises exercising the most control. This allocation of risk is what should be used to define the transaction and price it for transfer pricing purposes (STEP 6). The other parties performing control activities should be remunerated appropriately, taking into account the importance of the control activities performed.
B.188.8.131.52. In exceptional cases, it may be the case that there is no party that both exercises control and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. Such a scenario would rarely occur between independent enterprises and therefore a thorough analysis should attempt to identify the reasons for this. An assessment of the commercial rationality of such a transaction may be necessary (see paras B.184.108.40.206. to B.220.127.116.11. above).
B.18.104.22.168. The assumption of risk based on the analysis above should be compensated with an appropriate anticipated return. Normally, this means that the party or parties assuming the risk will enjoy the potential upside consequences resulting from the playing out of the risk, for example, the profits that result from a successful venture risk; but would also bear the potential downside consequences if the risk materializes resulting in greater costs or lower than expected profits. In a proper transfer pricing analysis, associated enterprises should always be appropriately remunerated for their contributions— the functional analysis considers functions and assets and not only risks. For example, parties performing risk mitigation functions on behalf of an entity assuming risk should be adequately compensated at arm’s length for those functions. Similarly, where a party is performing control functions, this should be taken into account even if it does not assume the risk relating to those control functions. The form of this compensation will depend on the arrangements between the enterprises and the nature of the contribution: it may be appropriate for such a party to share in the potential upside and downside consequences resulting from the playing out of the underlying risk. Alternatively, the contribution might be compensated in a manner that is not contingent on the underlying risk.
B.22.214.171.124. Continuing the example from Paragraph B.126.96.36.199., it is assumed for the purpose of the example that the following are the risks borne by the respective parties.
|Risk Category||Exposure of A Co||Exposure of B Co|
|Product liability risk||It is assumed that A Co faces this risk arising from the product failure, technology absorption by B Co and consequential reputational risk. Further, A Co is primarily engaged in product and technology development so this risk is also borne by A Co.||It is assumed that B Co faces product liability risk as a result of rejection where the products do not conform to the order specification given by domestic power utilities. Risks arising from non-conformity with customer specifications or national/international product standards are borne by B Co. However, this risk is mitigated due to the excellent quality, safety standards and processes deployed by B Co and its own R&D centre.|
|Technology risk||It is assumed that A Co is exposed to higher
technology risk, being the technology owner. Due to market competition and an ever-changing technology scenario, the company needs to continuously upgrade its existing technology and develop new technology. A Co continuously focuses on providing products with contemporary technology.
|It is assumed that the manufacturing operations of B Co are non-complex. Further, product technology and know-how have been provided by A Co. Hence, B Co does not face any major technology risk.|
|Research and development risk||It is assumed that since A Co serves diverse markets, its engineering and R&D professionals constantly strive to provide innovative solutions that offer competitive advantages for customers worldwide.||It is assumed that since no significant R&D (except for supporting B Co’s business and that of providing technical assistance to its
customers) is carried out by B Co, it faces no significant
risk on this account.
|Table B .2 .5: (cont’d)|
|Risk Category||Exposure of A Co||Exposure of B Co|
|Credit risk||It is assumed that in the case of inter-company sales of technology and components A Co faces minimal risk.||It is assumed that all the major credit risks associated with sales are borne by B Co.|
|Inventory risk||It is assumed that A Co is primarily engaged in product and technology
development and this risk is not borne by A Co.
|It is assumed that B Co is responsible to manage the procurement of raw materials/components and maintain the requisite stock levels for each
product including finished goods. However, this risk is mitigated to the extent that components are procured
from A Co.
|Foreign currency risk||It is assumed that A Co exports technology and components to B Co; hence they are also subjected to appreciation/ depreciation of local currency against the foreign currency. Hence A Co is also subjected to this risk.||It is assumed that since B Co imports technology and components from A Co and its sales are restricted to domestic markets, the imports are subjected to
appreciation/depreciation of local currency against the foreign currency. Hence B
Co is subjected to this risk.
Summary of Risks Borne by Each Party
|Category||Level of Intensity|
|A Co||B Co|
|Product liability risk||–||®®®|
|Research and development risk||®®®||®®|
|Foreign currency risk||®®||®®|
Economic circumstances of the transaction
B.188.8.131.52. Economic analysis deals with industry analysis and the circumstances that may be relevant for determining market comparability. The relevant information on the industry can be broadly classified into following:
Ø Global economic trends and developments relating to the industry to which the enterprise belongs;
Ø Economic trends in each taxpayer’s country for the same industry; and
Ø Market position of the enterprise and surrounding economic conditions.
Care must be exercised while considering global economic trends, as the market trends in the taxpayer’s country and in the country of its associated enterprise and/or of the potential comparables (in the case where foreign comparables are used) could be significantly different. For example, in the 2008 global financial crisis some of the banks and automobile companies reported huge losses globally, but significant profits in emerging economies. Where there are such significant differences between the economic circumstances prevailing in different markets such that it is not possible to eliminate them by making reliable comparability adjustments, then companies from such different markets might not be retained as reliable comparables.
B.184.108.40.206. Undertaking a more detailed classification of the above broad headings would yield the following specific factors which may need to be looked at in performing an industry analysis if they are economically significant for the examined controlled transaction:
Ø Geographic location of the market;
Ø Market size;
Ø Level of the market (e.g. retail or wholesale);
Ø Competition in the market and the relative competitive positions of the buyers and sellers;
Ø Availability of substitutes;
Ø Government regulations of the market;
Ø Levels of supply and demand;
Ø Consumer purchasing power;
Ø Location-specific costs of production including the costs of land, labour, capital, transportation costs etc.;
Ø Economic conditions of the overall industry, the key value drivers in the industry and the date and time of transactions;
Ø The existence of a cycle (economic, business, or product cycle); and
Ø Other relevant factors.
B.220.127.116.11. Market prices for the transfer of the same or similar property may vary across different markets owing to cost differentials and/ or differences in purchasing power and habits prevalent in the respective markets which may affect the market price. Markets can be different for numerous reasons; it is not possible to itemize exhaustively all the market conditions which may influence transfer pricing analysis but some of the key market conditions which influence such an analysis are discussed below.
B.18.104.22.168. In general, uncontrolled comparables would first be sought from the geographic market in which the controlled taxpayer operates, because there may be significant relevant differences in economic conditions between different markets. If reliable comparables from the same market are not available, an uncontrolled comparable derived from a different geographical market may be considered if it can be determined that (i) there are no differences between the two markets that would materially affect the price or profit of the transaction or (ii) reasonably reliable adjustments can be made to account for such material differences between the two markets.
B.22.214.171.124. An example of a potential issue relating to geographic location is that of “location savings”, which may come into play during a transfer pricing analysis. Location savings are the net cost savings that an MNE realizes as a result of relocation of operations from a high-cost jurisdiction to a low-cost jurisdiction. Typically, the possibility to derive location savings may vary from one jurisdiction to another, depending for example on the following:
Ø Labour costs;
Ø Raw material costs;
Ø Transportation costs;
Ø Training costs;
Ø Incentives including tax exemptions; and
Ø Infrastructure costs.
It is quite possible that part of the cost savings may be offset at times by “dis-savings” on account of the poor quality and reliability of the power supply, higher costs for transportation, quality control etc. Accordingly, only the net location savings (i.e. savings minus dis-savings) may give rise to an extra profit arising to an MNE due to the relocation of its business from a high-cost to a low-cost jurisdiction.
B.126.96.36.199. The computation of location savings typically involves the quantification of the net cost savings derived from relocating in a low-cost country, as compared to the relevant high-cost country. In theory, the cost savings computation includes selection of a pre-transfer manufacturing or servicing base in the relevant high-cost country compared to the comparable manufacturing or services cost in the low-cost country, taking into account such things as total labour cost per unit of output (adjustment on account of difference in labour productivity), cost of raw material, costs of land and rent costs; tax benefits etc. The cost savings can be partially offset by higher cost of infrastructure such as less reliable power supplies etc. in certain cases.
B.188.8.131.52. Location-specific advantages and location savings are defined as a type of benefit related to geographical location. The relocation of a business may in addition to location savings give some other location-specific advantages (LSAs). These LSAs could be, depending on the circumstances of the case:
Ø Highly specialized skilled manpower and knowledge;
Ø Proximity to growing local/regional market;
Ø Large customer base with increased spending capacity;
Ø Advanced infrastructure (e.g. information/communication networks, distribution system); or
Ø Market premium.
Taken together, location savings and each of the other types of benefit related to geographical location are called location-specific advantages (LSAs). LSAs may play a very important role both in increasing the profitability of the MNE and in determining the bargaining power of each of the associated enterprises. It should be noted that the term LSA includes sources of value that are discussed elsewhere in the Manual, and should not be double-counted in assessing arm’s length outcomes.
LSAs can be measured as follows:
B.184.108.40.206. The incremental profit, if any, derived from the exploitation of LSAs is known as “location rent”. Thus, the term “location savings” represents “cost savings” whereas “location rent” represents the incremental profits derived from LSAs. The value of “location rent” is at most equal to, or less than, the value of LSAs.
B.220.127.116.11. The extent to which LSAs will lead to location rents depends on competitive factors relating to the end product and to the general access to LSAs. It is possible that in a particular case, even though LSAs exist, there are no location rents. For example, in situations in which the market for the end product is highly competitive and potential competitors also have access to the LSAs, much or all of the benefits of LSAs would be passed on to the customers through lower prices of products, resulting in little or no location rent. However, circumstances where extra profits are passed on to customers are varied, and may be permanent or temporary. Where this is temporary, at the end of this period of competition, the MNE may possibly achieve a larger market share in the local market with an increased ability to sell products at a higher price. Alternatively, if an MNE has exclusive access to the LSAs, then the MNE may derive significant location rents associated with the LSAs, as the LSAs reflect a competitive advantage. These location rents may dissipate over time due to competitive pressure, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
B.18.104.22.168. As with the determination of whether location rents exist, the arm’s length attribution of location rents depends on competitive factors relating to access to the LSAs, and on the realistic alternatives available to the associated enterprises given their respective bargaining power. To the extent that competitors would not have access to the LSAs, the relevant question is why this is so. There are a number of possibilities. For example, the MNE could have production intangibles that allow it to manufacture at a lower cost than competitors. At arm’s length, the owner of the intangible would typically be entitled to the rents associated with this cost saving, as it would have a realistic alternative to undertake its production elsewhere at similarly low costs. As another example, it might be that the low-cost producer is the first to operate in the low-cost jurisdiction and there are no comparable low-cost producers in its jurisdiction or other jurisdictions, implying that, for a time at least, it is well-placed to extract a part of the location rents.
B.22.214.171.124. The next question would be the appropriate split consistent with the arm’s length principle. As discussed above, the bargaining power of the associated enterprises which reflects the arm’s length nature of two independent parties negotiating over their respective shares of savings/rents may be well suited as the key metric for this. This can be used to determine the arm’s length surplus (savings/rents) allocations when comparable uncontrolled transactions or benchmarks are not available.
B.126.96.36.199. Government rules and regulations should be treated as conditions of the market in the particular country if they apply in the same way to controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Such rules would include government interventions in the form of price controls, interest rate controls, exchange controls, subsidies for certain sectors, anti-dumping duties etc., and should be taken into account in arriving at an appropriate transfer price in that market. The question becomes whether, in light of these conditions, the transactions between associated enterprises are consistent with comparable uncontrolled transactions between independent enterprises.
B.188.8.131.52. An example of where government rules affect the market is that of certain pharmaceutical formulations, which may be subject to price regulation in a particular country. Another example is Export Oriented Units which may be subject to beneficial provisions under the taxation laws of a country; ideally, companies that enjoy similar privileges should be used as comparables, and if that is not possible, comparability adjustments may need to be made as part of the comparability analysis. Another example is where foreign exchange regulations limit the amounts of the payments that can be made for services or intangibles. However, such regulatory limits may not set arm’s length prices for services or intangibles. For example, assuming that all the transactions are denominated in the same currency, certain countries have restrictions on the payment of interest on external commercial borrowings and the exchange control regulatory requirements authorize the borrower to pay interest at LIBOR plus say 200 basis points. The country of the lender may, however, not agree to use this as a basis for benchmarking the transaction when the lending enterprise itself borrows in its domestic market at a higher rate.
B.184.108.40.206. The market level of the company is another key factor; for example, the price at the wholesale and retail levels would generally differ.
B.220.127.116.11. Other market conditions — some other market conditions which may influence the transfer price include: costs of production (including costs of land, labour and capital); availability of substitutes (both goods and services); level of demand/supply: transport costs; the size of the market, and the extent of competition.
B.18.104.22.168. On a general level business strategies are one of the important factors in a comparability analysis. However, the examination of the legitimate business strategy of an MNE will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The business strategy of an MNE is dependent upon the structural characteristics of an industry. Nonetheless, MNEs with different business strategies do exist within the same industry. In fact, the business strategy of MNEs may differ due to their different global integration — local responsiveness pressure, different corporate histories, internal efficiencies and competitive advantages. Business strategies would take into account many aspects of an enterprise such as innovation and new product development; degree of diversification, risk aversion, assessment of political changes; impact of existing and planned labour laws, duration of arrangements and other factors bearing upon the daily conduct of business. Such business strategies may need to be taken into account when determining the comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions of the enterprises. However, the ultimate objective of a business strategy of an MNE is to improve its market share and/or overall profitability.
B.22.214.171.124. On a strategic level market share improvement strategies considered by MNEs can be divided into the following three main categories depending on the period of their existence in a market:
Ø Market penetration strategy;
Ø Market expansion strategy; or
Ø Market maintenance strategy.
The above market share strategies depend on various factors like market power and the business life cycle of the MNE in a particular market. Market penetration occurs when an MNE is a relative newcomer to a particular market and is seeking to enter and establish its products/ services in the new market. An MNE might actively pursue a market expansion strategy to increase its market share in highly competitive markets. Market maintenance occurs when an MNE has already entered a market and is aiming at maintaining its market share.
B.126.96.36.199. A market penetration strategy may involve a combination of strategies for:
Ø Attracting existing users of a competitive brand to new products; and
Ø Attracting non-users to the product category to which the new product belongs.
B.188.8.131.52. When an MNE pursues a market maintenance/expansion strategy it may focus on combining multiple strategies of:
Ø Attracting users of competitive brands;
Ø Pursuing current users to increase usage; and
Ø Attracting non-users of the product category.
All these three market share strategies use two fundamental tactics:
Ø Lowering the price of their products on a temporary basis by offering discounts on the product to become extremely competitive in the market; and
Ø Increasing their marketing and selling expenses through increased advertisement; sales promotion activities like offering rebates, free samples, offering extended warranties etc. and increased marketing activities such as increasing the number of salespersons, commission agents or distributors and increased payments of commission to distributors.
It may be desirable to isolate the costs related to the pursuit of the above tactics as precisely as possible so that the allocation of costs at arm’s length can be computed.
B.184.108.40.206. Market penetration, market expansion and market maintenance strategies are legitimate business strategies that may involve substantial costs, sometimes resulting in significant losses. Accordingly, there is strong implicit recognition that market share strategies cannot be pursued indefinitely by a taxpayer and there has to be some definite time frame in the foreseeable future when these strategies might yield profits. The allocation of the costs of these strategies between an MNE and its subsidiaries is an important issue in transfer pricing and will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is important to examine the following factors in order to address this issue of cost allocation between parties to the transactions:
Ø Which entity is the initiator of the strategy?
Ø Which entity is the intended beneficiary of the strategy?
Ø Are unusually intense advertising, marketing and sales promotion efforts taking place, since these would provide a signal of market penetration or market share expansion strategies;
Ø What is the nature of the relationship between the related parties, i.e. their responsibilities and risk profile?
Ø Does the strategy involve intangibles? and
Ø Which party is the legal and economic owner of such intangibles?
For example, a limited risk company acting solely as a sales agent with little or no responsibility for market development would generally not bear the costs of a market penetration strategy initiated by its parent company.
B.220.127.116.11. When an MNE enters a new market with its product or expands market share of its product in an existing market through its subsidiary, questions of the creation of marketing intangibles and increases in the value of product-related intangibles such as trademarks, trade names etc. follow closely behind. Therefore, it is important to examine and follow the process of creation of intangibles in a market, as well as the legal ownership of such intangibles and the right to share in the return from such intangibles (the notion which some countries refer to as “economic ownership”). It is recognized that market research; designing or planning products suitable to market needs, advertising, marketing and sales promotion strategies; after-sale services and networks of dealers and sales/commission agents may contribute to the creation of marketing intangibles depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
B.18.104.22.168. When applying the Cost Plus Method, Resale Price Method or Transactional Net Margin Method (see further Chapter B.3.) it is necessary to choose the party to the transaction for which a financial indicator (mark-up on costs, gross margin, or net profit indicator) is tested. The choice of the tested party should be consistent with the functional analysis of the controlled transaction. Attributes of controlled transaction(s) will influence the selection of the tested party (where needed). The tested party normally should be the less complex party to the controlled transaction and should be the party in respect of which the most reliable data for comparability is available. It may be the local or the foreign party. If a taxpayer wishes to select the foreign associated enterprise as the tested party, it must ensure that the necessary relevant information about it and sufficient data on comparables is furnished to the tax administration and vice versa in order for the latter to be able to verify the selection and application of the transfer pricing method.
B.22.214.171.124. Comparable uncontrolled transactions (“comparables”) are of two types:
Ø Internal comparables, i.e. transactions between one of the parties to the controlled transaction (taxpayer or foreign associated enterprise) and an independent party; or
Ø Third-party or external comparables, i.e. comparable uncontrolled transactions between two independent parties, neither of which is a party to the controlled transaction.
B.126.96.36.199. Even though internal comparables may possibly display a higher degree of comparability there is a need to subject inter nal comparables to as rigorous a scrutiny as external ones regarding comparability factors, and to make comparability adjustments when necessary. Use of internal comparables may have advantages but also requires caution as mentioned below; accordingly, this will require careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case.
B.188.8.131.52. The advantages of internal comparables are:
Ø Internal comparables may have a more direct and closer relationship to the transaction under review than external ones due to one party to the transaction being the same and the use of identical accounting standards;
Ø Transaction-specific financial and other information is more likely to be available;
Ø Comparability analysis involving internal comparables may be less expensive for the taxpayer as no public database search is required.
B.184.108.40.206. The potential disadvantage of internal comparables is that they may not necessarily be the best evidence if there are differences, e.g. in transaction volumes, contractual terms, geographical markets and business strategy, which are material and cannot be eliminated through reliable comparability adjustments.
B.220.127.116.11. Internal comparables, where available and reliable, may allow the taxpayer to consider the use of the Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method because it is the most direct method. Internal comparables may also be used with the other recognized transfer pricing methods.
B.18.104.22.168. However, reliable, internal comparables may not exist to cover the scope of the controlled transactions under consideration. Thus, the taxpayer often needs to examine external sources of potential comparable transactions among third parties.
Third-party comparable/external comparable
B.22.214.171.124. There are two types of third party or external comparable. The first type relates to transactions between two independent parties, neither of which is a party to the controlled transaction. For example, it might be possible to apply the CUP Method based on the price of a comparable product sold under comparable circumstances by uncontrolled pa