Tag: Triple dip

UK vs GE Capital, April 2021, Court of Appeal, Case No [2021] EWCA Civ 534

In 2005 an agreement was entered between the UK tax authority and GE Capital, whereby GE Capital was able to obtain significant tax benefits by routing billions of dollars through Australia, the UK and the US. HMRC later claimed, that GE Capital had failed to disclose all relevant information to HMRC prior to the agreement and therefore asked the High Court to annul the agreement. In December 2020 the High Court decided in favour of HMRC. GE Capital then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal overturned the judgement of the High Court and ruled in favour of GE Capital. HMRC-v-GE CAPITAL 2021 ...

UK vs GE Capital, December 2020, High Court, Case No [2020] EWHC 1716

In 2005 an agreement was entered between the UK tax authority and GE Capital, whereby GE Capital was able to obtain significant tax benefits by routing billions of dollars through Australia, the UK and the US. HMRC later claimed, that GE Capital had failed to disclose all relevant information to HMRC prior to the agreement and therefore asked the High Court to annul the agreement. The High Court ruled that HMRC could pursue the claim against GE in July 2020. Judgement of the High Court The High Court ruled in favour of the tax authorities. UK vs GE 2021 COA 1716 ...

Netherlands vs X B.V., December 2020, Supreme Court (Preliminary ruling by the Advocate General), Case No 20/02096 ECLI:NL:PHR:2020:1198

This case concerns a private equity takeover structure with apparently an intended international mismatch, i.e. a deduction/no inclusion of the remuneration on the provision of funds. The case was (primarily) decided by the Court of Appeal on the basis of non-business loan case law. The facts are as follows: A private equity fund [A] raised LP equity capital from (institutional) investors in its subfund [B] and then channelled it into two (sub)funds configured in the Cayman Islands, Fund [C] and [D] Fund. Participating in those two Funds were LPs in which the limited partners were the external equity investors and the general partners were Jersey-based [A] entities and/or executives. The equity raised in [A] was used for leveraged, debt-financed acquisitions of European targets to be sold at a capital gain after five to seven years, after optimising their EBITDA. One of these European targets was the Dutch [F] group. The equity used in its acquisition was provided not only by the [A] funds (approximately € 401 m), but also (for a total of approximately € 284 m) by (i) the management of the [F] group, (ii) the selling party [E] and (iii) co-investors not affiliated with [A]. 1.4 The equity raised in the [A] funds was converted into hybrid, but under Luxembourg law, debt in the form of preferred equity shares: A-PECs (€ 49 m) and B-PECs (€ 636 m), issued by the Luxembourg mother ( [G] ) of the interested party. G] has contributed € 43 million to the interested party as capital and has also lent or on-lent it approximately € 635 million as a shareholder loan (SHL). The interested party has not provided [G] with any securities and owes [G] over 15% interest per year on the SHL. This interest is not paid, but credited. The SHL and the credited interest are subordinated to, in particular, the claims of a syndicate of banks that lent € 640 million to the target in order to pay off existing debts. That syndicate has demanded securities and has stipulated that the SHL plus credited interest may not be repaid before the banks have been paid in full. The tax authority considers the SHL as (disguised) equity of the interested party because according to him it differs economically hardly or not at all from the risk-bearing equity (participation loan) c.q. because this SHL is unthinkable within the OECD transfer pricing rules and within the conceptual framework of a reasonable thinking entrepreneur. He therefore considers the interest of € 45,256,000 not deductible. In the alternative, etc., he is of the opinion that the loan is not business-like, that Article 10a prevents deduction or that the interested party and its financiers have acted in fraudem legis. In any case he considers the interest not deductible. According to the Court of Appeal, the SHL is a loan in civil law and not a sham, and is not a participation loan in tax law, because its term is not indefinite, meaningless or longer than 50 years. However, the Court of Appeal considers the loan to be non-business because no securities have been stipulated, the high interest is added, it already seems impossible after a short time to repay the loan including the added interest without selling the target, and the resulting non-business risk of default cannot be compensated with an (even) higher interest without making the loan profitable. Since the interested party’s mother/creditress ([G] ) is just as unacceptable as a guarantor as the interested party himself, your guarantor analogy ex HR BNB 2012/37 cannot be applied. Therefore, the Court of Appeal has instead imputed the interest on a ten-year government bond (2.5%) as business interest, leading to an interest of € 7,435,594 in the year of dispute. It is not in dispute that 35,5% of this (€2,639,636) is deductible because 35,5% of the SHL was used for transactions not contaminated (pursuant to Section 10a Vpb Act). The remaining €4,795,958 is attributable to the contaminated financing of the contaminated acquisition of the [F] Group. The Court of Appeal then examined whether the deduction of the remaining € 4,795,958 would be contrary to Article 10a of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act or fraus legis. Since both the transaction and the loan are tainted (Article 10a Corporate Income Tax Act), the interested party must, according to paragraph 3 of that provision, either demonstrate business motives for both, or demonstrate a reasonable levy or third-party debt parallelism with the creditor. According to the Court of Appeal, it did not succeed in doing so for the SHL, among other things because it shrouded the financing structure behind [G], in particular that in the Cayman Islands and Jersey, ‘in a fog of mystery,’ which fog of mystery remains at its evidential risk. On the basis of the facts which have been established, including the circumstances that (i) the [A] funds set up in the Cayman Islands administered the capital made available to them as equity, (ii) all LPs participating in those funds there were referred to as ‘[A] ‘ in their names, (iii) all those LPs had the same general partners employed by [A] in Jersey, and (iv) the notification to the European Commission stated that the Luxembourg-based [H] was acquiring full control of the [F] group, the Court formed the view that the PECs to [G] had been provided by the [A] group through the Cayman Islands out of equity initially contributed to [B] LP by the ultimate investors, and that that equity had been double-hybridised through the Cayman Islands, Jersey and Luxembourg for anti-tax reasons. The interested party, on whom the counter-evidence of the arm’s length nature of the acquisition financing structure rested, did not rebut that presumption, nor did it substantiate a third-party debt parallelism or a reasonable levy on the creditor, since (i) the SHL and the B-PECs are not entirely parallel and the interest rate difference, although small, increases exponentially through the compound interest, (ii) the SHL is co-financed by A-PECs, whose interest rate ...

UK vs General Electric, July 2020, High Court, Case No RL-2018-000005

General Electric (GE) have been routing financial transactions (AUS $ 5 billion) related to GE companies in Australia via the UK in order to gain a tax advantage – by “triple dipping†in regards to interest deductions, thus saving billions of dollars in tax in Australia, the UK and the US. Before entering into these transactions, GE obtained clearance from HMRC that UK tax rules were met, in particular new “Anti-Arbitrage Rules†introduced in the UK in 2005, specifically designed to prevent tax avoidance through the exploitation of the tax treatment of ‘hybrid’ entities in different jurisdictions. The clearance was granted by the tax authorities in 2005 based on the understanding that the funds would be used to invest in businesses operating in Australia. In total, GE’s clearance application concerned 107 cross-border loans amounting to debt financing of approximately £21.2 billion. The Australian Transaction was one part of the application. After digging into the financing structure and receiving documents from the Australian authorities, HMRC now claims that GE fraudulently obtained a tax advantage in the UK worth US$1 billion by failing to disclose information and documents relating to the group’s financing arrangements. According to the HMRC, GE provided UK tax officers with a doctored board minute, and misleading and incomplete documents. The documents from Australia shows that the transactions were not related to investments in Australian businesses, but part of a complex and contrived tax avoidance scheme that would circulate money between the US, Luxembourg, the UK and Australia before being sent back to the US just days later. These transactions had no commercial purpose other than to create a “triple dip†tax advantage in the UK, the US and Australia. HMRC are now seeking to annul the 2005 clearance agreement and then issue a claim for back taxes in the amount of $ 1 billion before interest and penalties. From GE’s 10 K filing “As previously disclosed, the United Kingdom tax authorities disallowed interest deductions claimed by GE Capital for the years 2007-2015 that could result in a potential impact of approximately $1 billion, which includes a possible assessment of tax and reduction of deferred tax assets, not including interest and penalties. We are contesting the disallowance. We comply with all applicable tax laws and judicial doctrines of the United Kingdom and believe that the entire benefit is more likely than not to be sustained on its technical merits. We believe that there are no other jurisdictions in which the outcome of unresolved issues or claims is likely to be material to our results of operations, financial position or cash flows. We further believe that we have made adequate provision for all income tax uncertainties.” The English High Court decision on whether the case has sufficient merit to proceed to trial: “150. For the above reasons, I refuse the application to amend in respect of paragraphs 38(b) and 38(e) of APOC and I will strike out the existing pleading in paragraph 38(e) of APOC. I will otherwise permit the amendments sought by HMRC insofar as they are not already agreed between the parties. Specifically, the permitted amendments include those in which HMRC seeks to introduce allegations of deliberate non-disclosure, fraud in respect of the Full Disclosure Representation, a claim that the Settlement Agreement is a contract of utmost good faith (paragraphs 49B and 53(ca) of APOC) and the claim for breach of an implied term (paragraphs 48 and 49 of APOC). 151. As to paragraph 68(b) of the Reply, I refuse the application to strike it out. To a large extent this follows from my conclusion in relation to the amendments to the APOC to add allegations of deliberate failure to disclose material information. In GE’s skeleton argument, a separate point is taken that paragraph 68(b) of the Reply is a free-standing plea that is lacking in sufficient particulars. I do not accept this: there can be no real doubt as to which parts of the APOC are being referred to by the cross-reference made in paragraph 68(b)(ii). 152. The overall result is that, while I have rejected the attempts to infer many years after the event that specific positive representations could be implied from limited references in the contemporaneous documents, the essential allegation which lay at the heart of Mr Jones QC’s submissions – that GE failed to disclose the complete picture, and that it did so deliberately – will be permitted to go to trial on the various alternative legal bases asserted by HMRC. I stress that, beyond the conclusion that there is a sufficient pleading for this purpose, and that the prospects of success cannot be shown to be fanciful on an interlocutory application such as this, I say nothing about the merits of the claims of deliberate non-disclosure or fraud.” UK-vs-GE-2020 ...

Netherlands vs X B.V., July 2020, Supreme Court (Preliminary ruling by the Advocate General), Case No ECLI:NL:PHR:2020:672

X bv is part of the worldwide X group, a financial service provider listed on the US stock exchange. At issue is deductibility of interest payments by X bv on a € 482 million loan granted by the parent company, US Inc. In 2010 the original loan between X bv and US Inc. was converted into two loans of € 191 million and € 291 million granted by a Luxembourg finance company in the X group, to two jointly taxed subsidiaries of X bv. According to the Dutch Tax Authorities, the interest payments on these loans falls under the provisions in Dutch art. 10a of the VPB Act 1969 whereby interest deductions are restricted. The Court of appeal disagreed and ruled in favor of X bv. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court by the tax authorities. In a preliminary ruling, the Advocate General advises the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal. According to the Advocate General, X bv is entitled to the interest deduction. The conditions of the loans are at arm’s length. Taxpayers are free in their choice of financing their participations, including choosing financing arrangements based on tax reasons. The loans have not been taken out on the basis of non-business (shareholder) motives. Nor is it important that the interest deducted in the Netherlands is also deducted in the US and France (under the Dutch provisions applicable in the years of the disputed transactions). Click here for translation ECLI_NL_PHR_2020_672 ...